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A CONSTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM
Michael C. Dorfand CharlesF. Sabel*
In this Article, ProfessorsDorf and Sabel identif a new form of government, democratic experimentalism, in which power is decentralized to
enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge tofit solutions
to their individual circumstances, but in which regional and national coordinating bodies require actors to share their knowledge with others facing
similar problems. This information pooling, informed by the example of
novel kinds of coordinationwithin and amongprivatefirms, both increases
the efficiency of public administration by encouraging mutual learning
among its parts and heightens its accountability through participation of
citizens in the decisions that affect them.
In democratic experimentalism, subnational units of government are
broadlyfree to set goals and to choose the means to attain them. Regulatory
agencies set and ensure compliance with nationalobjectives by means of bestpracticeperformance standardsbased on information that regulated entities
provide in return for the freedom to experiment with solutions they prefer.
The authors argue that this type of self-government is currently emerging in
settings as diverse as the regulation of nuclearpower plants, community policing, procurement of sophisticatedmilitary hardware,environmental regulation, and child-protective services.
The Article claims further that a shift towards democratic experimentalism holds out the promise of reducingthe distance between, on the one hand,
the Madisonian ideal of a limited government assuredby a complex division
of powers and, on the other hand, the governmental reality characteristicof
the New Deal synthesis, in which an all-powerful Congress delegates much of
its authority to expert agencies that are checked by the courts when they infringe individual rights, but are otherwise assumed to act in the public interest. ProfessorsDorf and Sabel argue that the combination of decentralization
and mutual monitoring intrinsic to democratic experimentalism better protects the constitutionalideal than do doctrines offederalism and the separation of powers, so at odds with current circumstances, that courts recognize
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the futility of applying them consistently in practiceby limiting themselves to
fitful declarationsof their validity in principle.
For example, conventional administrativelaw imposes externaljudicial
checks on administrativeagencies, obligingjudges to choose between superficial scrutiny offormal proprieties and disruptive, indeed often paralyzing,
inquiry into what an idealized agency might be expected to do. By contrast,
democratic experimentalism requires the social actors, separately and in exchange with each other, to take constitutional considerationsinto account in
their decisionmaking. The administrative agency assists the actors even
while monitoring theirperformance by scrutinizing the reactions of each to
relevant proposals by the others. The courts then determine whether the
agency has met its obligations tofoster and generalize the results of this informationpooling. Agencies and courts alike use the rich record of the parties'
intentions, as interpretedby their acts contained in the continuing, comparative evaluation of experimentation itself In the administrativeand related
settings, the aim of democratic experimentalism is to democratizepublic decisionmakingfrom within, and so lessen the burdens on ajudiciay that today
awkwardly superintends the every-day workings of democracyfrom an external vantage point.
Finally, the Article reconceptualizes constitutional rights. Relying in
this and other regards on ideas associated with early-twentieth-century
American pragmatism, the Article treats disagreements over rights as principally about how to implement widely shared general principles. Under the
heading of "prophylactic rules" and related doctrines, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that there are often a variety of acceptable
remedies for a violation of rights or a variety of acceptable means of achieving a constitutionally mandatedend. The authors arguefor a radicalextension of these doctrines, in which judicial recognition of a general, core right,
permits substantial experimentation about how to implement that right.
They propose institutional mechanisms to facilitate such experimentation.
The authors contend, however, that with rights, as with other constitutionally entrenched principles, means and ends cannot be neatly separated, so
that experimentation at the periphery also redefines the core, ultimately challenging the very distinction between core and periphery.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICAMENT AS PROLOGUE

A. The Crisis
The defining and revolutionary features of American constitutionalism-separation of powers, federalism, and the very idea of a written
Constitution that constrains government-are losing their vitality as organizing principles of our democracy. None functions as originally intended; it is debatable whether any functions at all.
The distress of our constitutional system is of a piece with the rise of
the administrative state in the New Deal and its subsequent disorganization. The emergence of agencies that formulate rules, bring enforcement actions, and adjudicate grievances distanced American government
from the founders' attribution of these powers to separate branches.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's acquiescence to congressional assertions
of a virtually plenary police power, contained within the authority to regulate interstate commerce, displaced the older model of a federal system
with a central government whose powers are sharply limited with respect
to those of the States.
The judicial decisions allowing the expansion of the administrative
state and the extension of national authority were partly a response to
decades of criticism of the Court for interfering with political judgments,
and therefore might have been expected to end that criticism. They did
not, in part because the Warren and Burger Courts soon found themselves embroiled in their own political controversies, but even at its inception, the post-New Deal Court's jurisprudence promised trouble.
Although thatjurisprudence formally respects democracy by deferring to
most political decisions, the decisions to which it defers often look profoundly undemocratic. Thus, constitutionalism after the New Deal and
its familiar revisions of the founding frame-especially the creation of a
"fourth branch" of government,' never freed from the diacritical marks
of tenuous constitutionality, and the effacement of State sovereigntycould be justified only so long as they were self-evidently effective. They
no longer are.
These constitutional perplexities are all the more daunting because
they seem inevitable given two circumstances generally taken as hard facts
of our political life. The first is that our national affairs are too complex,
diverse, and volatile to be governed by lapidary expressions of the public
will-laws of Congress, administrative rules, judicial judgments-that indicate precisely how to dispose of most of the cases to which they will
eventually be applied.
The second is that our national life is so factious that declarations of
sovereign intent general enough to be workable open the way to divergent, often self-interested, interpretations. The more encompassing the
1. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578-79 (1984) (noting that the term
originally applied only to so-called independent agencies).
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legislation (or the broader the delegation of legislative authority to an
administrative agency), the more its application must be guided not
merely by the text of the enactment, but also by reference to the legislators' intention as revealed in the debates attending passage of the law.
Anticipating this, interested groups simply manipulate the discussion that
becomes the legislative history to favor the interpretation they will subse2
quently urge of it.
Even, or perhaps especially, recognition of general constitutional
rights to, say, freedom of speech or equal protection of the laws, quickly
splinters as it travels the long arc from authoritative text to guiding rule
of interpretation. 3 Again and again, general principles that command
respect in the abstract are devalued through contradictory application.
In these circumstances, whatever government does, including efforts to
correct defects of preceding enactments or police its own boundaries,
contributes to its undoing.
Acknowledging these hard facts, many of the Americans most familiar with the operation of our public institutions would save the administrative state, and, in the bargain, reinforce the representative democracy
it serves by having much less of it. When the chief concern is inefficiency,
the remedy is generally fiscal starvation aimed at stopping the state from
doing things that private citizens can do better for themselves. When the
concern, on the contrary, is the worry that free-wheeling delegation of
interpretative authority in the name of efficiency is a menace to democa return to the pristine
racy and the rule of law, the remedy is generally
4
constitutionalism of the founding generation.
These broad and fundamental designs for reform merge in appeals
for a new federalism in which the states appear as virtuous republics.
Smaller and more homogeneous than the nation state, the states are supposed to govern themselves better when nearly alone, while somehow
purging themselves of the taint of localist corruption with which they
2. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
16-18 (1980); Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to
Improve Public Law 81-105 (1997). For an analysis of the legislative process as interestgroup bargaining that predates modem public choice theory, see generally Theodore J.
Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States 42-63 (2d ed.

1979).
3. The existence of "tests" of constitutionality in a variety of areas hardly obscures the
degree to which even agreed-upon texts, such as the First Amendment's prohibition upon
the "Establishment" of religion, U.S. Const. amend. I, take on a cipher-like quality in their
application. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of
"Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 323 (1995) (describing the lack of
stable principles of adjudication in Religion Clause cases).
4. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994) (claiming originalist and textualist support
for the view that the President possesses exclusive authority to superintend execution of
federal law).
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were long associated. 5 These calls reverberate with more elaborate appeals for the decentralization and limitation of national authority by
those who accept the New Deal administrative state as a formal starting
point, but urge, as remedies to the current confusion, judicial self-restraint, changes in the scope of delegation of congressional authority to
administrative agencies, or modifications in the exercise of agency authority. Added to all these conflicting designs for reform is the confusion
created by fragmentary and likewise conflicting successes in realizing
each of them. No wonder the New Deal state and the constitutional understanding on which it rests today lead a ghostly existence: Too present
in daily life and debate to be forgotten in a netherworld, they are nonetheless too yielding when opposed, and too dumbstruck when criticized
to count as more than historical shadows in the battle for their own
survival. 6
B. Proposed Solutions
If the foregoing is alarming, much of the explicitly programmatic
constitutional discussion currently directed to these themes is frankly and
deliberately alarmist. Its premise is that constitutional order and democracy in practice have diverged so substantially and irremediably that we
must choose between them: either the Constitution, or democracy as we
live it.
Self-described originalists (on the Supreme Court, in the universities,
and elsewhere in public life) are moved by abhorrence of an overweening
state to choose a return to the Founders' vision. 7 But between criticism
of particular usurpations and evocation of the distant world in which such
abuses were supposedly prohibited, the originalists offer little or nothing
by way of a program to reconcile the vast activity of the actual administrative state with the discipline they believe it requires.8 Despite their large
restorative ambitions and the intensity of their passion, most originalists
have been careful to talk in the measured tones of insiders in the constitutional bar, preferring careful, apparently technical, commentary on the
5. We address the latest resurgence of federalism in constitutional doctrine, infra Part

VI.
6. See Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 918, 934
(1992) (observing that even New Deal admirer Bruce Ackerman cannot provide a
substantive defense of New Deal institutions).
7. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of
the Law 143-60 (1990) (arguing that constitutional interpretation must seek the text's
original meaning for the enterprise to be legitimate); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3, 37-44
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (same).
8. For example, there appears to be no political support for the abolition of paper
money that a return to the principles of the Founding would entail. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 744
(1988).
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rules of interpretation to programmatic declarations. 9 Their ideas of democracy and constitutional order can be known by inference, if at all.
Their silence leaves others to wonder how the restored federalism they
encourage can avoid the defects that caused Madison himself to recoil
from the localism he knew, and seek protection against oligarchic state
governments in an extended republic.' 0
For theorists of public choice"-experts in the modem sciences of
collective action-the program is "face the facts." They choose democracy over the Constitution. But the democracy they describe does not
merit the name. For, in their science, the very institutions that in the
public mind taint our polity, are depicted as a workable, perhaps optimal,
response to fundamental problems of social choice that threaten the stability of any representative democracy. Without legislative logrolling,
agenda setting by powerful committees or committee chairpersons, and
the apparently ramshackle compromises to which these lead, for example, legislators would chase themselves about in an endless search for majorities, preferring B to A, C to B, and then A to C. Without the figurative
fire alarms of concerned citizens to direct their efforts, congressional
oversight committees would waste their scarce resources in a fruitless attempt to patrol all the activities of administrative agencies. Even the
cacophonous debate that attends complex legislation, and so bedevils the
courts, the administrative agencies, and the public itself, can be rendered
intelligible by a science that instructs us which voices actually do count
12
for democracy to work.
But "face the facts" is not a program for a democracy that insists on
some assurance that measures taken in its name are notjust procedurally
impeccable, but also effective and legitimate. Thus, the public choice
theorists do not say whether the compromises produced by the decision
machinery of the legislative chambers are substantively coherent, let
alone addressed to the needs of the nation. Indeed, if legislation is just a
jumble of proposals that together attract a majority, or, if coherent, re-flects first and foremost the logic of congressional decisionmaking, why
should the public and courts defer to it either as an expression of the
democratic will or as the promise of an effective solution? Reverence for
what works without regard to constitutional foundations appears as impractical as reverence for constitutional foundations in disregard of
practicality.
Alongside these calls for hard choices, there is less urgent, more
knowing commentary: now critical, now apologetic or justificatory in
9. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 7, at 37-41 (describing how originalists supposedly use
historical sources).
10. See The Federalist No. 10, at 83-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
11. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 547
(1983).

12. See generally Mashaw, supra note 2 (offering a qualified defense of the public
choice view of the legislative process).
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tone, but always so willing to understand our dilemmas that it risks resignation to them. The critical tones in this discussion are sounded by those
who carry forward in constitutional law the program of unmasking law as
politics, central to American Legal Realism and its successor, Critical
Legal Studies. 13 But when the constitutional bench itself worries openly
about the prospects of its politicization, this unmasking seems more like
Schadenfreude than the analytic foundations of reform.
The moralists and philosophers, who take the American Constitution
to be the nearest thing we know to an embodiment of the deep principles
14
of liberal social order, sound justificatory rather than critical themes.
In part by reinterpreting the categories of liberalism itself in light of constitutional experience, and in part by reforming constitutional law in light
of our deeper philosophic understanding, we can improve the good work
that our history bequeaths.' 5 Perhaps this view of current dilemmas
would seem less self-absorbed and more attentive to the institutional turmoil of the age if it did not culminate in the claim that our confusions
would soon be revealed to be mere misunderstandings-if only judges
would think more like philosophers.
At its most comprehending, beyond criticism and apology, the
corpus of constitutional commentary becomes, literally, a list of all the
inevitable and irreducible tensions in our constitutional life, and the ties
that lead, cyclically, from one to another. 16 But the very idea of a taxonomy of constitutional dilemmas underscores the assumption that in the
end unites restorationists, public choice theorists, moralists, and critics:
There is a fixed set of answers, each with equally fixed limits, to all the
large questions raised in alarmed debate.
C. Limitations of the Existing Categories
What is missing in constitutional discussion, and in legal reflection
more broadly, is an effort to rethink American constitutionalism and the
design of our representative democracy in the light of those urgent
doubts about the possibilities of democratic government in an age of
complexity, and with attention to the principles of constitutional design
that inform our democratic traditions. The genius of American constitutionalism has been its ability to synthesize and resynthesize, as circumstance demanded, two contrary understandings of democracy articulated
13. See generally Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law (1988) (critiquing most approaches to constitutional interpretation).
14. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law. The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 34 (1996).
15. Thus, some moralists don the garb of originalists, at least in claiming that their
progressive vision of constitutionalism is rooted in historical acts of consent. See Bruce
Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 154-56 (1991). For an analysis of Ackerman as
moralist-cum-originalist, see Sherry, supra note 6, at 933.
16. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 114 (1991).
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at the time of the French and American Revolutions. 17 The first understanding is deliberative and aimed at the good of all in abstraction from
the diversity of everyday affairs. The second is calculative, aimed at the
good of each as measured by success in the most diverse practical activities.' 8 The current impasse in constitutional design derives from the limits of these underlying, mutually defining conceptions, not a misstep of
synthesis; a fresh advance, correspondingly, will depend on reconceptualizing deliberative democratic choice in relation to modem practical
affairs.
The first understanding, inspired by the ideal of the Greek polis and
the North Atlantic tradition of civic republicanism it nourished, sees public decisionmaking as deliberation or reason giving among free and equal
citizens. 19 It sees in legislative debate a form of discussion in which members, mindful that they are acting for citizens who regard themselves as
free and equal, look beyond the advantage of particular interests to the
common good; majority vote merely formalizes the truth revealed to serene reason by persuasive deliberation. In its pure form, faithful to its
origins in the polis, this conception of democracy is disdainful of the
economy or practical activity in general. The ideal citizen or legislator
sets aside all such distracting entanglements upon entering the place of
public debate, and the lawmalding assembly is so fixed in its attention to
the great matters of state-above all, the measures needed to protect de20
mocracy itself-that it does not stoop to consider them.
The counterview, with antecedents in the clientelistic exchange of
votes for favors in Republican Rome, Whig England, or the early
American Republic, exalts the particulars of self-interest and emphasizes
the vote as an instrument of self-advancement for both citizens and their
representatives. 2 1 The latter solicit the votes of the former by promising
to act to their advantage in politics. Debate and discussion in the legislature or its antechambers discover not the enduring truths of statecraft but
the momentary possibilities of compromise that appease a majority of the
represented interests while securing the positions of their representatives.
17. See generally Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government
102-31 (1997).
18. See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 31-32 (1956); Manin, supra
note 17, at 153-54.
19. See generally J.G. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975).
20. For contemporary invocations of this ideal, see Hannah Arendt, The Human
Condition 194-95 (1958); Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the
Legal Profession 33-34 (1993); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in
Search of a Public Philosophy 130-33 (1996); see generally Jfirgen Habermas, Faktizitft
und Geltung: Beitrige zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats
(1992).
21. See generally Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of
Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 (1969) (reviewing the
reconceptualization of self-interested political action from subversive factionalism to
partisan politics).

276
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Thus, in the traditional contrast, deliberation as reason giving is and can
only be a rarefied activity reserved in effect to an elite of the demos yet
detached from it, while the daily affairs of democracy are carried out almost wordlessly by political merchants buying and selling votes.
The first and fundamental synthesis of these views in American constitutionalism is famously Madison's. For Madison, the rivalries and conflicts resulting from a division of powers between the states and the federal government, among the judicial, executive, and legislative branches,
and within the legislature, between the more deliberative Senate and the
more calculative House of Representatives, would disorient and disorganize factional interests.2 2 This result, in turn, would reduce the chance
that majorities could entrench themselves at the expense of minorities or
that any branch or level of government could usurp the powers of others
or the rights of citizens. Amidst the indecision created by these conflicts,
senatorial deliberation (originally cleansed of the worst dross of particularity by indirect election of Senators) would speak with an authority it
could not claim if any one interest were to predominate. Constitutional
review by a Supreme Court, still further removed from the politics of do ut
des, would defend the ideal of a deliberative republic in those seldom
instances where faction managed to rally itself despite the impediments
of constitutional design. 23 Madison's synthesis was premised frankly on
the idea-reasonable for his day-that society is largely self-governing,
and hence it is better to make a few good laws arduously than to make
24
many laws easily, some almost certainly bad.
The second and current synthesis crystallized during and after the
New Deal. Its premise-which was common knowledge in the years of
the Great Depression-is that the rise of large-scale industry, organized
on mass-production principles so disrupted the preceding local and regional economies into which they intruded that society was no longer, for
practical purposes, self-governing. For one thing, the mass producers
were so large in relation both to other economic actors and to the state
itself that these producers could exercise market power unrestrained by
the normal check of competition or the traditional police powers of a
state that still conceived of economic activity as commercial and agricultural more than industrial. For another, the spread of the mass producers and the employment relations they created undermined traditional
22. See The Federalist Nos. 10 (discussing virtues of an extended Republic in
defusing faction), 47 (discussing the Constitution's inclusion of a principle of separation of
powers) (James Madison).
23. See The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (assuming the Supreme Court's
power ofjudicial review), No. 63 (James Madison) (discussing senatorial deliberation).
24. Madison held this view especially with respect to the federal government. Thus,
his argument in The FederalistNo. 10 for the extended republic should not be mistaken for
an argument for a powerful central government. Indeed, the limits placed on the national
government by the strategy of enumerated powers was, for Madison, essential to his
defense of the 1787 Constitution. See Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James
Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic 209-12 (1995).
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forms of self-insurance and provision for old age, putting vast numbers of
citizens at risk of pauperization.
The precondition of a response was to relax certain rulings of the
Supreme Court that interpreted the Commerce Clause, the Due Process
Clauses, and other constitutional provisions in a way that barred federal
and state regulation of most relevant aspects of economic activity.25 The
innovative resynthesis came through the application and extension of certain principles of mass production to the structure of government itself.
As the problem-solving capacities of the legislature were taken to be limited, Congress was permitted to delegate responsibility for regulating the
economy to agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission,
conceived of as the "board of directors" of the industry under its supervision, or to entities such as the National Labor Relations Board, whose
purpose was to establish a collective bargaining regime within which labor and capital in the mass-production industries could compose their
differences. 2 6 The provision of old-age and other kinds of insurance that
citizens could no longer provide themselves was entrusted to bureaucracies patterned after organizations selling similar types of insurance in the
private sector.
The result was a system more respectful of Madisonian distinctions
than either its critics (aghast at the extension of federal power) 2 7 or its
advocates (exhilarated at the prospect of a government at last with instruments equal to its tasks) 28 imagined. 29 Deliberation was still conceived as
the exceptional task of establishing enduring, not to say everlasting,
frameworks for social action. What did it matter that Congress delegated
its framework-making authority to agencies or boards ifthese delegations
in the end provided stable arrangements by which the concerned parties
could order themselves? This was an accommodation to the new organizational complexity of society itself; indeed, precisely by removing concern for the day-to-day problems of this complexly organized society from
Congress and the state legislatures, the New Deal synthesis honored the
25. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-17 (1941) (sustaining
Congress's very broad view of what effects commerce); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (applying a deferential standard of review to sustain a minimum
wage law for women).
26. See generally James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) (inquiring into
the origins, nature, and potential of administrative process).
27. See. e.g., Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 Tex. L.
Rev. 695, 696-99 (1996) (urging a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause on
originalist grounds).
28. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 15, at 105-30 (celebrating the New Deal as a
"constitutional moment" that radically transformed the pre-existing Constitution).
29. The basic point was made by those who identified political mechanisms that
safeguarded federalism even if the Supreme Court would not. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper,
Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the
Role of the Supreme Court 171-259 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558-60 (1954).
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Madisonian ambition of preserving the dispassionate deliberative power
of the democracy against the entanglements of clienteles and faction.
Although the system of checks and balances now included various forms
of congressional and judicial review of the exercise of delegated authority,3 0 whether the checks and balances disorganized factional interests
sufficiently to allow deliberation to prevail remained an empirical question, as it had been since the inception of the constitutional order.
Today, of course, it is commonplace to see the New Deal synthesis as
inviting, rather than obstructing, the self-serving politicization of regulation and public administration generally. But this view confuses a contingent outcome with a historical inevitability. To be sure, the users of the
new administrative state-firms in regulated industries and beneficiaries
or potential beneficiaries of social insurance and welfare programs-were
quick to game the rules, urging the extensions and exceptions to regulations that suited their interests. But from roughly the New Deal through
roughly the mid-1970s, the new arrangements worked well enough to satisfy the citizenry and suppress questions about the constitutionality of the
synthesis.
When the agencies and bureaucracies did lose the capacity to frame
action within their appointed areas, and came to be seen as manipulated
by those they were meant to regulate, much of their failure was directly
connected to analogous disorientations in private-sector firms and flowed
in large measure from a common cause: the increasing volatility and
complexity of social and economic circumstances. Firms found it increasingly difficult to apply their own uniform routines to increasingly differentiated problems; how could regulatory agencies establish a minimum
uniformity of routines at the level of whole sectors of the economy? If the
firms' halting efforts to adjust to the volatility in their markets led to continual changes in the conditions of employment and the prospects of employability of large parts of the work force, how could government social
welfare and insurance programs premised on the risks, remedies, and inflexible organizational structures of the stable mass-production economy
perform adequately 3 Agencies that held fast to their rules were decried
politically for their rigidity; agencies that made local accommodations to
changing circumstances were suspected of favoritism and caprice. By the
mid-1980s, the accumulation of these grievances changed the debate
about the purpose and prospects of the administrative state. From a dis30. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for one check, judicial review of
agency action. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994). The most potent congressional check, the
legislative veto, was held unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983).
31. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security
Disability Claims 64-68 (1983) (detailing the difficulties of disability programs of the Social
Security Administration in responding to changes in their environment, including changes
in the understanding of disabilities); see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1796-97 (1975) (reporting the
general difficulty of representing, within administrative institutions of the New Deal
settlement, interests that arose subsequently).
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cussion of whether it was possible to limit the extension of entitlements,
emerged a new debate about government's capacity to translate its general responsibilities to regulate economic and social life and protect vulnerable citizens into rules and social services worth their price.
Disorder brought forth partial correctives that disavowed the institutional premises of the New Deal synthesis without providing an alternative synthesis, and begot, in consequence, more disorder. As Congress
and the executive, for example, came to doubt the fidelity of administrative agencies to sovereign purposes, each began to disregard the very limitations of its own decisionmaking capacities that had given rise to the
administrative state, and attempted to achieve directly what it could no
longer achieve through delegation. Thus, Congress increasingly resorted
to detailed statutes to limit the interpretive latitude of agencies. 32 The
executive, with its own agenda, subjected administrative rulemaking to
review by new, highly centralized agencies whose purpose was to determine if particular rules conformed to that agenda-often phrased in
terms of a cost-benefit analysis. 3 3 On the legislative side, the increased
complexity of statutes and their accompanying reports invited interest
groups to manipulate the legislative record. At the same time, centralized executive review increased the bargaining power of the executive as
against the quasi-independent agencies. However, the same bureaucratic
centrality that gave the new monitoring agencies their power cut them off
from the information they would need to use that power for any end
more deliberate than decreasing the volume of regulation.
Meanwhile, two convergent developments have embroiled the
Supreme Court in the disorganization of the national administrative
state, with the result that the Court's own judgments have often become
as confused and contentious in their detailed application as have congressional enactments or general administrative policies. The first is the triumph of the legal realist adage that much of law is politics. As a result,
the sententious claim that it is decidedly the province of the judiciary to
say what the law is, 3 4 has come to be seen as the exception to a more
general principle of judicial acquiescence to political judgment-even
when, as in the case of administrative interpretations of statutes,
majoritarian principles arguably provide greater support for judicial intervention than acquiescence.35 Against this background, occasional ju32. For a pessimistic assessment of this phenomenon and related congressional

responses to judicial rules of construction that take an oversimplified view of the legislative
process, see James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 26-40 (1994).
33. For a critical assessment of this process in the Bush-Quayle administration, see
Malcolm D. Woolf, Clean Air or Hot Air?: Lessons from the Quayle Competitiveness
Council's Oversight of EPA, 10 J.L. & Pol. 97, 101-04 (1993).

34. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
35. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984). For analysis of this principle, see Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in
the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev.
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dicial invocations of the importance of checks and balances or state sovereignty appear to be little more than formalism, 6 as all actors understand
the deep truth that the Court would not dare disrupt the deeply en8 7
trenched features of the post-New Deal order.
Cases such as INS v. Chadha, which invalidated a unicameral legislative veto on the grounds that it violated the Constitution's prescription
for lawmaking,38 shed harsh light on a constitutional reality at once unassailable and manifestly at odds with itself. Thus, some commentators puzzled how delegation of lawmaking authority by Congress to one legislative
chamber could be less constitutional than delegation of comparable powers to administrative agencies.8 9 For others, however, the more obvious
and troubling question was just the opposite: How, given Chadha's seemingly straightforward rule, could the delegations to administrative agencies be lawful?40 Yet critics who voiced this objection went unheard. On
matters of structure, the Court and its defenders have made their peace
with modem reality-however uneasy or unprincipled that peace may be.
The second aspect of the Court's entanglement in the ongoing constitutional crisis followed directly from its acquiescence in the nationalization of politics by the New Deal. Expansion of federal powers left citizens
looking for a substitute for traditional doctrines limiting the reach of government; at times, the Court was willing to provide these in the form of
guarantees derived from the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 1 Petitions for redress were addressed to the Court, some759, 767-68 (1997); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power
in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 454-55 (1989); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale LJ. 969, 971-72 (1992); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2074 (1990).
36. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 496-502, 516-17 (1987);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Ter Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 78, 97-101 (1995).
37. Thus, for all of the well-founded fear generated by recent Supreme Court
decisions striking down national legislation as too intrusive on state sovereignty, see
discussion infra Part VIA, it should be noted that the Court has gone out of its way to
reaffirm those New Deal era precedents that, in their time, were correctly understood to
establish Congress's virtual (if not quite actual) omnipotence with respect to economic
regulation. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554-57 (1995) (accepting the
authority of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
38. 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
39. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659, 672
(1987); Strauss, supra note 1, at 636-37.
40. See, e.g., Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the
Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 4-11 (1994) (arguing that existing constitutional theories do not justify the
administrative state).
41. Thus, we take issue with the contention that the New Deal revolution in the
Supreme Court was primarily about judicial restraint. But see generally Stephen
Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 483 (1997) (arguing that the New Deal constitutionalism is not especially nationalist).
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times, as in the case of Brown v. Board of Education,4 2 with modest success,
sometimes, as in the case of Roe v. Wade,43 with more contested results.
Whether as reluctant arbiter or rulemaker of last resort, the Court
was no better at connecting shared general principles (for the Court,
those found in constitutional text) to particular applications of those
principles (here, concrete doctrines) than were other branches of government. Efforts to regulate constitutional matters directly produced a
now familiar sequence of principled pronouncement, disagreement over
the application of that principle, and eventual retreat. The Court's recent rediscovery of enforceable federalism-based limits in the Tenth
Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and the general pattern of the
Constitution," seems destined to repeat this sequence, as the Court's
wistful categories collide with the reality of a world economy in which the
global and the local are being connected with startling directness. 4 5
The cumulative result has been, first, a fight over the Madisonian
heritage between two broad camps that include most of the participants
in the constitutional controversies surveyed at the outset, and, then, the
beginnings of a truce as some of the chastened partisans find common
ground at the traditional center of American jurisprudence. On one side
of the dispute are the hard-nosed advocates of minimal government who
maintain that true deliberation in the Madisonian sense is impossible.
This camp includes many of the originalists and theorists of public
choice. They would sacrifice democratic ideals for a constitutional order
that protected liberty at the cost-assuming, as they may not, that it is
indeed a cost-of paralyzing government. The most practical among
them sense that their program has a future on the condition that restoration of the eighteenth-centuy Republic is used as a threat to deter further expansion of the administrative state, perhaps even to reinforce cer46
tain of its weakened structures, and not as a blueprint for disassembly.
On the other side are the heirs to the civic republican tradition.
These are the activists among the moralists and philosophers who would
modify our current order to create an interpretive elite able to deliberate
in Madison's sense. The most practical among them sense that their program has an audience only if the prospective administrative elite, mindful
As even Gardbaum concedes, the federal government exercises greater authority relative to

the states than it previously did. See id. at 486.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (invoking the Tenth
Amendment to prohibit federal commands to state officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that Indian Commerce Clause does not authorize
Congress to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invoking general principles of limited government to limit
scope of Interstate Commerce Clause).
45. See infra Part VI (discussing federalism).
46. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 2, at 201-02 (noting that public choice insights do
not require originalism).
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of the limits of the New Deal, promises to resort to philosophical speculation only in the infrequent cases when all rules of thumb and other modest means fail. 47 Here, too, animating principle dwindles to last resort.
The common ground for the practically minded of both sides is
marked out by the assumptions and categories of the legal process school
that has held sway in American jurisprudence and law teaching in the
post-War period. This school, as developed originally in the works of
Hart and Sacks, takes for granted that the branches of government have
the functions attributed to them as a matter of practical and constitutional necessity.4 8 The task ofjudges and lawyers is to apportion responsibility for deciding a particular case to the branch institutionally best fitted
to the job at hand. The "new" legal process school that emerged in the
late 1970s and early 1980s reaffirmed the integrity of the branches of government, but argued that the rules for assigning institutional responsibility for decisionmaking should be modified to accommodate the growing
49
significance of statutory as against common law.
The newest elaboration of the legal process view makes more modest
assumptions about the capacities of the basic institutions themselves;
hence, it is as much concerned with reducing the total burdens the
branches of government bear together as guarding against the danger
50
that one branch is overtaxed by responsibilities assigned to it by others.
For those approaching the traditional center from origins in civic republicanism, diminished expectations are born of a sense of the limits of the
ultimate powers of theory, and, beyond that, cognition itself. However
virtuous the institutions, they do not allow for the theoretically informed
foresight in deliberation that would be necessary to avoid the welter of
unintended consequences that thwart even the most dispassionate designs for a better republic; institutions limited in the ability to discharge
their own affairs must be sparing in what they expect of others similarly
disabled.
For those approaching the center from origins in public choice, the
institutional infirmities result from a combination of the counterintuitive
perversities both of choosing one of numerous, competing proposals by
majority vote, and the extensive opportunities for rent-seeking concealed
by the forms of deliberation that these perversities, in part, create. 5 1 Respect for these infirmities sets limits on the obligations one institution
may place on another, and so counsels against overzealous application of
47. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 56-57 (1996).
48. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in Making and Application of Law (1958).
49. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 2 (1982); Cass
K. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 411

(1989).
50. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 47, at 56-57; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court,
1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 7 (1996).
51. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 2, at 81-105.
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constitutional checks and balances as a means of restoring pristine government. For both civic republicans and public choice theorists, these
limitations rule out the first-best world of deliberation unambiguously in
the service of the public good, but they do -not, on either view, exclude
the possibility of second-best management, able to do better than current
arrangements precisely because it is no longer enthralled by the idea of
the best. The common hope is that we can learn enough about the limits
of our capacity for collective self-determination to make constitutionally
serviceable use of the current institutions of our democracy.
The assumption that American institutions cannot be fundamentally
improved because of their inherent limitations may well prove no more
durable than the earlier assumption of the legal-process school that those
same institutions were practically invulnerable to disruption because they
were functioning well. How bizarre the assumption that the one feature
of our institutions that remained fixed as they somehow slipped from
unimprovable to incorrigible is their inaccessibility to deliberate alteration! Perhaps the early assumption of institutional inviolability even obscured possibilities for reform that could have reduced the disruption. In
that case, the legal-process idea of taking the institutions for granted becomes a form of self-fulfilling prophecy. Or leaving this possibility to the
side, why not suppose simply that the institutions of government worked
well in the immediate post-War period because by design, or by good
fortune, they fit well with their environment? In time the environment
changed, and the lack of fit explains the poor performance of the institutions. Whatever their defects, assumptions like these are surely as plausible as the notion that, whatever happens, the basic features of our government must remain as they are. Perhaps we have, in fact, no basic choices
in the construction of our governing institutions. But how would we
know unless, abandoning the legal-process assumption that we do not, we
try to conceive what those choices might be?
D. A New Form of Deliberation
To reinvigorate our Madisonian heritage, therefore, we need a new
model of institutionalized democratic deliberation that responds to the
conditions of modern life. Such a reconceptualization must avoid the
presumptions and coyness of an immediate partisanship claiming to
speak for a revolution that speaks for itself. It must also resist the contrary rationalizing impulse that denies the possibility of all innovation by
reducing novelty to a problem of classification in familiar categories or to
new rules for rearranging the familiar furniture of our institutions. The
foundation of this architecture would be a new connection between the
broad pronouncements of the legislature and the courts, and applications of these pronouncements to particular situations. This connection
would have to leave room for experimental elaboration and revision to
accommodate varied and changing circumstances, yet credibly limit the
opportunities for self-dealing that this very openness of necessity seems to
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create. It would have to address both the Madisonian concern about the
self-aggrandizing tendency of government and the equally Madisonian
concern about the menace of oligarchy in the closed communities of
small republics. 52 In addressing these concerns, the design would have to
show the respect for individual rights that, in the American constitutional
tradition, provides crucial protection against both the tyranny of the majority and the tyranny of entrenched interests. Finally, the design would
have to show how the judiciary could protect these rights without paralyzing experimentation or usurping the sovereignty of the democratic
people.
In this Article, we make a first effort to elaborate such an architecture and to show how Congress, the courts, administrative agencies, and
the states would function within the structure it defines. We claim that
many of the elements of this structure have already been established in
the practices of state and local governments, Congress, administrative
agencies, and the Supreme Court, and that its adoption might be accomplished piecemeal by drawing on the available precursors. To illustrate
both the operating principles of the design and the possibility of its incremental realization, we bring it to bear on the recharacterization of the
three central but troubled institutions of American constitutionalism:
federalism, separation of powers, and judicial protection of individual
rights. Within these broad categories, we examine particular controversies, including conflicts of economic interest, the provision of public
services, and disputes over rights arising from moral differences. Our
choice of controversies obliges us to develop a claim that a common set
of experimental methods can be used to define legal boundaries in a
wide variety of contexts. Our aim in introducing the detail required to
address the full range of cases is to exemplify the class of solutions generated by our design principles, and, thus, make them available to an initial,
informed appraisal; we do not aim to provide conclusive answers to particular controversies. A method founded on the generalization of experimental corrigibility would belie itself in proceeding otherwise.
The backdrop of our design is the pragmatist account of thought
and action as problem solving in a world, familiar to our time, that is
bereft of first principles and beset by unintended consequences, ambiguity, and difference. Thus, a central theme of the pragmatism of Peirce, 53
Dewey, 5 4 and Mead5 5 is the reciprocal determination of means and ends.
Pragmatists argue that in science, no less than in industry and the collec52. See The Federalist No. 10, at 83-84 (oligarchy in small republics) (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); The Federalist No. 51, at 322-24 (self-aggrandizing
tendency) (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
53. See generally Charles Sanders Peirce, How To Make Ideas Clear (1878), reprinted
in Pragmatism 26 (Louis Menand ed., 1997).
54. See generally John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Education (1916).
55. See generally George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a
Social Behavioralist (1934).
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tive choices of politics, the objectives presumed in the guiding understandings of theories, strategies, or ideals ofjustice are transformed in the
light of the experience of their pursuit, and these transformations in turn
redefine what counts as a means to a guiding end. Art epitomized for
Dewey the essentials of pragmatist investigation, because in art means become ends, and the relation between them commands attention because
of this immediacy: The picture is constantly reconceptualized in the
painting. 56 Pragmatism thus takes the pervasiveness of unintended consequences, understood most generally as the impossibility of defining first
principles that survive the effort to realize them, as a constitutive feature
action, and not as an unfortunate incident of modern
of thought and
57
political life.
This view of ambiguity of means and ends focuses attention on the
possibilities of improving our ability to respond to shocks to our expectations, rather than on the search for first principles that will be immune to
disruption. The pragmatists understood doubt as the recurrent yet always
surprising breakdown of some of the settled beliefs and expectations
upon which we must depend for active investigation of the world, not as
the expression of a global skepticism about the very possibility of knowledge. Seen as localized breakdowns in our expectations, doubt spurs inquiry into remedial action and reforms conceptions. To emphasize just
how much doubt depends on surprise, and how little on a first principle
of skepticism, the pragmatists urged a simple test: Try to doubt a belief
you hold deeply, and you will discover you cannot.5 8 Thus, pragmatism
guides us in better coming to grips with a circumstance that we have
come to anticipate: That experience will again and again disrupt our
habits and the understandings that rest on them.59
Pragmatism guides us further in characterizing as irreducibly social
the inquiries that doubt prompts. More exactly, because of the ambiguities of means and ends, the early pragmatists argued, the intelligibility
and actionability even to ourselves of our very own utterances and
projects depends on how others interpret and react to them. 60 The collaborative investigation of differences in response to doubt is thus central
to self- and mutual understanding. This view seems addressed to an age
in which the diversity of opinion and situation seem at once to render
56. See John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy 183-84 (1948).
57. Compare most forms of liberalism, and neoclassical economics in particular, in
which ends are fixed once and for all by the wants individuals happen to have, and reason
simply satisfies those wants as far as possible with the available means.
58. See Charles Sanders Peirce, The Fixation of Belief (1877), reprinted in
Pragmatism, supra note 53, at 7, 13.
59. Compare again economics and contemporary social science generally, which
habitually portray behavior and institutions as conducive to or resulting from some selfreinforcing pattern or equilibrium.
60. See generally Mead, supra note 55.
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collective problems almost intractably complex, and yet, perhaps, to pro61
vide a resource for their solution.
Pragmatism guides our project, finally and most directly, because it
cuts across various spheres of human activity. Thus, it qualifies as a candidate for linking breakdowns and emergent solutions throughout public
and private life. As a theory of thought and action through problem solving by collaborative, continuous reelaboration of means and ends, pragmatism suggests that advances in accommodating change in one area
often have extensive implications for problem solving in others. Democracy was the method for reflecting on the connection of means to ends in
social activity. Specifically, for Dewey, it was a method for identifying and
correcting through public debate and action the unintended consequences of coordination among private actors. He was concerned to
know what democracy, so understood, could learn from the methods of
public scrutiny and experimentation by which science discerned and adjusted unworkable ideas about the natural world. 62 Today, when private
solutions often seem to work and public ones often do not, this inquiry,
limited and tentative though it remained, invites us to consider the possibility that the explanation for what we observe may lie not in the intrinsic
features of the public and private spheres, but rather in historically contingent and publicly corrigible differences in the problem-solving methods currently applied in those spheres. 63
The immediate instigation of our design for democracy is a series of
innovations by private firms that suggest institutional devices for applying
the basic principles of pragmatism to the master problem of organizing
decentralized, collaborative design and development under conditions of
volatility and diversity. The innovations, inspired by organizational breakthroughs in Japan, but no longer limited to Japanese firms or those in
close association with them, are a response to markets that have become
so differentiated and fast changing that prices can serve as only a general
framework and limit on decisionmaking. To determine what to make
and how, firms in this new economy must therefore resort to a collaborative exploration of disruptive possibilities that has more in common with
pragmatist ideas of social inquiry than familiar ideas of market exchange.
For instance, to establish initial product designs and production meth61. Compare again economics, which generally assumes that knowledge is public and
available to individuals either for free, when it is common, or at a price, when it is
proprietary-unless it is irretrievably private because lodged, tacitly, in the intuitions and
inarticulate experience of other individuals.
62. SeeJohn Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 166 (1927); Dewey, supra note 56,
at 84-85.
63. Compare yet again, and finally, neoclassical economics and the public choice
school directly influenced by it. These both assume that efficient problem solving is
possible only in markets characterized by competition among firms maximizing profits
given prices. In this view, politics in general and democracy in particular is then just the
realm in which private actors try to influence public choices to correct market outcomes in
their favor.
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ods, firms turn to benchmarking: an exacting survey of current or promising products and processes which identifies those products and processes
superior to those the company presently uses, yet are within its capacity to
emulate and eventually surpass. This benchmarking comparison of actual with potential performance disrupts established expectations of what
is feasible. By casting pragmatic doubt on the advisability of current
methods, benchmarking spurs exploration of the possibilities immediately disclosed and may lead to discovery of entirely new solutions
through investigation of the surprising similarities and differences among
64
various approaches.
Following this initial benchmarking, distinct and effectively independent operating units of the firm, each responsible for one component of the overall project, propose changes to the provisional design
based on the units' respective capacities and take account of implications
for their own activities of the changes proposed by others. The discipline
by which the whole and the parts are elaborated together is called simultaneous or concurrent engineering. Once production begins, breakdowns in
the new routines trigger error-detection and error-correction systems that
correct weaknesses of the design or production process that escaped earlier examinations. Continuous adjustment of means to ends and vice
versa is, as in pragmatism, the means and end of collaboration among the
producers. Moreover, the exchanges of information required to engage
in benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error correction also
allow the independent collaborators to monitor one another's activities
closely enough to detect performance failures and deception before
these latter have disastrous consequences. Because it ties mutual assessments of reliability to joint explorations of capability, we will speak of the
system of collaboration as a whole as learning by monitoring.
The private sector institutions of learning by monitoring suggest a
public sector model of problem solving adapted to a polity in which omnibus, national measures can rarely address the particularities of local experience, yet locales in isolation from one another are unable to explore
and evaluate even the most immediately promising solutions to their
problems. The model requires linked systems of local and inter-local or
federal pooling of information, each applying in its sphere the principles
of benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error correction, so
that actors scrutinize their initial understandings of problems and feasible solutions. These principles enable the actors to learn from one another's successes and failures while reducing the vulnerability created by
64. In this sense, benchmarking makes use of the exploratory power of analogy to
suggest novel recharacterization of the familiar settings by examining the interplay of
similarities and differences that connect them. See Keith J. Holyoak & Paul Thagard,
Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought 19-38 (1995). For a closely related view of the
revelatory power of metaphor, see generally Hans Blumenberg, Shipwreck with Spectator:
Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence (Steven Rendall trans., MIT Press 1997) (1979);
Hans Blumenberg, Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben 55-94 (1981).
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the decentralized search for solutions. The system in which citizens in
each locale participate directly in determining and assessing the utility of
the services local government provides, given the possibility of comparing
the performance of their jurisdiction to the performance of similar settings, we will call directly deliberativepolyarchy.
The chief role of Congress in such a system would be to authorize
and finance experimental reform by states and other subnationaljurisdictions in such broad areas of public action as welfare, vocational training,
or environmental protection. But this authorization would only be
granted on condition that those who engage in the experiment publicly
declare their goals and propose measures of their progress, periodically
refining those measures through exchanges among themselves and with
the help of correspondingly reorganized administrative agencies.
Accordingly, the primary role of courts would be to ensure that subnational experiments fall within the authorizing legislation and respect
the rights of citizens. Judicial standards for both sorts of inquiry would be
defined in part by reference to the possibilities successively revealed in
the experiments themselves. Thus, the price communities must and
should want to pay in this world for the right to experiment is to provide
individuals in their own and other jurisdictions with information to judge
their performance (including the methods by which performance is
judged); this information allows individuals and groups to challenge arrangements they think violate their constitutional and other rights by reference to working alternatives that do not. In this way the vindication of
individual rights encourages mutual learning and vice versa, and judges'
discretion in applying broad principles is schooled and disciplined by actual experimentation with possibilities they could never have imagined.
We call the overall system of public problem solving that combines federal learning with the protection of the interests of the federated jurisdictions and the rights of individuals democratic experimentalism.
Using the novel forms of local participation in service provision as
well as the informative performance comparisons that democratic experimentalism provides, citizens of individual jurisdictions can hold their institutions to account. Looking at the ensemble of results against the
background of changing goals, the electorate as a whole can judge the
overall success of reform efforts. Eventually, this accountability could
give rise to a new local politics of detailed debate on the advantages and
disadvantages of current choices, given possibilities demonstrated elsewhere, as well as a new national politics focused on differing interpretations of the broad patterns of experimental results, and their implications
for redirecting experimentalism and its institutions. Thus, democratic
experimentalism does not pursue the chimera of replacing conflict with
consensus. Its aim, rather, is to change the reasons and evidence produced in public debate, and with them the conditions for participation in
civic life, so that our disputatious democracy is made both more effective
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as an instrument of public problem solving and more faithful to its purpose of assuring the self-determination of free and equal citizens.
E. ConstitutionalInterpretation
We offer the model of democratic experimentalism not as an alternative to the American constitutional tradition but as an interpretation of it.
In doing so, we are mindful ofJohn Hart Ely's observation that a rule of
social order, whatever its virtues, is not a constitutional principle unless
anchored in that tradition. 65 Democratic experimentalism, we claim, is
precisely such a principle: It reinterprets democratic deliberation to advance the Madisonian project of using the institutions of government itself to foster practical cooperation despite the human propensity for opportunism, including especially the abuse of public power for private
ends. It rests, moreover, on the bedrock of respect, associated in
Madison's time with the idea of religious toleration, for diverse, changing
understandings of the world, and the contentious varieties of individual
and group life they inform, as antecedent to and protected by the
Constitution.
In saying this, however, we do not mean to suggest that democratic
experimentalism is solely, or even primarily, a matter of doctrinal reinterpretation to be accomplished without disrupting established institutions.
Nor, on a broader understanding, do we mean to suggest that it is so
exceptionally suited to (the famously exceptional) American circumstances that it is for practical purposes applicable only to them. In both
regards our view is more nearly the opposite. We argue that given the
interlocking institutional changes we propose, certain doctrinal reinterpretations in areas such as federalism and the separation of powers show
the way beyond the current impasse, and bring the process of constitutional interpretation into accord with its Madisonian inspiration-by
which we do not mean a return to the original understanding, but a focus
on experimentation and structure as the keys to both good and limited
government 66 Precisely because of the centrality of institutional change
to our project, we suggest its feasibility by indicating instances, current
65. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
Yale LJ. 920, 949 (1973).
66. Madison's penchant for experiment is well captured by his observation about

lawmaking generally: "All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure

and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
discussions and adjudications." The Federalist No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). As Jack Rakove notes, Madison shared the dominant view among
Federalists of the founding era that "[t]he real interpretation of the Constitution would
occur as decisions taken within government gradually settled its operations in regular
channels." Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 345 (1996). But Madison's understanding of the crucial role of power
allocation led him to believe that "It]he end of constitutional [as opposed to statutory]
interpretation was to determine which branch or level of government possessed the right
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and historical, where public administration anticipates reforms of the
kind proposed, and, more generally, by indicating why the preconditions
for reform may be less demanding than commonly supposed. 67 Conversely, we note cases where the absence of corresponding institutional
reform has vitiated doctrinal innovations of the type we urge. The aim is
to underscore that institutional and doctrinal change require and complement each other in the project of democratic experimentalism, without suggesting that, because the changes are potentially self-reinforcing,
the progress of the project as a whole is somehow automatic.
Similarly, in constructing democratic experimentalism from the
materials of American institutions and constitutional doctrine, we mean
to be offering an extended and, to us, particularly pertinent example of
how a familiar type of representative, constitutional democracy may be
transformed into a novel, directly deliberative one; we do not mean to
suggest American exceptionalism. The principles of direct deliberation
are informed by fundamental and widely diffused changes in the organization of cooperation, and could be connected to a renewed understanding of the concepts of freedom and equality of citizens that form the
68
common heritage of modem constitutional democracies.
In presenting democratic experimentalism and the private sector developments with which it has affinities, we draw contrasts with hierarchically centralized organizations. In describing these latter organizations,
we do not mean to suggest that the industrial or administrative world was
ever in fact governed by a single comprehensive principle. Indeed, on
the regulatory side, we will be at pains to show that many of the entities
and practices that developed under the nominal aegis of the Progressive
Era and the New Deal were in fact guided by principles more congenial
to act in a particular area of governance, and in doing so, to preserve the equilibrium
among institutions that the Constitution intended to establish." Id.
67. In particular, we show how incremental reforms in different jurisdictions can
create the structure that might otherwise be thought to be a precondition for
experimentalism. We call this process bootstrapping,and discuss it infra Part IV.
68. Although we do not pursue the point in detail here, it is worth noting that in
recent years the organs of the European Union have arguably been converging on
experimentalist methods similar to those we propose in the American context. For
example, the European Commission acts very much like a regulatory agency in pooling the
experience of the member states regarding types of regimes, and employs experimentalist
systems of rolling rules of a type we explore below. See Volker Eichener,
Enstscheidungsprozesse in der regulativen Politik der Europfiischen Union 1-41, 332-82
(1997) (unpublished postdoctoral thesis, Ruhr-Universitit Bochum) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Adrienne Heritier et al., Ringing the Changes in Europe:
Regulatory Competition and the Transformation of the State 152-55 (1996) (air pollution
regulation). Similarly, a recent decision of the European Court ofJustice may be used as a
model of experimentalistjudging. See infra text accompanying notes 430-438. Finally, for
a preliminary exploration of directly deliberative polyarchy as a model for an emergent
democracy in the European Union, see generally Oliver Gerstenberg, Law's Polyarchy, 3
Eur. L.J. 343 (1997). These convergent developments do not, of course, imply the
universality of our design principles, but they do suggest that the claims we make in the
American context have the potential for wider applicability.
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to our project than to the principles associated with those periods. (A
similar argument could be developed on the private sector side, although
we will not develop it here.) 69 Furthermore, our sustained argument for
continuing incremental transformation as both a descriptive account of
social developments and a blueprint for reform flies in the face of any
neat periodization. Thus, in the Conclusion, we challenge the leading
epochal account of American constitutionalism precisely because it overemphasizes cataclysm and particular forms of popular mobilization at the
expense of incremental change. Nonetheless, hierarchical organizational
principles have been extraordinarily influential in the architecture of existing institutions. Fighting fire with fire, we aim to propose a set of alternative principles. Therefore, we will refer to "New Deal" institutions
knowing that the appellation is partly misnomer.
In the succeeding parts, we develop our notion of democratic experimentalism and locate it within the American constitutional tradition.
Part II recounts the development and global spread of learning by monitoring in the private sector. Part III explains the ways in which learning
by monitoring can function in the public sector, as democratic experimentalism. Part IV fleshes out the details of democratic experimentalism
by recounting its partial emergence in a diverse group of settings. Part V
then explains how such piecemeal reforms might be integrated into a
new national framework by describing some of the new roles for familiar
institutions within the context of democratic experimentalism.
The final three parts of the Article test and refine democratic experimentalism by showing how it suggests mutually reinforcing solutions to
central dilemmas of constitutional interpretation. In Part VI, we use
ideas about the relation of means to ends that are at the core of democratic experimentalism to derive a model of federalism that specifies limits to the authority that the national legislature should exercise over subnational jurisdictions and conditions on the experimental autonomy of
the latter. Our model suggests criticisms of recent efforts by the Supreme
Court to revive traditional federalism distinctions effaced by the New
Deal, as well as standards for distinguishing those current federal-state
programs that already incorporate principles of democratic experimentalism, from other methods of devolving power from the federal government to the states-such as current welfare reform legislation-that do
not. In Part VII, we propose a democratic-experimentalist resolution to
the delegation problems associated with administrative law and with the
crisis in separation of powers more generally. Finally, in Part VIII, we
explain how democratic experimentalism can be used to guide application of the broad individual rights that the Court finds protected by the
Constitution to particular circumstances, thus relaxing the tension be69. See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Stories, Strategies, Structures:
Rethinking Historical Alternatives to Mass Production, in World of Possibilities: Flexibility
and Mass Production in Western Industrialization 1, 29-33 (Charles F. Sabel &Jonathan
Zeiflin eds., 1997).
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tween the very concepts of entrenched constitutional rights and self-determination by the polity.
II.

CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED ORGANIzAnoNAL

FoRMs

The organizing features of the American economy play an important
role in shaping our governmental institutions, and, beyond that, our
ideas of what public administration and even the democratic public can
do. 70 Thus, the public administration archetypal of the New Deal is
largely patterned on the giant, mass-production corporations that dominated the American economy from the last decades of the nineteenth
century until the last decades of our own. Government improved the efficiency of its own organizations by adopting the corporations' successful
techniques. To monitor and limit the corporations' power in American
life, it created regulatory institutions that meshed with corporate forms. 71
The congruities produced by deliberate imitation and accommodation
were renewed and extended as government recruited successive generations of corporate managers, schooled in the vast private bureaucracies
that dominated the post-War economy, to apply their lessons to the modernization of public administration. To grasp the logic and limits of our
administrative state, we begin, therefore, with a review of the operating
principles of the economic organizations on which it was modeled. To
grasp the possibility of fundamental reform of that state, we show how,
under competitive threat, the corporate model has been so profoundly
transformed as to redefine our very idea of an organization, and thus
enlarge the possibilities ofjoint action in public and private affairs.
The corporations that embodied the idea of efficiency for most of
the last hundred years were centralized, hierarchical, and vertically integrated: Headquarters set goals, and hierarchically ranked, specialized
subunits realized them. As long as they worked, these features were seen
as expressing basic, incontrovertible, and mutually reinforcing principles
of efficiency, governance, and cognition that became synonymous with
72
effective human action.
The first of these principles, efficiency, concerned the division of labor. Adam Smith gave powerful reasons for thinking that a top-of-thewidget maker and a bottom-of-the-widget maker can produce more per
70. To take an example familiar to students of American constitutional law: The
enormous growth in the national economy over the last two centuries may be thought to
justify the concomitant growth of Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568-70 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (describing the evolution of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence during a period of economic expansion).
71. On the affinities between the New Deal regulation of the economy and the
principles of mass production, see Michael J. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second
Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity 73-104 (1984).
72. The classic history of such firms is Alfred D. ChandlerJr., The Visible Hand: The
Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977).
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unit time than two whole-widget makers working separately, and that addition of more and more specialized resources will yield commensurate
increases in productivity. Smith's ideas culminate in the familiar notion
of economies of scale associated with mass production: The greater the
production volume, the lower the unit cost of the product.73 Mass production supposes a superintendent with comprehensive knowledge of
market possibilities and production techniques who will design the product and initiate subdivision of production into specialized tasks, each of
which can be further decomposed by subordinates. Consequently, the
hierarchical firm separates the conception and execution components of
production, centralizing the former at the top of a corporate hierarchy.
The second principle, governance, in many ways a corollary to the
first, concerns the vulnerabilities created by efficient specialization itself.
The more highly subdivided the production of any product, the tighter
the connections among the single components of the production process. Conversely, the less likely it is that any of those components can be
put to use in other production processes. (Consider the example of an
auto-body maker outfitted with the highly specialized equipment to produce at the lowest possible cost all the bodies for a particular make and
model of car.) Owners of highly specialized, complementary resources
cooperate, therefore, at great risk. Whoever invests first in the joint project can be held up by a partner who simply refuses to commit the complementary resources-without which the initial investment is worthless-except under terms more favorable than originally agreed. (The
auto-body maker has no market without the assembler; the assembler has
no product without the supplier.) But the threat of expropriation deters
the initial investor, so the joint project is paralyzed by the prospect of the
vulnerabilities it creates. Vertical integration (the assembler, say, buys the
auto-body maker) is the organizational answer to this danger of
opportunism. If a single owner has exclusive or residual control-the
power to dispose of assets unless their use is otherwise specified by prior
contract-over all phases of production so specialized that there are very
few sellers and buyers of the relevant goods and services, the possibility of
holdups disappears. 74 Possession, through ownership, of these residual
73. See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 7-25 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of

Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
74. The original, most trenchant,

and most general conceptualization of the

firm as

an organizational means for conducting certain types of transactions more efficiently than
can be achieved through markets is due to Ronald Coase. See generally 1H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm (1937), reprinted in The Nature of the Firm 18, 18-33 (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991). The emphasis on the potential costs of
holdups as a central motivation in the choice of vertical integration as against arms-length
dealing is largely due to Oliver Williamson. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and
Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 104-05 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ.,
233, 234, 250-53 (1979). The example in the text of the Article of the takeover of the

auto-body maker by the assembler alludes to key features of the amalgamation of the
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control rights, moreover, arguably helps solve coordination problems
that arise within the resulting integrated firm, for the owner can use the
threat of dismissal to discipline employees who use ambiguities in their
employment contracts for their own benefit at the expense of the enterprise. 75 Thus, the assignment of property rights follows the logic of vertical integration, giving the economy its basic structure and providing a
means for its continuous direction.
The third principle, cognition, is more general; indeed, it largely accounts for the first two. It ties the most basic features of organizations to
the limits of human cognition, and particularly our manifest inability to
perform all the calculations necessary to assess fully the costs and benefits
of the choices plausibly open to us at any moment in anything like the
available time. To act, given this bounded rationality,we must economize
our limited attentiveness by making use of the expedients of habit and
the subdivision of complex tasks into simpler ones. By habit, we take cruFisher Body Corporation into General Motors (GM) in 1926, which is often taken as a
paradigmatic case of vertical integration as a response to duress. See, e.g., B. Klein et al.,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L.
& Econ. 297, 308-10 (1978). Coase himself, however, disavowed any close and general
connection between the boundaries of the firm and efficient transactions, citing the
counterexample of a prominent supplier of auto bodies that retained its independence,
and noting that Fisher Body was already sixty percent owned by GM at the time of its
complete incorporation into the larger firm. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm:
Origin (1988), reprinted in The Nature of the Firm, supra, at 34, 43-46, 71. Moreover, a
recent study by Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel, based on contemporary accounts and
archival sources, argues that GM's paradigmatic takeover of Fisher Body is best understood
in light of the principles of collaborative innovation. See Susan Helper et al., The
Boundaries of the Firm as a Design Problem 8-18 (Nov. 14, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (paper presented to the Meeting on
Make Versus Buy: The New Boundaries of the Firm, Columbia Law School). According to
their findings, GM's main motivation for incorporating Fisher Body was not to foreclose
the possibility of holdups, but to take advantage of Fisher's generally recognized expertise
in developmental collaboration: GM wanted to learn from Fisher how to reorganize itself
to become a better collaborator with its suppliers. The account by Klein et al. asserts that
GM incorporated Fisher Body after Fisher refused to build stamping plants adjacent to GM
assembly facilities for fear of reducing collaboration with other, non-GM customers. The
evidence cited in the study by Helper et al. shows, however, that the Fisher brothers
colocated the stamping plants before 1926, and continued to collaborate with other
automakers, notably Chrysler, before and after that date. Moreover, far from being
excluded from the management of the merger firm, the Fisher Brothers were given
important positions on its key executive committee to take advantage of their expertise in
collaborative supplier relations. See id. The spread of pragmatist institutions of
decentralized coordination described below can thus be considered an empirical
vindication of the Coasean intuition that firms need not select from a familiar set of fixed
organizational models.
75. For the view that possession of residual control rights both structures the economy
and provides principals with an effective means to discipline their agents, see Oliver Hart,
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 6-8 (1995); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 692-93 (1986); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the
Theory of the Firm, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1759-60 (1989).
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cial elements of our situation so for granted that we can reckon with the
assumptions thus made without the need to be attentive to what we are
assuming and how it shapes our further thoughts. By the subdivision of
mental tasks, we break problems down into chunks whose separate solutions are within our cognitive grasp, and which can then be 76fitted together into a comprehensive solution to the original question.
When problems are sufficiently complex as to require collaborative
solutions, the expedients of thought become the very structuring principles of organization that economic consideration already suggests: Centralization and hierarchy are both necessary to partition problems into
manageable chunks. But they also ensure that subordinates, who, by definition, know things their superiors cannot, do not make self-interested
use of their expertise. Routines-the organizational equivalent of habits-likewise do double duty. First, they establish the connections among
the parts and the limits on the operation of each part necessary to maintain the integrity of the whole. Second, the limits set by routines constrain the possibilities for self-dealing that specialization affords. The cognitive gains from hierarchical specialization and routinization, moreover,
are mutually reinforcing. The more routinized a task, the easier it is to
learn (and this, as Smith observed in his analysis of the gains to subdivided labor, explains the almost superhuman dexterity of operators performing simple, repetitive jobs);77 but the more routinized the operations-the more, say, it consists of a few repetitive movements of the
hand-the easier it is to decompose it further. (Smith counted this possibility of further simplification as another source of the efficiency gains of
the division of labor, and suggested it might be accomplished either by
78
attentive workers or "philosophers" specializing in this very task. )
Smith's insights concerning specialization suggest that organizations,
no less than persons, are condemned to a pathos of knowledge. To know
we must specialize; yet in specializing we come to be defined by what we
unknowingly take for granted. Hence, the true price to the organization
of gains through specialization (beyond the risk that a shift in demand
will devalue dedicated equipment) is a kind of institutional self-oblivion. 79 To pursue its ends effectively, the organization must stop inquiring
76. The idea of bounded rationality in relation to routine and division of labor was
introduced contemporaneously, and to great effect, into computer science and
organizational theory by James G.March and Herbert A. Simon. See James G. March &
Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 150-71 (1958). For elaborations of the original ideas,
see generally Herbert Simon, Thinking by Computers (1966), reprinted in Herbert Simon
et al., Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution 55 (Massimo Egidi &
Robin Marris eds., 1992); Decisions and Organizations (James G. March ed., 1988).
77. See Smith, supra note 73, at 11-13.
78. See id. at 13-14.
79. March and Simon were aware of this problem. They imagined its solution to be a
context-sensitive master routine for selecting routines. However, they had little to say
about how such an adaptive master routine could be institutionalized in the setting of
hierarchical organizations. Thus they write, for example:
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why its ends are its ends or why it pursues them as it does. When the
routines become entrenched as the inevitabilities of common sense, the
organization is the prisoner of its history, choosing within the limits imposed by its forgotten initial choices.
Palliatives and partial antidotes exist. The destiny of particular institutions may be contained in their initial choices. But new institutions can
be formed to address new needs; and if they are, the struggle to survive
given scarce resources selects the organizations with routines most suited
to the demands of their environments.8 0 Hence, organizational efforts in
the aggregate are not misdirected even if particular organizations cannot
reorient their activities to accommodate change. Alternatively, anticipating their own congenital rigidity, organizations might establish counterinstitutions, such as research laboratories, whose purpose is to routinize the
creation of knowledge that renews crucial aspects of current routines.
An organization is confronted with a problem like that of Archimedes: in
order for an organization to behave adaptively, it needs some stable regulations
and procedures that it can employ in carrying out its adaptive practices. Thus, at
any given time an organization's programs for performing its tasks are part of its
structure, but the least stable part. Slightly more stable are the switching rules
that determine when it will apply one program, and when another. Still more
stable are the procedures it uses for developing, elaborating, instituting, and
revising programs.
The matter may be stated differently. If an organization has a repertory of
programs, then it is adaptive in the short run insofar as it has procedures for
selecting from this repertory a program appropriate to each specific situation that
arises. The process used to select an appropriate program is the "fulcrum" on
which short-run adaptiveness rests. If, now, the organization has processes for
adding to its repertory of programs or for modifying programs in the repertory,
these processes become still more basic fulcra for accomplishing longer-run
adaptiveness. Short-run adaptiveness corresponds to what we ordinarily call
problem-solving, long-run adaptiveness to learning.
There is no reason, of course, why this hierarchy of mechanisms should have
only three levels-or any specified number. In fact, the adaptive mechanisms
need not be arranged hierarchically. Mechanism A may include mechanism B
within its domain of action, and vice versa. However, in general there is much
asymmetry in the ordering, so that certain elements in the process that do not
often become strategic factors (the "boundaries of rationality") form the stable
core of the organization structure.
. . . Organization will have structure, as we have defined the term here,
insofar as there are boundaries of rationality-insofar as there are elements of
the situation that must be or are in fact taken as givens, and that do not enter into
rational calculations as potential strategic factors. If there were not boundaries to
rationality, or if the boundaries varied in a rapid and unpredictable manner,
there could be no stable organization structure.
March & Simon, supra note 76, at 170-71.
80. For the study of economic organization as the process by which competitive
markets select for organizations with adaptive routines, see generally Richard R. Nelson &
Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). For the view,
central to this school of thought, of routines as the tacit preconditions of action, see
Richard R, Nelson, Routines, in The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary
Economics 249, 249-53 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds., 1994).
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But in attempting to correct the defects of organizations from without,
these devices acknowledge implicitly that they could not be corrected
from within, and so ratify the view that the astonishing accomplishments
of hierarchically specialized institutions are necessarily associated with
the danger of stultification.
During the years of the post-War expansion, these potential cognitive
and economic costs were a wholly theoretical prospect, and so vastly outweighed by the benefits of specialization that these benefits alone came
to be taken for granted as defining the logic of efficiency. But starting in
the mid-1970s, for reasons we will not consider here, the stable markets
for standard goods on which this system of production had rested became fragmented and volatile, and some of the costs of specialization
were suddenly manifest and onerous. 81 In volatile and fragmented markets, the formerly acceptable risk of amortizing the huge initial investment in the design of highly complex products and production systems
required to achieve economies of scale became dauntingly risky. Firms
that responded to foreign competition with bold projects could easily
miss their markets and be left with nothing but write-offs to show for their
temerity. Firms that responded cautiously watched as developments
passed them by. For a time, this Hobson's choice seemed a cruel fact of
nature. Even as foreign firms developed new organizational forms to
compete under the changed conditions, American companies found the
prospect of any production system more efficient than their own so incredible that they attributed the foreigners' success to good fortune (low
wages), guile (dumping), or culture, instead of trying to learn from their
example. Adjustment was therefore delayed or misdirected, for example,
to forms of cost reduction that left the old system intact. But in the last
decade, under continuing competitive pressure, American firms have indeed come to make sense of, increasingly adopt, and even develop an
alternative to mass production that achieves efficiency without paying the
price of forgetful rigidity.
This new kind of firm is federated, not hierarchical and centralized:
Decisions of higher level entities are crucially shaped by the decisions of
their constituent units. They are open, not vertically integrated: Components or services crucial to the final product of one firm can be provided
by independent outside companies, and the firms' internal specialized
producers can provide outsiders with crucial inputs. 82 Such outward differences are the result of distinctive principles of efficiency and govern81. For extended, but still inconclusive treatments of the destabilization and
fragmentation of markets, see Robert Boyer & Jacques Mistral, Accumulation, Inflation,
Crises 124-34 (1978); Piore & Sabel, supra note 71, at 165-93.
82. The best analytic introduction to the differences between hierarchical mass
producers and the Japanese-style, decentralized firm is Masahiko Aoki, Information,
Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy (1988). See also Rosabeth Moss
Kanter, The Future of Bureaucracy and Hierarchy in Organizational Theory. A Report
from the Field, in Social Theory for a Changing Society 63, 83-87 (Pierre Bourdieu &
James S. Coleman eds., 1991); Charles Sabel, Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open
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ance; these, in turn, are rooted in a new understanding of cognitive possibilities that makes routines accessible to deliberate evaluation without
subverting them as guides to normal activity.
The basal unit of the new firm is the team or work group. This unit
has the responsibility to achieve the goals it agrees upon with its collaborators by the means that it determines through deliberation as a group.
Thus, unlike the specialized subordinates in the hierarchy of a mass producer, the work group is free to change its internal organization and to
choose inputs (tools, engineering services, components, and so on) from
within or outside the work group's company. Anticipating this need for
continuous adjustment of internal and external connections, members of
the group will have, or will acquire through training, related but distinct
specialties, as this diversity helps the group adapt to changing circumstances. Because of its autonomy, the work group is for most purposes an
independent firm, whatever its formal legal status.
Coordination of these groups is by the methods of iterated goal setting introduced above. For example, the new-van team in an automobile
firm sets the general performance characteristics of the vehicle it is designing by benchmarking evaluation of the best features of current vans
and the prospects of incorporating innovations under development into
its own design.8 3 It next decomposes these general goals, again by reference to leading examples and comparison of possibilities, into subtasks
such as the design of an engine, transmission, or heating, ventilation, and
air conditioning system, and chooses a specialist team from inside or
outside the parent company to realize each of the initial conceptions.
The separate specialist teams elaborate all the subsystems concurrently, applying to that task the same kind of evaluation of competitors'
successful efforts and developmental possibilities used in the van team's
first round of benchmarking. In addition, they benchmark the planned
capacities of the capital goods, work organization, and other production
methods central to their eventual products to ensure that those employed
will be at least as efficient as the ones used by the most capable competitors. Engine plants, for instance, will compare their prospective performance, measured in units such as person-hours, capital investment, or
square feet of factory space per motor produced, with the actual performance of plants making engines with similar technical specifications at similar production volumes and with similar warranties of reliability.8 4 Units
producing a service rather than a physical product will benchmark the
Labor Markets: Some Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in
a Volatile Economy, in Social Theory for a Changing Society, supra, at 23, 26-30.
83. For a good description of this process with abundant and detailed examples, see
generally Robert C. Camp, Benchmarking: The Search for Industry Best Practices that
Lead to Superior Performance (1989).

84. The example described in this section is drawn from the calculations contained in
a major Midwest motor company's organizational engine design report (confidential

report on file with the authors).
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service:8 5 The purchasing department of the automaker, for example,
will aim to spend no more time and incur no greater costs, in locating
potential suppliers and qualifying them as actually able to perform at the
required levels, than the most proficient purchasing departments in the
same or related industries. 8 6 Then, as groups begin to gain experience in
prosecuting the tasks as originally defined, the initial overall goals are
modified by the methods of simultaneous engineering. 87 Thus, the engine group may find a way to improve its target specifications or to cut
the cost of manufacture if the design characteristics of the transmission
are modified accordingly.
Refinement of the eventual design continues by means ofjust-in-time
or inventoryless production methods and the error-detection and correction methods associated with it. In just-in-time production, parts are supplied to each work station only as needed-ideally, one at a time. 88 This
production method renders disruptions and defects immediately visible.
Breakdowns at one station halt production by disrupting the flow of parts
to downstream operations; defects introduced in one manufacturing step
make it difficult or impossible to accomplish the subsequent ones correctly. To assure the flow of production, therefore, the source of the disruption or defect must be identified in a failure of workmanship or an
imperfection of design or operating organization. Such inquiries typically require tracing long causal chains back to improbable origins by an
insistent series of questions sometimes called the five whys: (1) Why is
machine A broken? Because no preventive maintenance was performed;
(2) Why was the maintenance crew derelict? Because it is always repairing
machine B; (3) Why is machine B always broken? Because the part it machines alwaysjams; (4) Why does thejam recur? Because the part is warped
from heat stress; (5) Why does the part overheat? A design flaw.8 9 Again,
85. See Camp, supra note 83, at 41-42.
86. Discussions with David Nelson, Vice President, Purchasing, Honda of America
Manufacturing, Inc., in Marysville, OH (Nov.-Dec. 1993). Professor Sabel served with
David Nelson on the Committee to Assess Barriers and Opportunities to Improve
Manufacturing at Small and Medium-Sized Companies, organized by the Committee on
Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council. See National Research
Council, Learning to Change: Opportunities to Improve the Performance of Smaller
Manufacturers at iii-iv (1993).
87. For a careful account of the advantages and disadvantages of various methods of
balancing the innovative autonomy of the subunits with the need for integrity of the whole,
see Allen Ward et al., The Second Toyota Paradox: How Delaying Decisions Can Make
Better Cars Faster, Sloan Mgmt. Rev., Spring 1995, at 43, 43-61.
88. Accounts by industrial engineers with substantial roles in, respectively, devising
and refining the just-in-time and related methods are Taiichi Ohno, Toyota Production
System: Beyond Large-Scale Production (1988) and Shigeo Shingo, A Study of the Toyota
Production System from an Industrial Engineering Viewpoint 97-121 (Andrew P. Dillon
trans., Productivity Press 1989) (1981).
89. For a particularly insightful discussion of this and related error-detection
methods, see generally John Paul MacDuffie, The Road to "Root Cause": Shop-Floor
Problem-Solving at Three Auto Assembly Plants, 43 Mgmt. Sci. 479 (1997).
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parallel questions arise for firms or units of firms providing services
rather than manufacturing products.
Thus, error detection and correction, like benchmarking and simultaneous engineering, reveal possibilities for improvement in unexpected
(mis-) connections among the parts of complex endeavors, and the cumulative effect of these results is captured in improvements in the benchmark standards for various processes. Just as benchmarking and simultaneous engineering are often carried out by groups or teams with diverse
experiences, so too is error detection and correction: Without diversity
of experience, a problem-solving group could hardly follow the zigzag
path traced by the answer to successive whys.
These practices, and benchmarking above all, link the performance
of the firm more directly to that of its competitors and collaborators at
any one moment, while establishing a record that provokes and partially
guides discussion of its own overall objectives. Benchmarking can begin
with internal comparisons and investigations. Motor units in the same
corporation can exchange performance data; the purchasing department
asks its customers-internal units and the outside firms supplying themto evaluate the services it provides by measures of their choice. But these
measures can only be first, preparatory steps towards comparison with
others. This next step requires separate companies and units within
these companies to pool data on the actual performance of key processes.
In volatile markets like the current ones, companies cooperate in this
way-often creating industry institutes that provide comparative performance measures of each company's processes, on the condition that the
request be accompanied by a full description of the inquirer's own current results-because no firm can risk assuming that its current
processes, no matter how much they improve on past practice, are competitive, let alone superior. 90
This swelling flood of data leads inevitably to a debate on how best to
channel the information it contains; that debate becomes part of the
broader discussion of the firm's direction and purpose. Once everything
is in principle measurable by comparison, there is no avoiding the questions of what to measure. If the goals of the corporation could be reliably
translated into progress on certain financial measures, and improvement
on these connected to measurable progress on certain benchmarks of
90. One of the most dramatic and consequential instances of such interfirm
benchmarking is the pooling of extraordinarily detailed data on production layouts and
capacities by leading companies in the automobile industry worldwide in the late 1980s.
Japanese managers wanted to show their United States and European counterparts that
their low selling prices resulted from efficient methods rather than the use of sweatshops
or below-average cost dumping. Managers outside Japan wanted to learn more about
Japanese methods, often in the hope of using improved documentation of the efficiency
gains to buttress the case for reform in their own organizations. See James P. Womack et
al., The Machine That Changed the World 244-45 (1990). An example of an industry
benchmarking institute is Venture Economics Investor Services Group (Newark, N.J.) for
venture capital.
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operating activity, the answer would plainly be to focus on the latter. But
under volatile conditions neither step is possible. 9 1 In some situations,
profitability or return on invested capital captures the firm's overall position; in others, growth in market share, expenditures on research and
development as a percent of sales, share of recently introduced products
in the total product mix, product development time, or share of revenues
earned from licensing new techniques may be far more revealing of the
firm's prospects. The relation of any of these measures to particular operating practices is likely to change as well. All this variability entails constant reevaluation of the utility and precise characterization of both summary indicators and the operating measures associated with them.
Reevaluation of performance measures can in turn prompt reconsideration of the larger, strategic purposes they reflect. Therefore, the most
sophisticated of the new firms engage in benchmarking and simultaneous
engineering of the measurement practices of benchmarking and simultaneous engineering themselves. These sophisticated firms use comparisons with measurement practices in related firms as a way of orienting
their own use of measures, and they link changing judgments of what to
measure and how in each subunit with coordinate changes in the
others. 9 2 These deliberations do not suffice to steer the firm under current conditions, but they are increasingly recognized as necessary for it.
The master cognitive innovation of this new type of firm is embodied
in precisely these apparently modest, surprisingly commonsensical institutions. For benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error-detection methods, such as the five whys, are procedures for doing just what
the standard view of effective action says cannot be done given bounded
rationality: routinely questioning the suitability of current routines. The
initial specification of new designs (benchmarking), the concrete realization of these approximations (simultaneous engineering), and their practical application (error detection), occur at just those times when selfinterrogation seems most valuable but most difficult. This timing obligates the actors to search for solutions in a circumscribed space of possibilities (the set of best current or potential designs of any activity entangled in the causes of a certain breakdown). The actors could not have
anticipated the exact contours and contents of these possibilities; thus,
the yield of procedures like the five whys is likely to be unfamiliar and
disconcerting enough to force reevaluation of habitual responses. The
91. See Marshall W. Meyer & Kenneth C. O'Shaughnessy, Organizational Design and
the Performance Paradox, in Explorations in Economic Sociology 249, 250-54 (Richard
Swedberg ed., 1993).
92. See Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard-Measures
That Drive Performance, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 71, 74-75; Robert S. Kaplan &
David P. Norton, Putting the Balanced Scorecard to Work, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct.
1993, at 134, 140-42. For a good case study, see generally Susan Rosegrant, A Measure of
Delight: The Pursuit of Quality at AT&T Universal Card Services (1994) (unpublished case
study nos. C16-94-1219.0 & C16-94-1220.0, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1993)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

new firm is therefore a member of a new class of institutions defined not
by the fixed routines to which they are oblivious, but rather by the routines they use for interrogating and altering their routines (including, of
course, the particular methods of self-interrogation). Think of the new
institutions as pragmatist in that they systematically provoke doubt, in the
pragmatist sense of an urgent suspicion that habitual beliefs are poor
guides to current problems.
Group discussion of problems renders the resulting flood of alternatives tractable. Group discussion meets an immediate objection to problem solving through extensive collaboration rather than hierarchical decomposition of tasks: the geometric explosion of pairwise contacts that
such collaborations might seem to entail. If A must consult first with B,
then with C, and the latter two must then meet by themselves, the sheer
number of consultations is unmanageable unless the group is minuscule.
If, however, the collaborators meet together-a possibility, strikingly, not
contemplated in the theories of bounded rationality-one meeting substitutes for many.
But group discussion does more than economize on participants'
time. 93 It pools the diverse capacities and experiences of its members in
judging the alternatives produced by benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and problem-solving searches. Thus, the new-van team, for example, convokes specialists in engine and transmission design as well as
in styling, marketing, and manufacturing to discuss proposals about the
target market in relation to desired engine performance. Each proposal
illuminates the others, and all are seen in light of the diversified knowledge of the group. The result is that both the group and its members are
enlightened by the interplay of diverse disciplines and projects. Or the
error-correction team convokes specialists in various phases of production, design, and maintenance: At successive rounds of inquiry each specialist's explanation provides a hypothesis to test, helping to evaluate the
plausibility and implications of alternatives, and, in the aggregate, ensuring a sufficiently broad canvass of likely causes. The upshot in both cases
is to reveal possibilities that would remain obscured if those same proposals for new designs or explanations of the causes of disruption were scrutinized one by one, orjointly by a lone evaluator. Think of group problem
solving as complementing the pragmatist search institutions by providing
for the pragmatist collaborative explorations of the ambiguities they
reveal.
This twofold information pooling-of plans or problems on the one
hand and perspectives on the other-yields efficiency gains of a distinc93. Meetings can, of course, create inefficiencies of their own. Without agreed-upon
ground rules, they can be chaotic. Exceedingly strict rules can be perceived as oppressive,
while efforts to enable everyone to have a say can waste everyone's time. Nevertheless, the
spread of work teams in environments more focused on the bottom line than expressive
politics for its own sake strongly suggests that the efficiencies of group problem solving
outweigh their inefficiencies.
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tive kind. Where the hierarchical decomposition of tasks leads to economies of scale, information pooling yields economies of scope: The
greater the variety of projects undertaken, the less costly it is to undertake
yet another variety of those projects. One source of these gains is suggested directly by the cognitive properties of the new institutions. Comparisons among (in part) unfamiliar alternatives (competing designs, various possibilities for realizing these, alternative explanations of the
origins of defects) reduce the likelihood of insular, self-absorbed decisions, while clarifying the implications and thus reducing the risks of discovering costly shortcomings of particular decisions long after they have
been made. A second source of efficiency gains is the self-reinforcing
character of disciplined information pooling itself. Just as decomposition
of tasks facilitates further decomposition, so the methods of collaborative
investigation of ambiguity lead, within and among work groups or project
teams, to increasing facility in the use of those methods and corresponding increases in the scope of alternatives that can be canvassed, and the
depth to which their several implications can be examined.
The cumulative, empirical effect of these efficiency gains is to allow
firms that have mastered the pragmatist disciplines to overturn the verities of the earlier mass-production system, transforming the competing
desiderata of that world into mutually reinforcing attributes of the new
one. Thus, it counted as a truism of mass production that exploration of
many design alternatives hindered timely and rigorous pursuit of any
one. The experience of firms in the personal computer and other technologically sophisticated industries with extremely short product life cycles shows, on the contrary, that pursuit of many alternatives is the best
way to understand the advantages and disadvantages of each, and so contributes to selection of the best current possibilities. The counterintuitive
result is that increasing the range of design alternatives considered at the
start of a product cycle speeds selection of one, and increases the quality of
the choice. 9 4 Think of this as the global scanning advantage of learningby-monitoring firms. Similarly, in mass production a decrease in efficiency was taken to be the price for an increase in quality. Isolated efforts
to increase accuracy seemed inevitably to interfere with the automaticity
of production, reducing the throughput of the system per unit time, and
decreasing productivity. 95 Coordinated efforts to increase accuracy (except as the by-product of the increasing decomposition of tasks) seemed
94. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, High Reliability Organizations Meet High Velocity
Environments: Common Dilemmas in Nuclear Power Plants, Aircraft Carriers, and
Microcomputer Firms, in New Challenges to Understanding Organizations 117, 124-26
(Karlene H. Roberts ed., 1993).
95. William Abernathy describes how, in the 1960s and 1970s, arguments for partial
improvements in large firms were routinely defeated by showing that the benefits they
might produce, however large, were small compared to the collateral costs of replacing
(fully amortized) equipment in other parts of the plant to accommodate the local change.
See William J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the
Automobile Industry 66, 211, 214-16 (1978).
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unmanageably complex. 9 6 But the error-detection and correction meth-

ods of learning by monitoring reveal local defects in the organization of
production that remained hidden under less exigent conditions. Elimination of these defects affords possibilities for raising overall efficiencythrough minimizing downtime due to breakdowns, through the introduction of delicate automation equipment whose operation depends on
maintenance of tight tolerances, and through reduction in the reworking
of botched products-that are simply unavailable in environments more
tolerant of fault. The counterintuitive result is that the higher the quality
97
of the parts of the new system, the greater the efficiency of the whole.
Think of this as the aggregate efficiency effect of local learning by
monitoring.
Pragmatist information pooling provides an alternative solution to
the problem of opportunism as well. That problem arises in mass production, we saw, as a direct consequence of hierarchical specialization.
Resources specific to one project in such a system have only scrap value if
put to another use, and expertise is so fragmented and specialized that
the doings of one actor or group are inscrutable to others. Hence, in
hierarchical firms, vertical integration, possession of residual control
rights by a unitary owner, and the corresponding direction of the integrated enterprise by authority and incentives are a response to the temptations of holdups and deception. The new institutions, in contrast, so
transform the conditions of cooperation that these incitements to trickery do not exist in anything like their accustomed form, and new forms of
trickery can be countered by the very exchanges of information required
for the exploration of ambiguity. The master resource in the new system
is the ability to redeploy resources fluidly, as demonstrated in both the
command of the novel search routines and in the capacity to reuse an
increasingly high percentage of the physical equipment committed to
one project in subsequent ones. The latter is accomplished, for example,
by extensive use of flexible capital equipment that can be reconfigured by
reprogramming the computers that guide its operation and changing
one type of tool-bearing module for another. Moreover, the greater a
work team's command of the search routines and problem-solving disciplines, the more accomplished the team becomes at such redeployment.
The effect is that product-specific resources lose their specificity. "Despecified," in the form of general-purpose assets, they are no longer the
instruments or objects of holdups.
96. Frederick Brooks, argued, for example, that the complexity of computer
operating systems tended toward a natural limit where the costs of coordinating the efforts
of the additional software engineer matched the contribution of that engineer to the
coordinated whole. See Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on
Software Engineering 44-50 (reprinted with corrections 1982) (1975). Brooks managed
the development of the operating system of the IBM 360, the most successful time-sharing
computer of its day.
97. See Ohno, supra note 88, at 40-41.
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The pooling of proposals and perspectives breaks down the distinctions between mutually ignorant specialists, each tempted to exploit the
ignorance of the other. In simultaneous engineering and error correction by the five whys, for example, actors must teach each other important elements of their respective specialties and reveal the logic of their
intentions in order to make themselves comprehensible at all. Where
hierarchy assumes and produces the information asymmetries of mutual
ignorance, learning by monitoring in effect creates an information-synmetricizing machine in which actors must keep one another abreast of
their intentions and capacities in order to advance the one and develop
the other. The assignment of property rights in the sense of rights to
residual control, accordingly, loses its centrality as a structuring and coordinating mechanism for the economy. If the supplier is continuously
helping to modify the customer's equipment to make better use of the
parts supplied (for example, by locating one of its own engineers at the
latter's plant) and the customer reciprocates, then the collaborators are
in effect jointly exercising residual control over the assets pogled in production; or, rather, they are in some sense partners or co-owners.
Thus, in the emerging pragmatist economy, the necessity of collaboration means that the benefits to individuals or teams of holding up production will rarely outweigh the costs. From the older perspective, this
result is as counterintuitive as the results of the new logic of efficiency.
Indeed, so pervasive were fears of holdups in mass production that
habitues of that world initially assumed that Japanese firms braved the
risks of intimate collaboration only because of certain peculiarities of the
Japanese setting, and hence that the Japanese organizational model was
unlikely to thrive outside ofJapan. According to one view, these peculiarities were cultural. Among the obligations of the Japanese to each other
is the duty to forebear from exploiting the vulnerabilities of (Japanese)
partners. The mutual expectation of such forbearance is trust, and in
those few and fortunate places where historically there happens to exist a
culture of trust, that culture, by definition, protects the dealings of those
it embraces from the shadows of opportunism that normally darken transactions among the mutually vulnerable. 98 From another perspective, the
peculiarities of the Japanese were institutional. By a (different) historical
accident, the flexibility of the Japanese economy derived from economic
structures that encouraged long-term collaboration between the factors
of production. Firms with lifetime employment that cannot cut costs by
firing workers have incentives to retrain for new, productive tasks. Banks
monitoring corporate performance are more likely to help a distressed
debtor restructure if there is no prospect of recovering a loan by forcing
liquidation. Economies that could not count on the loyal workforce and
patient capital that these institutions produced could not build the other
98. See Ronald Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism, 34 Brit. J. Soc.
459, 478-81 (1983).
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collaborative institutions at the workplace or in customer-supplier relations that depended on these as foundations. 99 Either way, the prospects
were slight for the diffusion of the Japanese system outside its territory of
origin and those few places with accidental similarities. Nowhere were
the prospects slighter than in the United States, with our culture of individual self-reliance, not mutual trust, labor-market institutions favoring
hire-and-fire strategies (with some corrections for seniority), and corporate monitoring by equity markets with a sharp eye for quarterly results.
But developments have confounded these expectations. Japanesederived organizational methods are now widely practiced in countries
within the developing world'0 0 as diverse as Brazil' 0 ' and Malaysia,' 0 2 as
well as in economically advanced countries as different as Ireland' 0 3 and
Germany.' 0 4 In few places, indeed, have these methods been adopted
with more innovative enthusiasm than in the United States, where they
have spread from automobile, computer, and semiconductor industries
that first came to grips with Japanese competitors adept at their use, to
industries as varied as garments and meat processing.' 05 It is difficult to
measure the precise extent of the diffusion of the new methods.' 0 6 But
99. For a popular version of this general view, see Michel Albert, Capitalism Against
Capitalism 11-19 (Paul Haviland trans., Whurr Publishers 1993) (1991) (comparing U.S.
capitalism to German capitalism). For the institutional view applied to capital markets, see
Michael E. Porter, A Research Report Presented to the Council on Competitiveness,
Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry 3-19 (1992), and to labor
markets and industrial relations, see Thomas A. Kochan & Paul Osterman, The Mutual
Gains Enterprise 19-43 (1994).
100. For overviews of the rapid spread of the new methods to developing countries,
see Raphael Kaplinsky, Easternization: The Spread ofJapanese Management Techniques
to Developing Countries 271-310 (1994); Special Issue, Industrial Organization and
Manufacturing Competitiveness in Developing Countries, 23 World Dev. 1 (John
Humphrey ed., 1995); Raphael Kaplinsky, Technique and System: The Spread ofJapanese
Management Techniques to Developing Countries, in id. at 57.
101. See A Maquina e o Equilibrista: Inovacoes na Industriaautomobilistica Brasileira
(Nadya Araujo de Castro ed., 1995).
102. See Rajah Rasiah, Competition and Governance: Work in Malaysia's Textile and
Garment Industries, 23 J. Contemp. Asia, 3, 11-19 (1993); Rajah Rasiah, Flexible
Production Systems and Local Machine-tool Subcontracting: Electronics Components
Transnationals in Malaysia, 18 CambridgeJ. Econ. 279, 281-85 (1994).
103. See Charles Sabel, Ireland: Local Partnerships and Social Innovation 29-33
(1996).
104. See Michael Schumann et al., Trendreport Rationalisierung: Automobilindustrie, Werkzeugmaschinenbau, Chemische Industrie 13-27 (1994).
105. The Virginia firm Agrometrics provides benchmarking data on production
efficiencies on the raising, processing, and marketing of broilers, turkeys, and hogs. The
firm surveys costs in all aspects of operations. Telephone Interview with Robert Rust,
Program Director, Agrometrics (Feb. 17, 1998).
106. Measurement is difficult precisely because the new firm as described here can be
built through many different sequences of distinct, more or less far-reaching innovations in
areas such as customer-supplier relations, the reorganization of management and the
workforce into project and production teams, new systems for accounting and measuring
the performance of individuals, groups, and business units, and so on. Very many firms in
the United States have demonstrably broken with some aspects of the old practices;
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diffusion in the United States has progressed far enough so that wellinformed proponents of the institutional-limitations view now see our institutions as hospitable to the 'Japanese" system.1 07 Yet there is no evidence that our system of corporate governance has shifted power from
corporate managers (with incentives to boost quarterly earnings) to
banks (supposedly concerned about the firm's long-term fiscal health) or
otherwise encourages patience more than it used to. 10 8 Indeed, there is
however, very few have adopted all the features of the new. Estimating the extent of the
new practices depends, therefore, on ajudgment ofjust how much has to change before a
firm crosses the line from old to new. Thisjudgment in turn will be sensitive to nuances in
the understanding of what, exactly, is innovative in the new methods. Thus, Paul
Osterman finds that 35% of the manufacturing firms surveyed had adopted work teams or
another organizational practice of that sort. See Paul Osterman, How Common Is
Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts It?, 47 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 173, 176-78
(1994). Teixeira and Mishel, referring to the same data, find that only 10% have adopted
three or more of the new practices. See Ruy A. Teixeira & Lawrence Mishel, Whose Skills
Shortage-Workers or Management?, Issues in Sci. & Tech., Summer 1993, at 69, 71-72. A
study of a General Motors assembly plant in Linden, New Jersey, provides a good
description of the persistence of traditional forms despite the intrusion of the new in the
late 1980s. See Ruth Milkman, Farewell to the Factory 137-80 (1997). A more recent, finegrained study of practices in new or modernized steel-rolling mills, on the other hand,
shows much more extensive, though still incomplete, change in the direction of the
discussion above. See Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, Old Dogs and New Tricks:
Determinants of the Adoption of Productivity-Enhancing Work Practices, Brookings
Papers on Econ. Activity, Microeconomics 1995, at 1, 53-55. For the accretion of change
in a single industry in the last decade, see the results of periodic surveys of customersupplier relations among United States auto firms in Susan R. Helper, An Exit-Voice
Analysis of Supplier Relations, in Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency New Perspectives
on Socio-Economics 355,355-72 (Richard M. Coughlin ed., 1991); Susan R. Helper, Three
Steps Forward, Two Steps Back in Automotive Supplier Relations, 14 Technovation 633,
634 (1994).
107. See, for example, Michael Porter's comment on a recent comparison of
governance regimes that presents the Japanese system as "supportive" of lean production
and the American system as "not supportive." See Michael E. Porter, Comment to
Mitsuhiro Fukao, Financial Integration, Corporate Governance, and the Performance of
Multinational Companies 92, 93 (1995). This distinction, Porter finds, is "clearly too
simple," because "[mi]any U.S. companies have adopted lean production and closer
partnerships with suppliers in recent years." Id. Compare Porter's earlier fears that the
time horizon of U.S. markets threatened to limit competitiveness. See generally Porter,
supra note 99.
108. Despite the spectacular dethronement of the CEO with the help of the board
and institutional shareholders at such corporations as General Motors, IBM, AMEX,
Westinghouse, and Apple, formal changes in corporate governance in the United States
have been cosmetic, at most. See, e.g.,Julia Amparano Lopez, CEOs Find That Chums on
the Board Are the Ones Most Likely to Plot a Revolt, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1993, at B1
(describing the pattern of upheaval leading to change at the highest level of these firms).
Thus, a recent representative survey of some 100 directors of major United States
corporations commissioned by the Institutional Investor Project of Columbia University
(which has close ties to the institutional shareholder activists) found that the "vast
majority" of those interviewed dismissed the idea of formally separating the office of CEO
from the office of chairman of the board of directors, and reserving the latter for an
outsider, who would presumably be a better representative of shareholders than the inside
CEO. See Elizabeth MacIver Neiva, The Current State of American Corporate Governance
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much evidence that our industrial relations have become more
"American" than before. 0 9 What accounts for the capacity of the
American economy to adopt the innovations in the absence of the preconditions for doing so?
The short answer is that the construction ofJapanese production systems does not suppose the existence of long-term relations, because the
system produces them in the course of its operation. Their firms' chief
reservation would be fear of engaging an incompetent or unreliable partner. However, the information exchanges intrinsic to learning by monitoring would alert them to this danger before the consequences were ruinous. The same process that allows firms and their internal or external
suppliers to agree on the definition of a subsystem or its components
allows joint evaluation of target prices, target rates of return for collaborating partners, and a target rate of productivity improvement to be expressed in periodic price decreases. 110 Given the targets, simple sharing
rules apportion the gains and losses from superior or inferior performance. For instance, the supplier typically keeps at least half the gains
from innovations leading to productivity increases in excess of the target
30-33 (Feb. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(funded by Institutional Investor Project, Columbia Law School, 1996) . The study found
further that the directors were reluctant even to meet (and infrequently did) with
representatives of institutional investors, and that this reluctance was "tame relative to their
aversion to inviting investors to serve on corporate boards." Id. at 63. The ideal director
for the directors interviewed-the same kind of people who presumably say that the
corporation should be managed in the interest of the shareholders--is, correspondingly, a
person like themselves: the CEO (or, increasingly, the division president) of a large
corporation. See id. at 24. A recent econometric study of the relation between board
composition and corporate performance reinforces the conclusion that the inside
managers are still very much in charge. This study finds that many boards now have
investment, strategic development, and finance committees whose purpose is to evaluate
long-term investment and finance decisions. But, crucially, membership on these
committees is disproportionately left to inside or management directors, presumably the
same people who formulated the plans in the first place, and the higher the percentage of
insiders in these bodies, the (marginally) better the corporate performance. See April
Klein, Firm Productivity and Board Committee Structure 11-17 (Apr. 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Reiew); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance 27-28 (Sept.
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
109. On the potentially disruptive incoherence of American labor law and a project to
reconstruct it in harmony with the transformation of the economy described above, see
Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation:
From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 946-83 (1994)
(proposing new institutions of workplace democracy in light of new organizational
methods); Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1461-96 (1993) (contending that the
Wagner Act reflected a cooperationist model of the workplace, rather than the adversarial
model commonly assumed).
110. On the evolution and structuring principles of the new subcontracting systems,
see generally Toshihiro Nishiguchi, Strategic Industrial Sourcing: TheJapanese Advantage
209-15 (1994); Michael J. Smitka, Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese
Automobile Industry 8-11 (1991).
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rate, with the share declining as the innovation matures. Persistent incapacity to meet price reduction or product-improvement targets despite
continuing, joint efforts to surmount problems is often penalized by stepwise reduction in the supplier's share of the customer's total purchases of
the affected product."' Suppliers that do exceptionally well in one or
more rounds can then be delegated more extensive responsibility in the
codesign of subsequent models; those that do exceptionally poorly will
eventually be dropped from the pool of collaborators. Similarly, workers
could be motivated by the prospect of acquiring general-purpose skills
(especially the ability to work in the new kind of teams) under conditions
where managerial incapacity or bad faith is easily detected, and superior
performance can be rewarded with more responsibility in teamwork.
Another more general way to put the point is to say that learning-bymonitoring systems can be constructed by bootstrapping: the process of
incremental change in which a favorable balance of risks and returns encourages first steps from many diverse starting points, and each move
points the way down one of several paths that eventually leads to a
roughly similar outcome." 2 Thus, a large firm can begin adopting the
new methods simply by establishing various operating units as work teams
or project groups responsible for achieving agreed-upon goals, and rewarding or penalizing them (with, for instance, larger or smaller budgets) according to results. As these teams and groups choose, in turn,
their collaborators from inside and outside the corporation, and adjust
their internal organization accordingly, reorganization proceeds in ways
that could not have been anticipated by central headquarters, yet are consistent with its (developing) purposes.
But accounts of innovations that permit local yet generalizable efficiency increases at little or no institutional risk and under the most varied
111. For data showing that the most successful suppliers to automobile assemblers in

the United States expect their customers to aid them if problems arise, but penalize them
further if the help is unavailing, see Helper et al., supra note 74, at 21-22. RecentJapanese
writings on subcontracting also emphasize the importance of continuous monitoring, with

corresponding incentives, as against trust, as the operative principle of long-term relations.
Thus, in a leading study, Toyota was "reputed to be the assembler with the closest
cooperative relationships with its suppliers." Kazuo Wada, The Development of Tiered
Inter-Firm Relationships in the Automobile Industry. A Case Study of Toyota Motor
Corporation, 8 Japanese Y.B. on Bus. Hist. 23, 47 (1991). It concludes:
[T]hese close cooperative relationships were realized under a system of
evaluations of suppliers by Toyota, which stimulated a competitive spirit among
suppliers. It is not that Toyota vwas not liable to opportunistic exploitation, but
that close cooperative relationships in themselves contain the means for
preventing the occurrence of opportunism. The evaluation system brought into
the close cooperative relationships is the important factor that raised the
percentage of Toyota's reliance on external production and that brought about
the tiered inter-firm relationships.
Id.
112. See Charles F. Sabel, Bootstrapping Reform: Rebuilding Firms, the Welfare
State, and Unions, 23 Pol. & Soc'y 5, 7 (1995).
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background conditions sound too good to be true, and, unqualified, they
are too good to be true. We complete this synopsis of the new collaboradon, therefore, by correcting omissions in the story so far and noting two
limiting concerns in the diffusion of pragmatist institutions.
The first correction concerns the costs of shifting from the old world
to the new. The shift to learning by monitoring, like any large change,
produces winners and losers. But changing things piece by piece, eventually changing everything, makes it much more difficult to establish the
distinction between winning and losing than in the case of punctual,
once and for all changes. Abandoning the familiar system one step at a
time, many will miss the attractive security that is stripped away long
before they catch sight of the novel opportunities they may gain. To continue the automobile example, if the new-van design team prefers an engine which the corporation's engine division cannot manufacture at an
acceptable cost, the designers turn to an outside supplier. If this happens
repeatedly, and the internal unit cannot replace the lost business with
orders from outsiders, its survival is in doubt. If the central engineering
division cannot offer designs for new plants as attractive as those furnished by specialized outside consultancies, it shrinks or is disbanded.
The idea of having to compete again and again to create and maintain a
fragile version of relations, once taken for granted as constitutive of the
work setting itself, is terrifying to managers and blue collar employees
alike.
Concerns of economic security aside, moreover, the reconceptualization of productive activity required to move from the old organization to
the new is itself daunting. Old-style managers are accustomed to making
investment decisions on the assumption that most of the production system is fixed, and therefore that a good investment is one that returns
large savings in production costs per dollar invested, assuming market
conditions continue as in the past. For these managers, the notion of
justifying projects by the cash flow they will likely generate in emergent
markets, essentially without regard to the history of the firm's investments
in related areas, is all but incomprehensible.' 13 For these reasons, the
new methods are typically greeted with skepticism and suspicion by those
habituated to the routines and security of the hierarchical, integrated
corporation, and they are implemented in established firms only under
dire competitive threat.
The second limitation concerns the ability of firms using the new
disciplines to set and implement large-scale objectives. The issue becomes how to monitor the viability of whole lines of businesses or divisions, to make choices among incompatible, long-term development
goals, or to respond to abrupt threats or opportunities facing the corpo113. For current proposals to reform financial reporting on these lines, see American
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, AICPA Special Committee on Financial ReportingUser's Needs Subcommittee (visitedJan. 18, 1998) <http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/
raw/aicpa/dbase/d~index.htrn> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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ration as a whole. As described so far, search routines that detect the
limits of habitual responses to design and operational problems are not
necessarily well suited to answering these kinds of questions. Put as paradox, the potential limit is this: Only agents monitoring the (new) corporation day-to-day-which is to say participating in its routine project selection and evaluation procedures-could know enough of its highly
decentralized operations to correct large errors or grasp transformative
opportunities effectively. But just such agents are discredited when the
errors come to light; traditional outside owners or stakeholders, whatever
bundle of interests they are trying to maximize, simply cannot learn
enough fast enough to be useful, as recent economic experience shows.
Thus, as contingent corporate monitors, the Japanese main banks are
supposed to take control of corporations they finance when sitting managers demonstrate incapacity. But during the current recession, the
banks have not demonstrated much capacity to act on such contingencies, despite several decades of experience with the routines of highly
decentralized decisionmaking. Firms under the banks' supervision have
wasted free cash flow in American style. 11 4 German banks have had notorious difficulties monitoring firms with which they have had long-term
relations as those firms adopt new methods. 115 For its part, the American
shareholder system of monitoring has never failed at the supervision of
Japanese-style corporations for the simple reason that it has not yet had
the chance. Allowing decentralization to proceed produces improved
performance insofar as there are gains from decentralization, but such
improvement is no guarantee that permissive governance conditions are
also suited to early detection of errors in the emergent system. From this
perspective, the differences in the limitations between banks, with their
view of the corporation as a community, and shareholders, with their
vengeful selfishness, are less important than the similarities.
Eventual solutions to the governance problem might extend pragmatist principles to the higher level of monitoring by, for instance, constructing boards of directors or other bodies whose members are at once
inside and outside the monitored unit. Venture capitalists with expert
knowledge of the industries in which firms they finance operate, invest114. For the authoritative current reference on the Japanese banking system, see
generally The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and
Transforming Economies (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994). On the current
difficulties with Japanese bank monitoring, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of
Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73, 81-87 (1995); Curtis J.
Milhaupt, A Relational Theory ofJapanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and
the Rule of Law, 37 Harv. Int'l LJ. 3, 57 (1996).
115. For a thorough and current review of the literature on the retreat of the German
universal (savings and investment) banks from stock ownership and corporate monitoring,
see John Griffin, The Politics of Ownership and the Transformation of Corporate
Governance in Germany, 1973-1995, at 111-27 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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ment bankers with knowledge of coinvestment possibilities in related industries, and managers of related divisions of the same or different companies are all examples of such figures. Their position gives them broad
and constantly refreshed knowledge of the context within which the firm
is operating. This knowledge presumably allows the identification of strategic opportunities or threats, as these emerge in the interplay of internal
project selection, continuing benchmarking of performance measures,
and external change. Strategy would become a joint result of product
design and production." 6 But until such solutions or others are realized,
there is an interregnum in the succession of governance institutions: For
now, advancing forms of co-ownership or partnership in the day-to-day
use of resources coexist uneasily and disruptively with receding forms of
exclusive property which, however vulnerable, are invoked whenever the
new forms fall. So long as the interregnum lasts, the new economic institutions remain incomplete.
Yet for our purposes these costs and fragilities count as so many signs
of the new institutions' vitality. Their rapid diffusion suggests that actors
in the most diverse settings are sure enough of the limitations of organizations premised on bounded rationality and mass production to pay the
enormous costs of adopting an alternative, and convinced enough of the
robustness of a pragmatist alternative to adopt it in part, pending completion of its ultimate architecture. It is rare in history that prudence counsels such recklessness; the current massive and costly rejection of the
known in favor of a promising but manifestly imperfect alternative recalls
in form, if not yet in historical significance, those great innovations that
exemplify and define our deepest ideas of collaboration, as the substitution of leaseholds and other forms of private property for feudal tenure,
of representative democracy for monarchy, and of mass production for
craft.

116. In presenting methodologies for linking operating decisions at the level of
business units to aggregate measures of business performance (qualified to take account of
the complexities noted above), large consulting firms emphasize just this connection
between the everyday and the strategic. For instance, in a brochure marketing a complex
proprietary performance metric called "total shareholder return," the Boston Consulting
Group stresses that "the process of mapping the strategy and resulting value drivers often
has as much benefit as the quantitative analyses of alternative actions or strategies. It serves
as a catalyst for surfacing opinions or assumptions and provides a forum among the
operating management team for gaining consensus on action." Boston Consulting Group,
Inc., Shareholder Value Management: Meeting the Value Challenge 22 (1995). Indeed, at
the limit, "[a] properly designed and implemented value management program... creates
a common language between line and staff, and between corporate and business units. It
provides a clear link between strategy and TSR performance." Id. at 24-25. In Germany,
the extensive reorganization of, in particular, the machine-tool industry in recent years has
led to the emergence of a new corporate form-the management holding-in which a
central and legally defining feature of the holding is the responsibility to draw strategic
conclusions from the operations of federated companies without assuming directive
responsibility for day-to-day decisions. See Griffin, supra note 115, at 132-35.
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But this similarity aside, the new pragmatist institutions are distinct
in blurring the boundaries between public and private organizations
which many of the earlier waves of institutional innovation helped establish. We are familiar with the private economy as, ideally, a realm of competing organizations, each under the control of an exclusive owner who
decides how to maximize profits given prices for goods and services determined by independent, identically motivated decisions of other owners.
In fact, the private sector is often a realm of huge, cooperating organizations under the control of managers responding first and foremost not to
markets, but to the enticements and threats of one another, and only
distantly responsible to absentee equity owners. The modem ideal of the
democratic polity also differs from its practical instantiation. Organizations in the ideal democracy-the state above all-have exclusive jurisdiction in their respective spheres of action. They are controlled by the public, acting through the legislature in response to broad currents of public
opinion as clarified in legislative deliberation. In fact, however, there is
competition among them because their jurisdictions typically overlap,
and they are often controlled by more or less entrenched bureaucratic
interests, sometimes colluding, sometimes contending with shifting factions in the legislature or other oversight bodies. Thus, the actual public
and private sectors look as much like each other as each resembles its
idealization.
Viewed against this backdrop, learning by monitoring transforms
economics and politics, assimilating each to the other, in part by introducing to the one a new variant of features normally associated with the
ideal of its opposite, in part by restoring to both ideal aspects apparently
sacrificed to reality long ago. Thus, we have seen that learning by monitoring "politicizes" the economy by introducing a kind of workplace democracy. Group deliberation in benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error detection become central to all decisions, from
improvements in manufacturing process to redefinition of the measures
and meaning of strategic success. In obliging disputatious yet collaborative evaluation of how diverse potential products will be used in life, of
conflicting ways of making them, and of the contrasting measures of corporate and individual performance, learning by monitoring strips from
economic decisionmaking the veiling technicity of maximization of profits given prices, and thus distributes authority from the "rulers" to the
"people." At the same time, learning by monitoring also restores an aspect of the familiar economic ideal, "(re)privatizing" the corporation by
exposing the internal units of mass-production firms, through
benchmarking, to the competition with external or market suppliers
from which they have long been sheltered.
Next, we want to show that the pragmatist disciplines produce a correspondingly transformative assimilation and restoration when they are
applied to political institutions in the form of democratic experimentalism. They "privatize" political institutions, not by establishing well-
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defined owners-for we have just seen that the very idea of exclusive ownership is losing its clear contours even in the private sector'"17-but rather
by exposing them to the novel "market" of compelling, competitive
benchmarking comparisons with the performance of like entities, and
thus allowing for the substitution of superior service providers for inferior
ones. They also "(re)politicize" political institutions by introducing a
novel form of deliberation based on the diversity of practical activity, not
the dispassionate homogeneity of those insulated from everyday experience. This form of deliberation, we will see, neither depends on consensus nor results in uniformity of view. Rather, it produces workable cooperation by continuously exploring different understandings of means and
ends among those who use, provide, and are affected by government services. Just as the new pragmatist disciplines are creating novel partnerships in the governance of the economy, so their application to politics
may result in new publics and new forms of public control of government
institutions.
III.

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM

The intuitive appeal of applying the pragmatist disciplines to democracy derives from these disciplines' potential to create a form of collective
problem solving suited to the local diversity and volatility of problems
that confound modem democracies, while maintaining the accountability of public officials and government essential to the very idea of constitutional order. In this and succeeding sections, we substantiate this intuition. We start by showing briefly how learning-by-monitoring solutions
are well fitted to the characteristic problems of modem polities as these
appear in the travails of post-New Deal institutions. Then, we construct
the organizational rudiments of local, or, rather, subnational, pragmatist
government, by transposing to the public sphere the institutions of
benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error detection. These
transposed problem-solving institutions, we argue, render public officials
in each locale and the service providers they supervise accountable to the
citizens, while affording the latter the chance to participate directly in
practical deliberations concerning the matters that affect them. These
same institutions, moreover, allow local jurisdictions to learn from one
another. Arguments in any one jurisdiction, and the performance to
which they lead, become considerations in the deliberation of similarju117. From this vantage point, the standard public choice program of reforming
public institutions by subjecting them to literal or figurative private owners with residual
control rights correctly identifies a problem of accountability, but incorrectly assumes that
accountability can only be established on the model of traditional property rights. See
Terry M. Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization, 7J.L. Econ. & Org. 106, 120-26
(1991). Notice that the overly restrictive assumption of this school is the mirror image of
Mashaw's view that public accountability means bureaucracy. See Jerry L. Mashaw,
Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of
Administrative Law, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405, 413 (1996); infra text accompanying note 124.
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risdictions. To catalogue the novel features of these arrangements, we
call the form of democracy thus created directly deliberativepolyarchy."l 8
A. Good Government Under Conditions of Volatility and Diversity
A central lesson of the limitations of New Deal institutions is that
effective government services and regulations must be continuously
adapted and recombined to respond to diverse and changing local conditions, where local may mean municipal, county, state, or regional as the
problem requires. This adaptability is just what the separate, centralized
agencies of the New Deal, and the doctrines authorizing delegation of
rulemaking power to them, lacked. The constant effort to adjust programs, regulations, and doctrines to changing circumstances has been
the agencies' undoing. 1 19
More precisely, and with all the advantages of hindsight, the lesson
of New Deal distress is that the success of any one government program
or regulation depends not only on its local adjustment, but also on the
availability of other, equally well-adjusted services and rules. Successful
training for employability, for instance, must be carefully coordinated not
only with developments in the local labor market, but also with the provision of day-care and family-support services (themselves a composite that
must address problems as diverse as substance abuse, domestic violence,
and foster care), as well as various kinds of social insurance that likewise
reflect the conditions of local life. By the same token, comprehensive
health, occupational, accident, and other forms of social insurance will
be affordable in the long run only if accompanied and informed by local
services that provide the insured with the information and means necessary to reduce the risks to which they are exposed (e.g., preventive
medicine, occupational health and safety measures, and training for
employability).
Looked at this way, effective government is first and foremost local
government; local government itself is a complex service product composed of discrete programs so mutually dependent that difficulties or successes in one may suggest or require changes in the others, or in the
connections among them. From this vantage point, the dilemma of government adaptability is just an instance of the general and apparently
intractable design problem of continuous, mutual adjustment of parts
and wholes to which simultaneous engineering now provides a solution.
But if local knowledge and simultaneous engineering are indispensable to government under diverse and volatile conditions, there is no reason to assume, and many reasons to doubt, that they are sufficient. Lo118. This term and the ideas associated with it are developed in the eponymous
companion piece byJoshua Cohen 8 Charles Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 Eur.
LJ. 313 (1997). For this use of the term polyarchy, see Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its
Critics 221-22 (1989).
119. See, e.g., infra Part V.C.1 (discussing the experience of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration).
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cales may be diverse and changing, but they are not unique. To the
extent that there are similarities in their current situations or the kinds of
changes they face, the efficient search for large improvements to current
practice, or for early warning that apparently promising alternatives are
in fact dead ends, starts with the experience of units facing analogous
problems. Just as discussion of the relation among programs and rules
within a single locale reveals strengths and weaknesses concealed when
each is considered in isolation, so comparison among individual programs' variant rules and methods of coordinating them allows each jurisdiction to see its viewpoints and its proposals in the light of alternatives
articulated by the others. Looked at this way, of course, learning among
locales is an instance of the systematic questioning of routines through
the circumscribed examination of alternatives now formalized in
benchmarking. Beginning with these analogies, we can easily imagine an
open, federated structure for local government that could both encourage and respond to the changes-not least in its own routinesprompted by the new pragmatism.
B. Local Government on PragmaticLines: Directly DeliberativePolyarchy
The basal cell of this structure is a stylized institution, corresponding
to the design team, that we will call the governance council. Nowhere fully
established, this construct nonetheless draws together and connects as a
whole crucial features of current, partial innovations in state and local
government. Its core members are the public officials charged with specifying and organizing provision of the services required in the jurisdiction,
and answerable to the jurisdiction's senior elected executive official; ex
officio membership is accorded local officials of administrative agencies
or other public entities that make rules or provide services relevant to
these core activities.
The council's initial task is to characterize the goals of government
in its various departments as informed on the basis of past practice,
benchmarking examination of relevant experience elsewhere, and the simultaneous-engineering proposals of council members from complementary service areas. Then, it chooses service providers to achieve those
goals within a fixed period, and evaluates their performance and its own
initial goals in the light of the experience as captured in the pragmatist
disciplines. At the end of the period, if necessary, it redefines its goals
and its own organization, suggests changes in rules under which it operates, and selects collaborators for the next round. Just as the design
group is free to pick suppliers from outside the firm as well as inside, so,
both to experiment at first and solve problems as they are identified, the
governance council must be free periodically to choose service providers
from among specialist government bureaucracies operating within its
own or other jurisdictions, nonprofit corporations, or for-profit firms.
For the purpose of solving particular problems it may choose to federate
with other jurisdictions like itself or delegate responsibility to more or
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less comprehensive units of government. Thus, while the governance
council is located in the here and now of a particular place with particular problems, it is not by nature either a geographic or functional unit
defined as doing certain tasks fixed in a certain place; rather-like the
states whose similar motility we describe in more detail below-it goes
where its constituents and their problems take it.
The service providers are the link between the government of officials and the local knowledge of citizens. Like their private-sector homologues, they are responsible for refining and suggesting alternatives to
initial design specifications. If necessary, they choose additional suppliers. Alone or with these lower-tier suppliers, they pursue the agreedupon goals, and propose further refinements and alternatives as operations bring difficulties to light. To do all this effectively, they must combine expertise in their respective areas of specialization-education,
transportation, policing, and so on-with the ability to collaborate closely
with citizen users in the specification of services and the detection of errors in their provision, as well as with other parties who may suffer damages as a side effect of the service activity. As the consumers of the service, citizen users have unique knowledge of those particulars of their
own, local circumstances that must be taken into account if even the most
apparently routine and impersonal services are to be of value to them;
conversely, those exposed to potential side effects are likely to have the
sharpest eye for threats to their well-being. The more directly an effective
service must be coproduced by its beneficiaries, and the more complex
the service's side effects, the more directly providers must cooperate with
citizen users and those with affected interests. Similarly, to generate effective rules, rulemakers must cooperate with those subject to the rules.
Consider some schematic examples, beginning with the most routine.
Buses that arrive punctually and frequently at times that are not synchronized with the commuting rhythms of potential riders do not increase the availability of public transportation. Potential riders know
more about (changes in) their regular comings and goings than any department of public transportation or private bus operating service. Similarly, current riders are more likely to notice sooner than any fleet operator which bus stops could be relocated to reduce the risk of crime, which
routes must be redrawn to permit access to new job opportunities, and
which buses are not properly cleaned. Meanwhile, (sedentary) residents
whose property abuts a proposed bus stop will be the first to insist on
precautions to prevent the new waiting area from becoming a magnet for
crime. Periodic community surveys and meetings, together with telephone hot lines and other customer-service devices, are likely to provide
the kind of participation necessary in such circumstances.
The police and public housing form an intermediate category. Here
the quality of service provided depends so directly on the contribution of
the beneficiaries that their active participation manifestly makes them
coproviders. Police on the beat can only identify and avert the situations
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that lead to disorder and crime-e.g., rival gangs crossing paths on the
way to different schools, landlords who tolerate drug dealing, and racist
officers-with the help of knowledgeable residents, and those residents
can only address these problems of public order with the help of the
police and other municipal authorities. Similarly, the way the occupants
of public housing use their homes shapes the maintenance, public security, and other services they need from the housing authority, and the services provided by the housing authority plainly shape the conditions of
occupancy. 120 In these situations, effective participation is likely to be
tiered: Beat meetings and project councils provide fora for solving chains
of particular problems, while police/civilian review boards, housing authority advisory councils, and ad hoc municipal task forces involving these
and other agencies provide the opportunity to address larger questions of
institutional architecture.
Perhaps closer and more nearly continuous collaboration between
service providers and citizen users will occur in those frequent instances
where the very aim of the service is to increase the citizens' ability to
furnish it for themselves, and, as a step towards this, to learn to monitor
the provider's capacities. This condition generally holds when the purpose of the service is to further learning, and most directly the case when
learning is associated with mastery of the new disciplines. Thus, to take
only one of many possible examples from current developments in
schooling, an increasingly influential school of American pedagogy argues that high school and vocational students learn most when they learn
to identify their difficulties in learning. They do so by beginning with
questions that arise in familiar environments and uncovering the ways
their habitual methods of problem solving obstruct a solution.' 2 ' Such
methods turn the traditional student-teacher relation into an ongoing,
consultative exchange between more nearly equal partners in the choice
and execution of pedagogic projects.' 2 2
A similar redefinition of the learning process occurs when small and
medium-sized firms seek technical services from specialized consultants
skilled in the new disciplines. 123 The most effective services help firms to
120. For discussion of the similarities of the two settings, see Mark H. Moore, Creating
Public Value: Strategic Management in Government 193-200, 240-55 (1995) (discussing
the problems and successful efforts to rehabilitate public housing in Boston).
121. See John T. Bruer, Schools for Thought: A Science of Learning in the
Classroom 31-50 (1993). The affinities with Dewey's views on education are striking; see
generallyJohn Dewey, The School and Society (1900) and The Child and the Curriculum
(1902) (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).
122. See Adria Steinberg & Larry Rosenstock, Cityworks: Redefining Vocational
Education, in Creating New Educational Communities: Ninety-fourth Yearbook of the
National Society for the Study of Education, Part I, at 147, 147-164 (Jeannie Oakes &
Karen Hunter Quartz eds., 1995).
123. See generally Special Issue, Evaluation of Industrial Modernization, 25 Res. Pol'y
181 (1996) (collection of articles using different methodologies to evaluate industrial
Modernization-the process of "mutual learning, cumulation, adaptation as programs in
one location become aware of and try to improve upon what is being done elsewhere");
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benchmark themselves as a means of identifying crucial problems (for
instance, whether their difficulties stem from outdated technology or
poor organization), and to use error detection methods to attack them.
The more knowledgeable firms become, the more outdated they find the
initial presentations of the consulting service, and the more they insist on
refreshment. Learning becomes an exercise in error detection, and the
firm's ability to find and eliminate faults in itself is a measure of the service provider's own utility. In the public sector, this form of learning entails continuous collaboration between service providers and citizen
users-through, for instance, industry or sector-specific advisory councils
composed of representatives of former or current clients, and companies
and other public-sector institutions that work with them. Collaboration
becomes a precondition for the service provider's ability to monitor itself,
and the ability to organize such collaboration (again taking account of
other affected interests and the relevant public bodies) becomes correspondingly more important as a criterion for selection as a service
provider.
Hence, the service providers and their subcontractors are accountable, on the one side, to the citizen users, and, on the other, to appointed
and elected political officials, who are themselves accountable to the citizenry. Citizens whose interests are likely to be affected for better or for
worse by the provision of various services participate in the formulation of
the strategy for service providers and help determine why services break
down or fall short; they also take part periodically in benchmarking reviews of the providers' performance. These reviews can begin with comparisons of results obtained by various units of all like providers in the
local jurisdiction, and extend (with the administrative assistance discussed below) to comparison of results obtained by providers in similar
jurisdictions pursuing comparable ends by various means. These same
reviews allow the responsible officials on the governance council to determine whether the providers have met the officials' (and the citizen
users') expectations and whether, in any case, the providers demonstrate
sufficient capacity to learn from their mistakes to improve. Benchmarking of the governance councils' decisionmaking routines-the procedures for selecting service providers, monitoring their performance, and
correcting by simultaneous engineering the problems arising from misspecification of the division of labor among them-combined with the
service-specific reviews, allows the elected official to assess the council as a
whole.
The citizens then evaluate the official(s) in elections, using the accumulated benchmarking information to compare the strategic choices and
operating results of their governance council with those in similar locales
Charles F. Sabel, A Measure of Federalism: Assessing Manufacturing Technology Centers,
25 Res. Pol'y 281, 281-307 (1996) (assessing collaboration among manufacturers to reach
quality standards and the effectiveness of learning through decentralized localized
autonomy).
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elsewhere. Electoral campaigns publicize the comparisons, underscoring
the missed opportunities revealed in better outcomes, criticizing mismanagement at home by the measure of others' accomplishments, or simply
provoking discussion of novel possibilities or reconsideration of discarded alternatives by recognizing promising developments in otherjurisdictions. Inevitably, elections raise questions about the reorganization of
public administration: If some public service providers compare poorly
to others, or to private ones, the relevant electorate will want to know
what conclusions to draw. By thus situating problems of local government in a broader context, democratic experimentalism suggests an alternative to the familiar idea of politics as concerned ultimately with the
public posing of fateful choices based on conflicting ideologies.
Awkwardly balancing the needs of precision and the needs of
euphony, we will use the term directly deliberativepolyarchy to describe the
form of democracy that results when a polity makes public choices by
means of tiered governance councils-councils that organize service provision with the collaboration of local citizens, and pool their experience
to inform their separate decisions. It is direct because citizens act for
themselves in elaborating solutions to problems that affect them, rather
than delegating responsibility to representatives. It is deliberative because decisions regarding the provision of services are normally made by
means of reason giving through discussion, not (except in cases of deadlock) the counting of votes. It is a polyarchy because the deliberations
and performance of each jurisdiction count as considerations in deliberations of those like it. Polyarchy is a general name for a polity in which
citizens, grouped in plural jurisdictions, can hold the officials of their
jurisdiction sufficiently to account by democratic means to replace them
when they perform badly. Jurisdictions in this general view are as free to
ignore one another as they are to compete or cooperate. In directly deliberative polyarchy, the underlying pragmatic motives for local deliberation are the same as for pooling information among locales. In this
sense, relations among jurisdictions are like relations within jurisdictions:
An unanticipated alternative commands as much attention when chanced
upon in response to local error as when remarked in distant innovation.
Just as benchmarking others' experience illuminates and informs the diversity of disciplinary interests brought to bear in simultaneous engineering-and vice versa-so too deliberative polyarchy complements local
problem solving as a means of loosening the hold of routine on public
action.
This ability to evaluate routine gives directly deliberative polyarchy
efficiency advantages and governance properties that appear as counterintuitive from the point of view of traditional public administration as do
the corresponding features of pragmatist firms in comparison to mass
producers. Thus, it counted as a truism in public administration that an
increase in quality, taken as an effective adjustment to local circumstance,
came at the price of a decrease in overall efficiency and, beyond that,
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public accountability. 124 So long as rules are made centrally and are only
legitimate when so made, this was almost a bookkeeping proposition.
Seen from higher up, the exercise of local discretion required to make
adjustment effective in particular cases would render the actual operation
of administration opaque, inaccessible to coordinated improvement, and
perhaps unlawful as well. Police on the beat were the canonical example
of "street level bureaucrats," doing justice by (nearly) breaking the law
and operating in a cloudy zone of informality equally inaccessible to orga125
nizational reform, judicial oversight, and public scrutiny.
But an experimentalist local government that looks to local adjustment for direction in higher level reform makes virtues of these vices.
Motivated through open discussion of its purposes and measured with
respect to its effects, local experimentalism sufficiently formalizes the informal to give it the character of deliberate and innovative accommodation, rather than furtive caprice. Because its purpose and performance
are public, successful local adjustments can lead to broad institutional
changes. The same kinds of information that allow scrutiny of motives
and outcomes, we will see repeatedly, permit judgments of lawfulness.
Thus, in directly deliberative polyarchy, local initiative increases the quality of services while bettering the conditions for their efficient organization and, in any case, augmenting the public accountability of the
providers.
Decisions in directly deliberative polyarchy no more rest on deep
prior consensus than does collaboration among pragmatist firms. Nor do
they depend on the log-rolling compromises of aggregative democracy,
or on the abstraction from the particular interests through which the deliberations of Rousseau and Madison arrive at rules fair to each by regulating only what is common to all. 1 26 Rather, in the pragmatist polity,
124. For a recent statement, see, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 117, at 413 (contending
that few government programs could be restructured to pursue objectively determinable
goals and reduce congressional micromanagement without loss of political accountability).
125. See Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in
Public Services 3 (1980); see also Aaron V. Cicourel, The Social Organization of Juvenile
Justice 87, 188 (1968). For a recent treatment of the resulting dilemmas for criminal law,
see generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1997) (explaining
why traditional means of controlling police discretion were either ineffective or excessive).
The gap between rules and reality has long been a central theme of the sociology of
organizations, and of firms and work in particular. In the sociological account, informal
groups exercise the discretion needed to adapt routines to cases, and the art of managerial
leadership is to motivate such groups to use their interpretive autonomy for the purpose of
the enterprise. See Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive 170-71 (30th
anniversary ed. 1968). For the shop-floor or street-level perspective, see generally Melville
Dalton, The Industrial "Rate-Buster": A Characterization, Applied Anthropology, Winter
1948, at 5, 13.
126. Here we follow Banning in sharply distinguishing Madison's conception of
public deliberation from the interest-group bargaining interpretation of The FederalistNo.
10. See Banning, supra note 24, at 205-12 (making what should be the obvious point that
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workable, long-term collaboration can issue from, and aid the construction of, the institution of problem-solving deliberation itself. Facing urgent problems that none can solve alone and seeking methods of establishing joint accountability, parties will often prefer to explore a potential
solution, even if they are unsure of its outcome, than to do nothing. This
collaboration arising from urgency is why direct deliberation, as our examples will show, in fact emerges first where the breakdown of traditional
institutions is most conspicuous and its consequences most menacing:
family-support services, policing, and military contracting. Once begun,
pragmatic problem solving loosens the hold of interest by fitfully darting,
as it were, beyond its reach, thereby discovering solutions bit by bit in the
unfamiliar territory beyond the reach of bounded rationality and habitual
calculations of advantage. 127 Such discoveries beget others: The value to
all of the current, partial innovation (measured as improvements in the
performance of current problem-solving institutions) will likely be increased substantially by the next innovation, and (as in the case of learning by monitoring in firms) the continuous exchange of operating information among the collaborators will reduce the risk that any party can
use the novel arrangements for self-dealing. In time, therefore, emerging
solutions change what the actors do and how they rely on one another.
Their very ideas of what is possible come to reflect these entanglements;
"self"-interest assumes as the starting point for subsequent calculations
the surprises of practical deliberation that formerly confounded it. Thus,
it is the very practical particularity of this deliberation-above all the novelty that results when diverse standpoints are brought to bear on unfamiliar alternatives-that advances the good of all participants.
The freedom of maneuver accorded local jurisdictions in directly deliberative polyarchy and the obligations of mutual regard that are its precondition both favor exploratory problem solving and become the more
effective for it. Above all, an experimentalist regime gives locales substantial latitude in defining problems for themselves. The goals and methods
of trash removal might appear to be relatively uncontroversial. 12 Not so
with schooling: Whether, for example, academic excellence is best realized, or certain values best inculcated, in single-sex rather than coeducational schools is a matter of dispute. 129 Instead of arguing the relevant
matters of principle at long range through the institutions of representative democracy, local jurisdictions in directly deliberative polyarchy can in
Madison defended an extended federal republic in which faction would be controlled, not
celebrated).
127. For the distinction between bargaining as the compromise of antagonistic
interests and deliberative decisionmaking as the discovery of new possibilities through
consideration of diverse viewpoints, see M. P. Follett, Creative Experience 156-78 (1930).
128. Of course, no problem is forever immune to controversy; whether, what, and
how much to recycle as opposed to dump are questions that increasingly occupy state and
local governments.
129. SeeJacques Steinberg, Crew Says No to Compromise On All-Girls Middle School,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1997, at B3.
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such cases initially act on their own best understanding of ends and
means. The possibilities for diversity inherent in this freedom pose
problems, of course, for the maintenance of the uniformity of performance measures needed for benchmarking and other comparisons, as
well as for the fundamental integrity of constitutional values; we take
these up in the discussion of experimentalist administration and courts,
respectively. But, problems aside, experimentalist decisionmaking is
largely self-starting precisely because it invites the actors to begin with
what, on reflection, they take for granted: who they are and what they
want.
Alternatively, when such autonomy does not prompt experimentalist
exploration, local jurisdictions, or parties within them, have recourse to
the apparatus of deliberative polyarchy. Thus, one of the tasks of the
agencies responsible for benchmarking is to help the parties advance past
blockages in local decisionmaking. They do so, for example, by suggesting how features of apparently irreconcilable alternatives have been
combined into new hybrids elsewhere, or by proposing that clashing strategies be investigated separately as independent, concurrent pilot
projects, or, more simply still, by chairing meetings by rules that all recognize as fair. Nor must this framework for generalizing results be fully
established to be effective. As with workable collaboration, the institutional ligatures of participation can be an outcome of, not a requirement
for, initiating change. Although benchmarking is formalized in a fully
fledged system of democratic experimentalism, it can begin informally as
a rough comparison of competing models and alternative performance
measures. So long as the comparisons meet the pragmatist criterion of
casting doubt on the assumption that current arrangements cannot be
improved and suggest directions for improvement (including refinement
of the comparisons), they count as polyarchic benchmarking, and encourage the generalization of forms of deliberation on which their own
improvement depends, whether institutionalized or not.
Thus, we do not claim that practical deliberation can never be paralyzed by the clash of interests. It often will be. The argument, rather, is
that sometimes it will not. If even one part of a system of democratic
experimentalism succeeds in avoiding such blockage, the institutions that
frame the regime as a whole can use that success both to help unblock
the others and to increase their own ability to do so.
IV. PIECES OF THE NEW POLYARCHY- ExAMPLEs OF
BOOTSTRAPPING REFORM

If directly deliberative polyarchy as a whole is still unrealized, partial
variants of it-with features that appear disruptively novel from the vantage point of current experience-are already widely practiced and
spreading rapidly in the United States and other countries. In some of
these, the emphasis is on benchmarking and close collaboration between
citizen users and service providers; in others, the accent is on simultane-
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ous engineering. All depart fundamentally from the New Deal model of
provision of public services by hierarchically organized government bureaucracies with exclusive jurisdiction in their respective activities. These
departures from the old model are not, of course, a demonstration of the
viability or inevitability of a new one. But they are evidence of the possibility of change in the direction we prospect, and there is no reason to
assume that it will be harder to connect these partial innovations into a
new order than to have created them amidst the recalcitrance of the old.
As coarse-grained indications of current possibilities for reform, we present highly compressed case studies of pragmatist service provision: the
reform of state family-support services, community policing, and the design of a submarine-launched missile system.
The examples are chosen both for the clarity with which they reveal
the connection between the details of institutional design and general
operating principles and for the way they illuminate the construction of
new institutions from the materials provided by the old. The reform of
one institution both leads to and depends upon the reform of the institutions with which it collaborates. In this sense, the examples illustrate the
bootstrappingnature of reform.' 3 0 The examples are, in addition, suggestive because of the sheer improbability of the hostile settings in which
they arise. No one was likely to look for the rudiments of new forms of
participatory service provision in scandal-ridden social-service bureaucracies, crime-ridden neighborhoods, or military-industrial complexes. So
their existence under inhospitable circumstances may be a harbinger of
diffusion in more congenial contexts.
3
A. Family Support Services' '

The failures of child- and family-protective services, ranging from
child welfare and mental health, to school-based counseling, to juvenile
justice and foster care, have become a leading symbol of the failures of
government as a service provider and, beyond that, of the limits of public
action in the face of urgent social distress. Too often families that might
130. See supra text accompanying note 112.
131. The best published account of family support services is Jane Waldfogel, The
New Wave of Service Integration, 71 Soc. Serv. Rev. 463 (1997), which focuses on
Maryland. Additionally, case studies conducted at the Kennedy School of Government
trace developments in Colorado and Arkansas. See Kristen Lundberg, Integrating Child
and Family Services: Colorado (unpublished case study no. C16-91-1082.0, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, 1991) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Kristen
Lundberg, Integrating Child and Family Services: Colorado, Sequel-1994 (unpublished
case study no. C16-94-1082.1,John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1994) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review); Kristen Lundberg, Integrating Child and Family Services:
Arkansas (unpublished case study no. C16-91-1083.0, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, 1991) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Kristen Lundberg, Integrating
Child and Family Services: Arkansas, Sequel-1994 (unpublished case study no. C16-941083.1, John F. Kennedy School of Government 1994) (on file with the Columbia Law

Riew).
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have remained intact with timely help dissolve because agencies that focused on narrowly defined problems could not coordinate an effective,
comprehensive response. Too often the dissolution results in the horrifying physical abuse of partners and children, and the foster-care and other
institutions intended to protect the victims inflict new wounds instead. In
states as different as Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, and others
besides, the reaction to this has been to attempt a wide-ranging reform
that gives citizen users and local communities a greater say in determining the services they need and how they shall be provided, and to use
their decisions in turn to restructure the relevant parts of public
32
administration.
The common and defining features of this reform are concurrent
and mutually dependent reorganizations of the central (state) and local
(county and sometimes neighborhood) levels of service provision. Thus,
at the state level, a "governance collaborative" (such is its generic name),
consisting at a minimum of representatives of the key child and family
services agencies, develops the general outlines of systemic reform and
the principles and standards for establishing local collaboratives in consultation with local groups. This state governance collaborative also defines the core results to be achieved as well as measures of progress. Local collaboratives then form under these guidelines. These collaboratives
convoke providers and citizen users, and present the state with plans for
service delivery in their jurisdictions. As the process continues, the
choices and experiences of each level influence the decisions of the
others and the overall result is what we are calling the bootstrapping reform of both.
In practice, reflecting the confusion and uncertainty from which the
reforms emerge, the composition and distribution of responsibility between state and local governance collaboratives, and the budgetary ties
between them, vary sharply from state to state; these can change significantly within any one state in a short time. In Oregon, for example, the
governor appoints a Commission on Children and Families of about fifteen members, including representatives of business and civic groups, social services, county commissions, and agencies. The heads of the concerned state departments serve ex officio. Membership on the
corresponding county commissions is open, but must include a majority
of lay citizens, among whom may be, again, business and civic leaders, or
representatives of nonprofit service providers. In addition to administering the delivery of specific programs (Healthy Start, FRCs, Great Start),
the county commission may plan the general reorganization of local ser132. See Stephen Page, The Emergence of Disciplined Collaboration for Human
Services: Iteration and Participation in the Policy Innovation Process 29-32 (May 1997)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Further, we draw heavily on Page's research for the institutional
detail presented in this section and for the analysis of the political efficacy of discursive
problem-solving strategies.
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vices for children and families, and draw upon the combined expertise of
their own staffs and those of the state commission to pursue their plans.
In Georgia, the governor, lieutenant governor, and speaker of the
state house together appoint about twelve members to a Family Policy
Council that groups together business and religious leaders as well as
state legislators. Here, too, state service department heads are members
ex officio. The county counterparts include local elected officials, representatives of business, public agencies, and community and civic groups.
The mandate of these entities is extremely broad: to achieve results with
the Policy Council through comprehensive service plans financed by
funds created by pooling the allocations of separate state agencies normally available to each area.
Maryland, to take a final variant, has created a sub-Cabinet for
Children, Youth, and Families, to which the governor appoints about
nine members, including the secretaries of the pertinent state departments. This sub-Cabinet collaborates with county-level Local Management Boards (LMBs), including the county commissioner or manager
and local representatives of providers of education, social, juvenile,
health, and mental health services. The emphasis is on the reduction of
out-of-home or foster placements, with LMBs allowed, in effect, to rein33
vest savings achieved in this area as they see fit.'
These reforms are still too new to permit any overall assessment of
their effectiveness, or even to say which methods of composition and collaboration encourage effective monitoring and dissemination of best
practices. Nonetheless, observers note two features of the reform that
suggest that it is politically viable enough to survive to be judged on its
substantive successes and failures. We call attention to them to suggest
the kinds of mechanisms that may contribute to the bootstrapping diffusion of experimentalist methods more generally.
The first is that the very process of reciprocating consultation between central and local levels, and horizontally within each, necessary to
formulate and adjust reform plans, is frequently judged by proponents of
and participants in reform to be politically expedient as well. Interests
that may oppose change find it hard to pursue a strategy of pure obstructionism in settings where many others are attempting sincerely to collaborate; once the potential obstructionists do begin to participate, they typically must counter proposals with other proposals, not vetoes. In this way,
they become accomplices to the outcome, and subsequent criticism, if
any, is blunted by this complicity. We take this finding as a fragmentary
and preliminary indication of the disruptive effects of deliberative problem solving on settled interests. At the very least, it demonstrates in a
context directly connected to the larger frame of reform under discus133. See Stephen Page, State and Local Governance Structures for Comprehensive,
Integrated Services: Options and Strategic Rationales 13 (July 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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sion that bootstrapping incrementalism can be self-reinforcing rather
than self-blocking.
The second politically relevant feature of the reform movement in
social services concerns the diffusion of information. Although neither
systems of evaluation nor performance measures have yet been consolidated, it appears that the reforms reduce the possibilities for information
hoarding-and particularly the hoarding of unfavorable results. Performance failures, accounting anomalies, or abusive exercises of discretion are very likely to come to light because the constant consultation
inherent in the articulation and redefinition of standards places many
persons with expert knowledge in the know about current projects. The
same forms of publicity that make it unlikely that the reforms will become
hostage to particular interests make it similarly unlikely that they will become hostage to scandals and the manipulations that go with them.
Whether jurisdictions that wish to learn about one another's successes and failures will be able to find each other and usefully pool their
results remains to be seen; thus far, innovators and bureaucrats coexist in
a complicated patchwork. Nonetheless, inconclusive as it is, the record of
a utopian disregard for the
the reforms suggests that they will not fail for
34
political conditions required to test them.'
B. Community Policingin Chicagol3 5
The movement for community or problem-oriented policing in large
American cities such as Chicago, Houston, and New York closely resembles reform of child-protective services. As in the latter, formal change
begins with the creation by central (here municipal) authorities of local
(neighborhood) service-provision units whose substantial autonomy is to
be exercised in collaboration with citizen users. And also as with childand family-protective services, the central policing authorities find it easier to catalyze decentralization than to pool usefully the resulting local
experience.
The differences concern the sheer difficulties of the task. However
difficult reform of child-protective services proves to be, reform of big-city
police departments appears in prospect harder still. First, there is the
extraordinary centralization of police organizations. Large police departments were professionalized first on the military model during a wave of
Progressive reform in the first half of the century, then professionalized
again in the image of the mass-production corporation during a second
reform wave in the 1960s.13 6 With their use of rank nomenclature, barracks, military-style roll calls at the start of each watch, minute direction
134. See Page, supra note 132, at 29-32.
135. The account presented here draws heavily on the current research of Archon
Fung. See Archon Fung, Street Level Democracy: Social Experimentation in Theory and
Urban Practice (forthcoming 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology) (draft on file with the Columbia Law Review).
136. See Livingston, supra note 125, at 565-68.
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of the rank and file by voluminous written orders and direct daily commands, and designation of outsiders-citizens and employees of other
public agencies alike-as "civilians," police departments seem a pastiche
of the most centralized and hierarchical features of military and massproduction corporate organizations.
Then there are the apparent incapacities of the citizen users most in
need of better police services. Grime concentrates in distressed neighborhoods whose residents, impoverished and without much formal education or skill, would seem unqualified for, as well as disinclined to take
part in, voting and the other routine forms of participation in representative democracy. 137 How are these residents to meet the manifestly
greater demands of directly deliberative problem solving under favorable
conditions, let alone in collaboration with organizations as rigid, hierarchical, and separated from the broader public by rifts in understanding
and culture as the police? That there is demonstrably effective citizen
participation in community policing in cities such as Chicago suggests
that experimentalist institutions can serve two complementary functions.
On the one hand, they act as organizational emollients, making hierarchies more fluid internally and more open to the outside. On the other,
they validate local knowledge as a form of expertise by demonstrating its
utility, thus fostering participation (and the learning it occasions) by
those usually held incapable of it.
The backdrop to the current reforms was the extended attempt in
the 1970s and 1980s to make the best of police isolation from local communities and the growing realization in the last decade of the profound
limits of that accommodation.' 3 8 At the most abstract level, the responsibility of the police is to ensure the greatest possible social order with full
respect for the rights of citizens. Yet, in isolation from the communities
in which they operate, the police have no information with which to
render that responsibility more precise. For want of an alternative, they
typically came to define their task as responding as effectively as possible
to indisputable signs of disorder, such as 911 calls. But, naked deterrence
aside, rushing to scenes of disorder cannot make local society more orderly. Thus, even as response times were reduced' 3 9 and the prison pop137. See Arend Lijphart, Compulsory Voting is the Best Way to Keep Democracy
Strong, Chron. of Higher Educ., Oct. 18, 1996, at B3 (observing link between low voter
turnout of the poor and uneducated on the one hand, and regressive social policy on the
other); see generally StevenJ. Rosenstone, Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout, 26 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 25 (1982) (noting correlation of voter turnout with wealth and employment).
138. For the background and emergence of community policing in the sense under
discussion here, see generally Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (1990). For
the view of crime as the self-reinforcing breakdown of moral discipline, and of community
policing as the strategy of restoring order at the first sign of potential disruption, see James
Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 203-07 (1975).
139. Emergency dispatch systems typically deliver patrol cars to crime scenes within 15
minutes of a serious call in most cities. See, e.g., Nicole Cox, 911 Response Took Longer,
Report Finds, Newsday (New York City ed.), Apr. 1, 1996, at A25 (reporting an eight-
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ulation swelled enormously, 140 police officials and academic observers increasingly came to realize that more effective policing required
anticipating and interrupting the causes of disorder-not just reacting
14 x
decisively to it.
But for such anticipatory intervention the police would
need to determine what to count as disorder, what the sources of disorder might be, how to address them, and how to determine the effectiveness of the resulting measures. Learning all this would require, in turn,
the organization of discussion between police and citizens, as experts in
the life of their communities and as direct users of police services, and
perhaps even criminals, as particularly knowledgeable "users" of the criminal justice system, and then further discussion of what to do next and
what to do better given the outcome. From these considerations has
emerged the broad movement for community policing. Within that
movement, certain wide-ranging institutional reforms, such as the
Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), unmistakably exhibit the
features of democratic experimentalism.142
The Chicago Police Department (CPD) introduced pilot versions of
CAPS into five of the city's twenty-five districts in 1993 and expanded the
program to the entire department in 1994.143 The reform has been
guided by three principles from the beginning. First, the business of
rank-and-file policing is defined as the identification and resolution of
particular, persistent problems of crime and disorder at the street or community level, rather than the execution of tasks defined by higher orders
of command. Second, for purposes of this problem solving, "beat teams"
are formed of seven or eight line officers, jointly responsible for a specific
neighborhood (Chicago is divided into 279 beats) and assigned there for
substantial periods.' 4 4 The closer and more durable relation between the
officers in the team and the neighborhood that is meant to result is called
"beat integrity." Finally, in a sharp reversal of the historical effort to insuminute response time for 1995 in NewYork City); Eunice Moscoso, As City Elections Near,
Austinites are on Alert for Crime Solutions, Austin Am. Statesman, Mar. 30, 1997, at Al

(reporting response times of 7.5, 7.4, and 4.1 minutes for the Texas cities of Austin, Dallas,

and Houston, respectively for 1996); Peyton Whitely, Two Rape Victims Win $300,000 from
City, Seattle Times, Apr. 10, 1996, at BI (reporting response time of 9.2 minutes in Seattle
for 1996).
140. For example, between 1970 and 1997, the federal prison population grew from
under 22,000 to over 100,000. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Quick Facts (last modified
Dec. 27, 1997) <http://www.bop.gov/fact1297.html> (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
141. See Livingston, supra note 125, at 575-77.
142. See Jim Suiski, Officer, New Beat System A Good Fit, Chi. Trib., Nov. 10, 1993,
§ 8, at 33 (describing the then-new program).
143. See Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, Community Policing
in Chicago, Year Three (Ill. Criminal Justice Info. Auth. 1996). The detail in this section
regarding community policing in Chicago is drawn from this source.
144. Reformers thought quite reasonably that officers would require persistent
assignments in order first to know the problems on their watches and then to have time to
implement solutions.
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late the force from the surrounding community, beat teams cooperate
extensively with local residents, primarily in monthly community problem-solving sessions called "beat meetings," at which priorities are assigned to crime problems and strategies are developed to address the
most pressing ones.
The beat meetings at the heart of the reform are typically attended
by five or six patrol officers, of whom one may be a sergeant or other
supervisor, and by anywhere from five to thirty beat residents, some representing community groups and others simply citizens concerned by
crime in their neighborhood. As beat meetings have grown into primary
centers of community and neighborhood problem solving, officials from
aldermanic offices, city service departments, and the Mayor's office have
begun to appear with increasing regularity. The usual practice is for the
participants to locate a pressing problem-such as an apartment building
being used as a center for selling and using crack cocaine-to specify a
linked series of measures in response, and to assign responsibility for accomplishing them. Thus, in the case of a crack house, one subgroup
might determine whether the landlord is especially permissive with drug
dealers or neglectful of the property and, if so, begin informal negotiations with the landlord or consider countermeasures to be pursued in
housing court. A second might contact tenants or neighbors to enlist
their aid in gathering evidence against the dealers or landlord. Yet a
third might consult with specialized drug-detail units within the police
force about the possibilities of increased enforcement or with municipal
maintenance services about the possibilities for repairing street lights and
other public amenities. A map of the beat, annotated to reflect pooled
knowledge of the problem, and a list of pending tasks frequently records
the results. Thus, the first phase of CAPS created a novel administrative
unit-beat teams and resident-participants convoked in beat meetingscapable, within broad limits, of setting its own goals and choosing the
means for reaching them, even when these strategic choices breached
formal barriers within the police department and between it and other
city agencies. By inviting direct resident participation in the identification of problems, formulation of strategies, and evaluation of results, the
plain intent of the reform was to ensure that the choice of experimental
projects and their evaluation would immediately reflect the judgment
and preferences of those who, as the primary consumers of police services, must bear the brunt of police failure.
A recent study of CAPS indicates the breadth of participation and
the counterintuitive make-up of the participants. In 1995, some 5000 residents were attending community police meetings in their neighborhoods each month. The counterintuitive finding is that beat-meeting
turnout was greatest in those neighborhoods where crime levels were
highest. This might seem a straightforward expression of need, but for
the association between crime and poverty and the inverse association
between poverty and political participation, noted above. Thus, in fla-
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grant exception to the de facto exclusion of the poor and the uneducated
from the politics of mass democracies, the high-crime Chicago neighborhoods with lower aggregate levels of education and wealth had higher
participation rates than those that are better off.1 45 Whatever the precise

explanation for this outcome, moreover, the realization by beat-meeting
participants that their own participation mattered surely played a central
part. A survey found that some sixty-four percent of problems brought
up at these meetings were being addressed and that full or partial
solu1 46
tions had been implemented in some sixty percent of the cases.
The initial CAPS emphasis on beat integrity and the reform associated with it went hand in hand, however, with inattention to the
problems of corresponding reforms at the center of the CPD to coordinate to best advantage the results of the local learning. Indeed, as first
implemented, CAPS reforms seemed to presume that decentralized and
informal problem solving would proceed with virtually no support from
the center at all, let alone coordinating direction. Only when many beats
floundered in their problem-solving endeavors and others began to demand help from the CPD in implementing solutions, did managers at
central headquarters respond by formalizing the core of the new procedures in a set of General Orders. These require documentation of problem-solving efforts, evaluations, and justifications of priorities and strategies. 147 These reporting requirements not only assure line-level
accountability to management, but provide data that can be used to
benchmark problem-solving teams and efforts against one another. The
Research and Development group at CPD is investigating implementation of electronic collection and distribution of this information.
All these efforts have been complemented, meanwhile, by attempts
to benchmark and pool information initiated from below. In the course
of the new problem solving, patrol officers and community activists have
realized that decentralization can bring a kind of isolation: Though they
may face similar problems with open-air drug markets, abandoned buildings, problem parks, poor city services, or low beat-meeting participation
levels, neighborhood residents proceed separately, and therefore without
benefit of the experiences of others. As a result, emergent leaders in
community policing in some areas-sometimes police officers and sometimes residents-dispatch successful problem solvers in one beat to assist
less successful counterparts nearby by making available their expertise
and, less often, additional resources.
Viewed through the lens of democratic experimentalism, the very
recent project of Chicago community policing reforms is therefore prom145. See Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, supra note 143, at
20-23.
146. See id. at 30-31.
147. See Wesley G. Skogan & Susan M. Hartnett, Community Policing, Chicago Style
161-93 (1997); see also Archon Fung, Residents Can Use Police General Order to Solve
Specific Neighborhood Problems, Neighborhoods, Spring 1997, at 1, 5, 9-10.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

ising but incomplete. Though the fundamental elements of experimentalism are in place, the essential institutional machinery of benchmarking
discipline has yet to be installed. Whether the reform will proceed along
this path is an open question whose answer will in large measure depend
upon whether reformers inside and outside the CPD at the center can
join forces with those active in the beats to solve the difficult organizational problem of capturing, pooling, making sense of, and then diffusing
the vast range of experience that these problem-solving efforts instigate
and reveal.
C. Simultaneous Design: Military Procurement
The disciplined decentralizations of the kind associated here with
Japanese-inspired production methods have been discovered and rediscovered independently many times in this century by various armed services and their civilian suppliers. Typically this occurs when complex
projects involving the integration of discrete, highly sophisticated subsystems must be developed and produced quickly, and yet-given the menace of catastrophic failure-with extraordinary reliability. 14 8 In the context of sophisticated and demanding military procurement, secrecy
attends matters of national security, tradition favors hierarchy, complex
technical debates appear opaque, and vast profits are to be made. All of
these factors would seem to favor management by closed, even conspiratorial oligarchy. That decentralized methods have been widely used in
this setting suggests as strongly as in the case of community policing both
the power of such methods and their amenability to adoption across a
wide range of government institutions.
The history of the design by the Special Projects Office of the United
States Navy of the Polaris submarine-launched missile system-the largest
and most successful naval project of the early Cold War-illustrates one
of the many paths to the new class of institutions. 149 Until 1955, when
the project began, naval procurements were managed by collaboration
between the Chief of Naval Operations-who, as commander of the
fleets, determined weapons requirements-and a group of technical departments-specializing in areas such as aeronautics, ordnance, or
ships-which selected a prime or general contractor to produce the material demanded in their respective jurisdictions. The prime contractor,
in turn, parceled out specialized tasks to subcontractors and assumed responsibility for integrating the weapons system itself. But missile development-and particularly the development of missiles requiring complex
shipboard fire-control mechanisms-straddled the boundaries between
148. See Jonathan Zeitlin, Flexibility and Mass Production at War: Aircraft
Manufacttire in Britain, the United States, and Germany, 1939-1945, Tech. & CultureJan.
1995, at 46, 46-49.

149. See generally Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development:
Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (1972).
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150
Ordinance and aeronautics both insisted on control.

Moreover, as strategic ballistic missiles were then an innovation for the
Navy, commanders and their representative in the Chief of Naval
Operations could not use experience as a guide to formulating operational needs. Nor, finally, was there a pool of prime contractors who
might have supplied at least part of the coordination that the Navy could
not. Previous developments, principally with the Chrysler Corporation,
had been with liquid-fuel missiles, whereas for submersed launchings the
Navy needed a solid-fuel missile with correspondingly different guidance
and fire-control mechanisms. 151 Lockheed's Missile and Space Division,
which did have solid-fuel competence, had none in other important as2

15
pects of the project.
In response to these difficulties, the Navy created the Special
Projects Office as a kind of federation of the key military participants and
specialist private-industry contractors. A Steering Task Group composed
of senior representatives of these two groups fixed the performance characteristics of the new missile system; a Projects and Programs Branch of
the Special Projects Office was assigned the task of supervising realization
155
of the goals.
This federation might have easily degenerated into a cartel of established interests, with each technical bureau defending its own bailiwick
and those of its favorite contractors by insisting on particular versions of
the subsystem within its competence-thus disregarding the effects of its
preferences on the performance of the system as a whole. This danger
was all the greater as the Special Projects Office formally had responsibilbut no direct authority for submitting a unified budget for the program,
54
bureaus.'
technical
participating
the
ity over
To avoid this combination of conflict and collusion, the senior naval
officers in the Office adroitly played on the original jurisdictional ambiguities both to create and moderate competition among technical bureaus, among contractors, and between contractors as a group and their
supervising bureaus. Almost inadvertently, they created a system for proposing and comparing design variants with many affinities to simultaneous engineering. Thus, bureaus with competence in adjacent areas were
encouraged to propose solutions to particular problems so that the relevant panel of the Steering Task Group or section of the Projects and
Programs Branch could choose between them. The bureaus, in turn, responded to the pressure to perform by encouraging competition among
their specialist contractors, and choosing the superior design. To ensure
that neither historic loyalties nor efforts to gain an advantage in the jurisdictionaljostling would lead to collusion between bureaus and particular

150.
151.
152.
153.

See
See
See
See

id. at 61-62.
id. at 79.
id. at 80.
id. at 73.

154. See id. at 69.
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subcontractors, or more generally to the suppression of local initiative,
contractors were entitled to appeal decisions against them to the Office
in the early stages of the program, and later allowed to negotiate minor
design changes with subunits of the Office located at their own facilities. 15 5 The overall result, as in simultaneous engineering and its related
disciplines, was to create an environment that shifted incentives from information hoarding (to avoid the possibility of threatening comparisons)
to information pooling (to increase the likelihood of surviving them). 15 6
The design of the Atlas/Titan series of intercontinental ballistic missiles, begun formally in 1954-a year before the start of the Polaris program-was informed by closely kindred principles that came to be called
"system engineering."1 57 Here too the novel demands of the project were
at odds with military jurisdictions and orientations, as well as with industrial specializations. An Air Force hierarchy dominated by experienced
pilots had trouble even imagining the utility of unmanned vehicles operating outside the atmosphere, let alone contemplating the optimal specifications for such a craft. 158 Even innovative airframe manufacturers, at
home with the idea of missiles, had trouble conceiving of such missiles as
mere platforms for electronic guidance systems and warheads, rather
than engines of flight with an integrity of their own. 159 Here too the
solution was to create a design team federating specialists and generalists
from the military and private sector, together able to challenge and correct one another and the additional specialized subcontractors they
would recruit to the project. On the private-sector side, the key figure
was the newly formed firm (Ramo-Woolridge Corporation) that was both
a specialist in aerospace electronics and a pioneer of the emerging systems approach. The systems approach was understood, according to one
of the company's founders, as an inherently "interdisciplinary" form of
engineering whose "function is to integrate the specialized separate
pieces of a complex of apparatus and people--the system-into a harmo155. See id. at 148-52.
156. For example, in 1958, at least six organizations were concerned with developing
the rocket motor for the Polaris:
Each had a viewpoint on rocket motor problems. Each was willing to evaluate the
technical judgments and time estimates of its rival. And each had its own access
to the program's top management. [In consequence,] the strategic decisions
involved in the design of the missile and its interactions with other subsystems
were the subject of a searching analysis.
Id. at 154.
157. For the history of Atias/Titan with emphasis on the development of systems
engineering, see Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, ch. 3 (forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review).
158. See id. at 13-14.
159. See id. at 31-32, 41-42 (describing the limited experience of the airframe
manufactures with electronics, warhead design, and the use of computers to solve the
kinds of complex problems arising in systems integration, as well as the dominance of
specialists in aerodynamics as against electrical engineers in such companies).
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nious ensemble that optimally achieves the desired end."160 The Air
Force in turn assembled a team of technically expert officers, each responsible for monitoring progress in one of the subsystems of the overall
16 1
project.
Design under this structure was, in the jargon of systems engineering
that later shaped the vocabulary of simultaneous engineering, concurrent
and parallel. Concurrence meant that parts, and even machines to make
those parts, were developed simultaneously, in advance of final definition
of the whole. Parallel design meant that related but distinct alternative
systems were developed side by side so that failures in the parts or subsystems of one could be corrected by substituting the corresponding component of the other. Thus, the launch facilities at Cape Canaveral (now
Cape Kennedy) were under construction before there was a missile to
launch.
The Titan rocket was produced as an almost accidental byproduct of
parallel development. First, the Air Force commissioned construction of
a second missile engine "for reasons of competition and the undesirability of entrusting such an important part of the program to one company." 16 2 The same logic suggested paralleling the other subsystem; doing this created all the components of the Titan. 163 By the early 1960s,
the Air Force's success with parallel design attracted the attention of
models of the savings in
economists, who constructed sophisticated
64
money and time that it made possible.'
Much more generally, the application of at least the rudiments of
simultaneous engineering principles stands out in a recent survey of government sponsored research and development in the United States in the
post-War period as a central determinant of success. Consider the experience of sectors such as semiconductors, computer hardware and software,
and biotechnology. In these areas, government policy (including strict
enforcement of anti-trust provisions and patenting policies favoring new
entrants) encouraged early exploration of diverse alternatives and competition among public and/or private entities performing research or developing technology in connection with particular projects. The aggregate outcomes were extraordinary successes. In contrast, when, as in the
case of the supersonic transport project or the effort to build a liquid
metal fast breeder nuclear reactor, the government made an early and

160.
161.
162.
(internal
163.

Id. at 1 (quoting Simon Ramo).
See id. at 46-47.
Id. at 55 (quoting General Bernard Schriever, head of the Atlas/Titan program)
quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 56.

164. See generally Richard R. Nelson, Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of
Parallel Research and Development Efforts, 43 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 351 (1961).
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a group of firms associsustained commitment to a particular design and165
ated with it, the results were clamorous failures.
There is, to be sure, irony in the observation that the military-industrial complex-symbol to many of government as an instrument of selfdealing, and to others of a suspect connection between official power and
violence-may well have been a pioneer in the use of methods that we
would associate with a new form of democracy. But it is irony of a familiar and instructive kind. The means of production and the means of destruction mirror and shape one another as breakthroughs in civilian life
are passed to the military, and vice versa; and every contrast among civilian forms of organization has its counterpart in differences of military
style. Thus, trench warfare solidified hierarchical forms of command,
166
while tank warfare favored flexible and decentralized decisionmaking.
(Or, to choose an example with a closer connection to political participation, the armed services were desegregated by Executive Order before the
Supreme Court ruled Jim Crow unconstitutional. 167 ) From this perspective, the surprising aspect of the successes of simultaneous engineering in
recent military projects is not, perhaps, their occurrence, but rather our
tardiness in drawing implications about the plasticity and transferability
of government from it.
D. Limitations of Piecemeal Efforts
A few hints to the contrary aside, the foregoing examples suggest
that directly deliberative polyarchy, because it does not presume consensus and because the information-pooling devices on which it ultimately
depends may begin informally, can spread piecemeal, by a process of
bootstrapping akin to the one noted in the diffusion of learning-by-monitoring institutions in firms. However, without national coordinating
mechanisms, those interested in innovating will have difficulty finding
one another and pooling their efforts to overcome the predictable resistance of vested interests. To see why such mechanisms are necessary, we
sketch the possibilities and limits of uncoordinated reform.
The possibilities for bootstrapping reform stem from the urgent
need to respond to, and the freedom of maneuver afforded by, breakdowns in current arrangements. Central (state or national) governments,
for example, may admit defeat in efforts to solve certain problems by programs under their direct control and then redistribute the funds dedicated to the failed efforts to lower level authorities, perhaps on condition
165. See David C. Mowery, US Post-war Technology Policy and the Creation of New
Industries, in OECD Proceedings: Creativity, Innovation andJob Creation 199 (1997). For
more detail, see id. at 202-04 (semiconductors, computer hardware and computer
software), 207-08 (biotechnology), 204-07 (supersonic transport and light-water reactor),

200 (statement of the general factors favoring success summarized above).
166. See Edward N. Luttwak, The Strategy of the Tank, in Strategy and Politics 295,
299-301 (1980).
167. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948).
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that these give some public account for the use they make of their new
discretion. Local authorities may have the freedom of maneuver under
current arrangements to engage in some form of experimentalism, or
attribute themselves this freedom, and the central authorities are so preoccupied by other matters (or so sympathetic, surreptitiously, with the
initiatives) that they do not protest. Success by any one of these approaches will often be self-reinforcing and will encourage attempts by the
others. Thus, a school district relaxes certain rules to permit decentralized experimentation in curriculum development (itself informed by new
ideas of learning through participation in problem-solving groups), perhaps in response to certain semiofficial demonstration projects undertaken by teachers with the help of some parents and administrators. So
authorized, the school affiliates itself with one or more associations or
networks of similar institutions pursuing related forms of decentralization. Through contact with these, the school launches additional pilot
projects that, together with the remonstrations of other schools in the
same jurisdiction pursuing slightly different projects in association with
other networks, result in requests for further rule changes at the district
level. Meanwhile, the federal government begins to consolidate separate
programs for linguistic minorities, students with learning disabilities, and
many others into block grants to be used substantially at the discretion of
local school districts. But a condition for the use of the funds is the articulation of a proposal for the reorganization of the old services on new
lines-particularly their integration with one another and classroom activities. Efforts at curricular experimentation now have to be coordinated
with experimental delivery of supplementary services, occasioning discussion of further rule changes, comparisons with responses in other districts to this kind of integration, and so on. Processes of this kind explain
why examples of the new system, however fragmentary, abound.
But to say that directly deliberative polyarchy, because of the forms
of accountability and consensus it establishes, can begin to take shape
spontaneously in response to current difficulties is not to say that its diffusion is automatic and assured, nor even that the new system of local government as described is self-sufficient and requires no national complement or preconditions. Diffusion is not assured because the change to
directly deliberative polyarchy, like the introduction of learning-by-monitoring methods in firms, creates great uncertainty about who will win and
lose by the change. This uncertainty produces a vast reserve of potential
opponents, easily activated by any event that confirms their fears. Think
of public-sector employees and unions menaced by competition from private service providers or from public-sector service providers from other
jurisdictions; of central-office administrators menaced by the increasing
autonomy of local officials; of vulnerable economic or ethnic groups that
prefer the threadbare protection they now enjoy from national programs
to the gamble that they will do better with some version of decentralization. Whether such opposition will prevail is indeterminate. Looking at
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the forces deployed against change, close students of the capture of regulatory agencies by special interests did not anticipate the deregulatory
movements of the 1970s and 1980s that loosened the hold of those interests; 168 nor, for similar reasons, did close students of U.S. corporations
anticipate the vast changes in business organization beginning in the late
1980s. 169 In such turbulent circumstances, the only reliable prediction is
that opposition can be overcome, if at all, only after a great struggle.
Amidst that predictable fight, directly deliberative polyarchy will only
progress if benchmarking and the complex of institutions for its monitoring are established on a large scale and ultimately attain national scope.
The need for such institutions was anticipated in the earlier discussion of
learning by monitoring in firms: Benchmarking requires a survey of possible comparisons, evaluation of possible metrics for ranking the comparables, and revision, when necessary, of initial choices of both. Furthermore, the effectiveness of such surveys, evaluations, and revisions
depends on the willingness of all participants to disclose information in
view of the investigations of the others. That is why, we noted, firms often
turn to third parties to organize benchmarking, and the organizers secure participation by various combinations of inducements and threats:
disclosing, for example, the pooled information only to those who add
their own results to the pool, or expelling members who refuse to cooperate in information gathering. Likewise in government, after easily accessible, informal opportunities have been exhausted, mostjurisdictions willing to benchmark will nonetheless be unable to organize the activity
themselves, and some jurisdictions-or at least their leaders-will be unwilling to exchange information for fear of showing poorly in comparison. A crucial role of the national institutions in an experimentalist regime is to assist the willing and oblige the unwilling to provide the
information citizens require for direct deliberation.
There is a straightforward connection between progress in the construction of a national system of comparisons and the outcome of the
fights to extend the reach of directly deliberative polyarchy. The more
extensive and accurate the national information pooling, the more likely
that innovative solutions will be widely known, and the greater weight the
novel alliances formed through these solutions will have in local and national debates about adopting experimentalist measures. Put another
way, national information pooling reduces the vulnerability of the vulnerable, and, to the extent that this is so, the more effective the system, the
more support there will be for augmenting it.
The second, indirect connection between creation of a national
framework and the prospects of experimentalism points to the limits of
the analogy between constitutional reform and economic reorganization
168. See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 32-37.
169. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 72, at 482-83 (arguing that conceptions of the
modem corporation reflect organizational patterns of the U.S. firm circa 1965).
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and underscores the distinctive and fundamental importance of higherorder, national institutions to the former. For employees and owners
alike, the possibility that successful, day-to-day operation of current arrangements may generate fundamental errors that those arrangements
cannot detect is a business risk worth running if current returns are high
and the chances of timely improvements in error detection good. Indeed, if a single firm adopts the new methods while its competitors do
not, the firm stands to benefit from the comparative advantage conferred. But constitutions are constitutions in the sense of foundational
principles of a political order only if they consistently establish the institutions of normal political decisionmaking and the institutions that repair
breakdowns in such decisionmaking. By establishing these higher-order
institutions, constitutions entrench the conceptions of political justice,
thereby constituting the polity as well as the government. To pursue a
strategy of decentralized design and production in anticipation of corresponding governance mechanisms may be prudent or rash. To adopt
cognate forms in the polity-subverting what is left of representative democracy without providing some coherent picture of the emergent regime-gambles that crucial part of our identity that derives from citizenship in a democracy in reckless ignorance of the stakes. Hence, it should
not be surprising that the little evidence there is suggests that, even in
those isolated cases where experimentalist provision of public services has
been broadly and successfully introduced under conditions of near emergency, practical success does not long forestall insistent questions regard170
ing the relation between the new forms of participation and the old.
Thus, either from the point of view of calculations of advantage that
tip allegiance in struggles over the desirability of new methods or from
the vantage point of large ideas that frame, through citizenship, our political and collective being, the project of democratic experimentalism is
incomplete and fragile without preliminary indications of the national
ends towards which reform should be directed. To be sure, change may
proceed by bootstrapping, as local incrementalism leads to complementary reforms at higher levels. However, even if elements of traditional
representative democracy long coexist with elements of a new participatory one, it is essential to present at least a tentative account of the
envisioned national framework of experimentalism as a whole. To that
task we now turn.
V. THE NATIONAL FRAMEwoRK
Under current conditions, the national lawmaking apparatus performs the Penelope labor of undoing with one hand what it does with the
other. To assure democratic deliberation for the common good, an
elected Congress has authority to make decisions of national importance;
but to take account of the legislature's bounded rationality, Congress del170. See Sabel, supra note 103, at 6.
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egates its power to administrative agencies or shares its power with the
states.
In an experimentalist democracy, in contrast, decisionmaking is
from the first presumptively decentralized, hence adjusted to local circumstance, and fragmented, for rules originate in the deliberations of
distinct local governments. The principal role of the national government in domestic affairs, accordingly, is to encourage and coordinate this
decentralized decisionmaking, and to protect citizens against abuses of
power-especially, and paradoxically, those abuses that may result from
or be exacerbated by the pulverization of central authority itself. The
task of the legislature is to authorize these deliberations and finance the
ensuing experiments where local resources are insufficient to do so. The
task of the administrative agencies is to provide the infrastructure of coordination, again where local resources are insufficient. The courts in this
system are charged with the familiar tasks of policing government and
safeguarding rights.
As experimentalist government is government by direct deliberation,
these judicial activities are now more conspicuously than ever in the service of the common end of increasing citizen participation in political
decisions, and especially in making forms of participation that produce
effective results in one jurisdiction available to others in which they are
applicable. But policing and monitoring are here also more directly connected than under the traditional approach. The judiciary draws on the
experimentalist capacities of the system it superintends and itself uses experimentalist methods in interpreting the law. Information furnished by
the system of decentralized learning organized by the administrative
agencies informs the judiciary's initial findings; it treats these findings as
a framework within which local governments and other rule makers elaborate solutions that meet their needs, provided they explain how local
variants respect the framing principles and demonstrate by performance
benchmarking that the solutions work as they should in principle. Thus,
constitutional considerations are instinct in political deliberation, and
the judiciary-like the agencies and the legislature-guides deliberative
democracy from within.
This Part presents our familiar national institutions as parts of a system that complements and completes local experimentalism. The Parts
that follow explore them further from the vantage point of an experimentalist judiciary recasting and solving in novel ways the dilemmas that
give rise to the traditional problems of federalism, separation of powers,
and judicial protection of individual rights. Our description of the transformations that democratic experimentalism would require of American
national institutions does not minimize the scope of change we envision.
At the same time, however, the transformation envisioned has deep
resonance with the values of American democracy and is partially anticipated by countercurrents within the tradition of American public
administration.
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A. Congress
The chief tasks of Congress in the experimentalist framework are to
authorize, finance, and, if necessary, withdraw national support for state
and local experimentation, as a means of reforming current solutions to
entrenched problems or responding to emergent ones. By authorizing
experimentation, Congress agrees to provide funds to local governments,
or to administrative agencies collaborating with them, to pursue, by any
constitutional means they see fit, such general purposes as Congress has
determined, provided that all beneficiaries of the authorization agree to
declare their goals and subject their activities to corresponding measurement by methods they agree upon.
Congressional authorization of subnational experiments would depend on a double determination. The first-conventional in characteris that the experiment identifies citizenship goods: goods that are important to the ability of citizens to act as such, yet that are unlikely to be
supplied adequately to them unless the state provides at least some citizens directly or regulates markets to assure provision. Education is a familiar example of such a citizenship good, for it provides the foundations
of self-determination upon which citizenship itself is founded, yet, in the
simplest case, citizens may lack the means to provide their children an
adequate education. The second determination necessary to authorization-reflecting the conditions propitious to experimentalism-is that
the citizenship good be complex. In this context, complexity means that
the good consists of one or more services whose means and ends are continuously adjusted to account for the diversity and volatility of the needs
of citizen users, and also to account for adjustments in services that are
complementary to the main services. The difficulties of New Deal institutions suggest that many current programs are complex (their complexity
overburdened the institutions); discussion of the contracting for new
services points to the same conclusion.
There will be, of course, disagreements as to whether particular
goods meet these tests, and how to frame experiments when they do. As
in the case of disputes at the local level of governance councils, the freedom of action provided by experimentalism itself will often clear the way
to resolve such disagreements. Some jurisdictions may believe, for instance, that because of moral hazards and other perverse incentive effects, provision of goods in the form of social welfare may lead to behavior that subverts their ultimate purpose of securing economic selfsufficiency. A showing that economic self-sufficiency, as measured in
publicly agreed ways, was increased more through training in workplace
skills or through public employment or (contrary to our own strongly
held view) by doing nothing at all than by any form of direct assistance,
would count strongly for their views. In an experimentalist regime, these
jurisdictions could pursue such alternatives on condition that they meet
certain procedural requirements discussed below. Thus, whereas division
now paralyzes the national legislature, and the resulting need for com-
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promise often so denatures competing proposals that their proponents
cannot be held in the slightest accountable for the results, division in an
experimentalist Congress would usually trigger authorization to act on
the contending programs. Such actions would be faithful enough to the
legislative purposes-and sufficiently measurable by standards they outline-to count as evidence of their plausibility.
The freedom of maneuver of an experimentalist Congress is further
increased by the possibilities of authorizing experimentation incrementally or allocating resources to jurisdictions that could not, unaided,
manage to put forward the kinds of coordinated proposals from which
experimentalism begins. When it is unclear what good pragmatist methods will do or there is fear of disruption if they are introduced abruptly,
Congress can dedicate a small, perhaps increasing, share of current allocations to a program for its experimentalist redesign. Congress could
also finance experimentalism from increments to the program's budget.
If the concern is, rather, that just those jurisdictions whose disorganization makes reform most urgent will initially be incapable of mustering the
organization needed to meet the minimal, formal requirements of experimentalist concertation, Congress can provide separate funds to local goverments and administrative agencies to permit them to build the capacity to do so. As we will see, the other institutions of the national
framework can introduce experimentalism from their separate starting
points and build the capacity to engage in it incrementally as well. 171
This freedom of maneuver comes at the price of substantial self-limitation in the direction Congress can impose on local governments participating in experimentalism. When Congress authorizes experimentation,
it puts its own disagreements to one side on the grounds that the means
to an end are only provisionally known, and the definition of the end
itself will change as appropriate means are discovered. Therefore, it cannot simultaneously give preference to some means over others, or, equivalently, define the ends so narrowly that only certain means count as furthering them. In authorizing experimentation, therefore, Congress
should state the publicly desired ends in abstraction from the means, and
with sufficient generality to accommodate refinement through pursuit of
effective solutions. Consider an example developed below: If an experimentalist Congress intends to increase highway safety, it should not prescribe an increase in the drinking age as the means. Rather, local governments should have the discretion whether to choose instead driver
education, mandatory use of safety-enhancing devices, or some other
combination of means, provided only that the locales give reasons for
their choices and expose those reasons to public scrutiny by benchmarking results.
Similarly, if the goal is to improve the possibilities for young people
to pass successfully from school to work, experimentalist reform cannot
171. See infra Part V.B.
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effectively be limited, for example, to the redesign of existing vocational
training programs. This presumes again that the legislature knows more
about the contours of a solution than the recourse to experimentalism
warrants. For if the current institutions most directly charged with an
official task are failing, it may be that the reason is a flaw in their very
constitution, and such flaws are likely to remain hidden unless the failing
program is contrasted with others constituted differently. Such contrasts,
in turn, depend on an unencumbered survey of possibilities. Indeed, just
as solutions often lie outside the realm marked out by habit, so the problem-solving institution best suited to solve a particular problem may have
originated as a response to another one, and only local knowledge of its
operation reveals the potential of applying it to a new task. Such are the
investigations that the authorization to experiment must encourage.
The same logic requires restraint in the determination of subnationaljurisdictions. The dimensions of effective government will change
according to the particulars of the problem of governance; "local" actors,
whatever their limitations, know best when "local" is improperly sized.
Hence, the experimentalist Congress defers to local government in defining the jurisdictions that will be the protagonists of particular experimentalist programs. In reforming schools or cleaning up environmental
hazards, Congress can assign the states responsibility for determining the
jurisdiction-local, statewide, regional, or jurisdictions wholly distinct
from ordinary political boundaries-to be established to treat the problem. Nor are Congress and state and local governments limited to combinations or subunits of existing governments in designating problem-solving jurisdictions. Congress can authorize the provision of funds to
administrative agencies or to local governments to be distributed in turn
to groups (of citizen users, local governments, and providers) able to
present promising plans for continuing collaboration (including longterm consultation with others).
With much power delegated to subnational bodies, on what basis
would the electorate choose national representatives? Campaigns for
election to an experimentalist Congress would join debate about national
and local strategies in novel ways, tending in time to establish closer connections between them. At the national level, debate would focus on the
implications of large alternatives revealed by experimental exploration of
current ones, especially in the form of proposals for new areas of experimentalism based, in part, on analogies to experiments in progress. This
debate would go hand in hand with a new localism, as candidates and
incumbents in democratic experimentalism challenge one another to say
what use they would make of the freedom to experiment locally, and especially how they would use the vantage point of national office to encourage the particular experimental activities they favor. Thus, candidates would soon have to demonstrate mastery of current alternatives,
express and motivate their preferences among these, and then pledge to
advance the preferred alternative by facilitating its local development. In
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doing this, they oblige themselves to support the information exchanges
upon which success will in large measure depend. Hence, they pledge to
cooperate with local officials in experiments within the experiment: efforts to scout out new possibilities, or to help direct participants to do so,
before these are recognized by more formal systems of evaluation. All of
this helps to break down the traditional distinction between national politics as the realm of questions so large as to be answerable in the end by
professions of faith-government, for or against?-and local politics as
service to constituents harried by the problems of wealth or poverty. The
more localities in an experimentalist democracy act on familiar grand
ideas, and the more representatives are accountable for the local consequences of this action, the more the familiar grand ideas come to be
defined by their implications in everyday life, and the more everyday life
is implicated in the articulation of novel ideas.
Such changes would not, of course, eliminate porkbarrel legislation.
Even in periods of fiscal austerity there will be military bases, government
laboratories, regional administrative processing centers, or dams that can
arguably be located in one jurisdiction rather than in another. These are
among the most prized trophies of representative democracy; experimentalism does not automatically lessen their appeal. But pork would be a
residual category, not the emblem of the hidden truth of politics behind
172
the incense of high principle.
172. In this context, consider, as a cynical harbinger of a new form of election fusing
local and national debate, the successful use by the Democratic Party in the last
presidential election of the strategy of decomposing all large symbolic issues into small and
less generally suggestive projects. Since the time of Walter Lippmann, it has been
axiomatic that a political party could succeed in American mass democracy only by
associating its program with the symbols of the way of life the majority favors, and
associating its opponents' program with symbols of what that majority rejects. The new
strategy derived from the insight that such symbols come to stand for a manifold of
practices with which they are only loosely associated. See Dick Morris, Behind the Oval
Office: Winning the Presidency in the Nineties 218-19 (1997). Thus, advocacy of a
constitutional amendment permitting school prayer stands very generally for the
conviction that moral beliefs are a public matter, but also, more particularly and loosely,
for the distinct ideas that our moral responsibilities to each other may legitimately be
discussed in public, that the state may foster such discussion, that religious and moral
beliefs may be connected, that children, above all, should learn and partake of all this, that
schools should therefore address moral concerns, and so on. Politicians who oppose a
school prayer amendment on constitutional grounds can avoid the sting from this
rejection of the comprehensive symbol by showing that citizens can get from government
most of the particular things they associate with that idea even without the actual
amendment. In the short run, as the presidential campaign of 1996 demonstrated, this
leads politicians to substitute lists of many small, nearly empty promises (school children
should wear uniforms to manifest their acceptance of a moral code; schools should teach
respect for moral concerns and mutual responsibilities) for a few large, empty promises.
But in an experimentalist setting, local government addresses just these "small" concerns
in a way that establishes the accountability of those who urge them and those who must act
to realize them. Under these conditions, the shift from the race to associate the opponent
with a big, unpopular idea from which prior positions block all escape (the hunt for

1998]

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMEATALTSM

B. Administrative Agencies
The chief purposes of administrative agencies in democratic experimentalism are to assist state and local governments in benchmarking, and
experimentalism generally, especially in connection with activities carried
out under congressional authorizations; to set-again by a variation of
benchmarking-regulatory standards for market actors; and to undertake such changes in their own activities and organization as cumulative
self-scrutiny indicates will further these purposes. In addition, certain experimentalist agencies provide citizenship goods themselves, such as the
administration of public lands, as opposed to assisting local governments
in providing the goods. Such agencies will have to organize and coordinate local benchmarking evaluation of the citizenship goods that they
provide.
The agencies are thus the continuing organized link between the
national and the local, helping to create through national action the local conditions for experimentation, and changing national arrangements
accordingly. Experimentalist agencies dedicated to comparative evaluation of public and private actors must contend with the evasions and deceptions of those unwilling to submit to assessments whose outcome they
do not control, and determined, therefore, to prevent the participation
of actors interested in open examination of their situation. Conversely,
experimentalist agencies must also contend with obstruction by those
who may use participation itself to frustrate their efforts: inveterate opponents of government administration or regulation in any form, or activist
citizens determined to paralyze administration, preventing approval of actions they disapprove. We focus here on benchmarking comparisons and
regulation through benchmarking as the prototypical activities of the experimentalist agency. We then suggest why experimentalist administration can likely succeed at these tasks despite the inevitability of obstruction. Last, we indicate the distinctive organizational features of this novel
form of administration that allow it rapidly to identify and generalize
good practices as they emerge in relevant areas of activity, and to reorganize itself to better its ability to do this.
1. Benchmarking. - In furnishing assistance in benchmarking, administrative agencies are almost literally creating the infrastructure of decentralized learning. Governments that want to learn from comparing
what they do to the activities of others like themselves must first find each
other, clarify the similarities of their activities, and define measures to
rate outcomes. Assuming that superficial resemblance is not always or
even often a good indication of deeper comparability of circumstance,
they must-by self-defeating circularity-start with deep mutual knowledge to become useful acquaintances. Because of their ability to survey
many jurisdictions from many points of view, administrative agencies can
"wedge" issues), to the race to decompose the old rallying calls, can be the beginning of a
new form of electoral politics.
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break this circle. With regard to programs in, for instance, education,
training, or child-protective services, the appropriate agency convenes the
local actors: to formulate suggestions for subgroupings of comparable
jurisdictions (very crudely: urban and rural with further subtypes within
each); to begin characterizing both individual programs (what services
are actually provided and how?) and the architecture of decisionmaking
(who participates and how?); as well as to devise performance measures
by which to evaluate these. Participants in these meetings arrive with proposals elaborated by the relevant groupings of officials from governance
councils, service providers, and citizen users, and they return to these to
discuss the results of each round and prepare for the next.
The agencies must be able to take account of local diversity and resulting differences in the direction of local innovation in order to provide
effective measures of performance in core programs-those which in
some form all jurisdictions are obligated to provide. As a consequence,
the agencies' measures must themselves be diverse and composite. Such
basic institutions of government such as schools or prisons, and many
others besides, serve distinct and potentially conflicting ends. Prisons exact a penalty for wrongdoing against society, incapacitate the wrongdoer
during his imprisonment, provide specific and general deterrence, and
rehabilitate the wrongdoer for participation in social life.' 73 Schools that
enable young persons to flourish in a democracy teach respect for self
and others, as well as the more or less specialized capacities needed for
economic and political independence. Different jurisdictions will naturally differ in their emphasis on these purposes and accordingly prefer
measures that record progress on the dimensions they prefer.
Nonetheless, common systems of measurement will be possible and
widely valued because jurisdictions are unlikely to disavow the institutional purposes they do not favor. Therefore, they will be concerned with
maximizing achievement of their preferred purposes while minimizing
the sacrifice of other legitimate aims. Thus, those who view prisons primarily as places of rehabilitation are unlikely to think that rehabilitation
is furthered if inmates literally or figuratively run riot in prison. 174 Conversely, those who see the purpose of penal institutions as inflicting deserved and dissuasive punishment are unlikely to prefer forms of discipline that encourage recidivism as against those that reduce it.17 5 In the
173. See George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 415 (1978); Wayne R. LaFave
& Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 27-29 (2d ed. 1986).
174. See Patrick R. Kane, Rehabilitation-The Prison System: "Warehouse
Rehabilitation" Federal Bureau of Prisons, 34 How. L.J. 496, 499 (1991) (arguing for
rehabilitation programs for most prisoners, while recognizing that "[flirst, we must have
security in these facilities").
175. Consider in this context a suggestion in Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, in which the majority upheld an Alabama prison regulation that
barred women from employment as prison guards in "'contact positions,' that is, positions
requiring continual close physical proximity to inmates," 433 U.S. 321, 325 & n.6 (1977).
Justice Marshall challenged the majority's assumptions about the nature and function of
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school setting, those who emphasize the importance of the pupils' esteem
for self and others will frequently consider this a precondition for acquiring the skills that afford self-sufficiency; those who emphasize the latter
will often treat it, conversely, as a precondition for the former. 176 In
short, localities will be under pressure to measure their effectiveness at
achieving a range of goals, not merely those they choose to emphasize.
Hence, despite the differences in emphasis from one jurisdiction to
another, there is a common interest in learning more about the relation
between various ends. In the foregoing examples, mutually comprehensible measurements reveal the trade-offs or surprising complementarities
between forms of discipline and rehabilitation, or between pride of identity and generally certified accomplishments. Jurisdiction X will not be
able to say to its disgruntled citizens who favor policy goal P, "We cannot
have P because we seek Q" if comparable jurisdiction Y pursues P as effectively as Y does, without sacrificing Q. The utility of mutually comprehensible measures creates incentives to agree to common, composite
measures by which each jurisdiction monitors performance indicators
that reflect not just its preferences, but the preferences of other jurisdictions as well. Beyond these composite, core measures will be ones devised
by institutions and jurisdictions in distinct settings: rural schools, or
schools for the deaf, or the unruly, and so on. Discussion and agreement
on measures of these various sorts harness diversity of purpose to a common enterprise without imposing false uniformity.
Despite their manifestly demanding goals, these benchmarking proceedings can be effective even if their results are modest when judged by
the exigent ambitions; the utility of modest results will encourage agreement that, in turn, allows the parties to learn enough to do modestly
better the next time. Recall that the aim in benchmarking is simply to
reveal sufficiently large differences in performance and approach to provoke local debate about the possibilities of improvement, and, subsequently, about the improvement of the groupings, characterizations, and
measures themselves. Agreement on groupings, characterizations, and
measures should be feasible because categorizations are understood as
provisional-in the case of novel programs, explicitly experimental-and
perfectible, not definitive. Recall, too, that benchmarking and the ensemble of learning-by-monitoring institutions of which it is a part, do not
the job of prison guard. Initially, he invoked a benchmark from other jurisdictions:
Where was Alabama's evidence that women are categorically unqualified for the position,
given the "highly successful experiences of other States" described in an amicus brief of
California and Washington? Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition to criticizing
the majority for too readily accepting a correlation between gender and control, Justice
Marshall noted that most prisoners will eventually be released, and they will be less likely to
commit further acts of violence if, during their imprisonment, they have learned "to relate
to women guards in a socially acceptable manner." Id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., James E. Abbott, Educating Students for the Community of WorkConnecting with the Fourth Essence, 115 Educ. 407 (1995) (linking self-esteem with
performance and using the new private sector forms as a model).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

aim to produce an exhaustive, fully replicable characterization of the
77
products or processes to which they are directed.'
Benchmarking does not produce laboratory protocols by which successful experiments can be reproduced elsewhere. Rather, it reveals or
leads to the discovery of unsuspected goals and indicates the guiding
principles and related kinds of means for obtaining them. Error-detection systems (which can themselves be benchmarked, and which can be
combined with random-assignment experiments and other familiar methods of evaluation) are then used to determine how to adapt the indicated
means to the local setting to achieve the goal. Put another way, the
benchmarking comparisons need only produce a usefully informative disequilibrium between current practices and prospects for improvement.
Thus, even the early characterizations of programs and outcomes can
produce enough learning to allow adjustment of the results of initial
rounds according to the exchanges of local experience they help
organize.
2. Obstruction. - But the very feasibility of agency coordination of
benchmarking will be an urgent reason to obstruct it for those who risk a
bad showing in comparison. Their obstruction can take many forms. Jurisdictions that do little in an area can group themselves with others who
do only that much or less and claim that their modest efforts and results
are the most circumstances will allow. There are performance measures
that notoriously conceal more than they reveal. 178 Insiders often find it
easy to exclude outsiders, because part of being an insider is knowing
which bits of the indigestibly large mass of information introduced into
debate really matter for decisions.
Yet, this obstruction will succeed in the long run only on the highly
unlikely condition that almost none of the local governments participating in the benchmarking and almost none of their constituents actually
intend to learn anything from it. Assume, to the contrary, that there is a
small group of governmental actors that does. The members of that
group can find one another in the general meetings and establish the
classification necessary to begin information exchange; the agency then
publicizes their measurement scheme and their substantive results. If
there are among the constituents of the obstructionists any who are discontent with the results their local governments provide, they can use the
public information to suggest unfavorable comparisons between their
home situation and that of the better performers. Thus, reversing the
burden of proof, they can pressure their own government to prove-by
cooperative participation in benchmarking.-that the comparison is unwarranted. And to defend itself by cooperating, the local government
177. See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
178. Consider, for example, the question of how to measure the return on the public
investment in technical assistance to firms. The firms prefer to measure this return by
their own estimates of potential savings since such a measure only provides information to
those familiar with the options the firm really faces, that is, to those inside the firm.

19981

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM

begins to provide information for assessments that are valid even if the
initial, invidious one proves not to be.
Truculence would be sanctioned initially by the administrative
agency, which would treat obstruction of benchmarking as a violation of
the obligation to exchange information accepted as a condition for obtaining national funds for experimental purposes. In addition, authorizing legislation would confer on aggrieved citizen users a statutory right to
participation. In judging the validity of administrative sanctions and citizen claims, courts would look for evidence that local governments and
agencies had actually engaged in directly deliberative problem solving
179
with regard to benchmarking and related activities.
Within any jurisdiction, the discipline of those who use participation
to frustrate the purposes of administration depends less on the shadow of
the law and more on the pressures of competition for influence and
place. Again, the crucial assumption is that there are some jurisdictions
in which participants do want to cooperate in problem solving. So long
as there are, and cooperation does produce results, aggressive participation as a means of obstruction will be open to criticism from within those
groups in whose name it is being exercised. Industrialists or managers
who quibble endlessly about providing any information or environmentalists who insist on having all that can be imagined will soon be confronted by compatriots who can cite examples where settling for less is
the way to get much more. Indeed, there are some first signs that advocacy groups are in fact realizing that they have more to gain by participating in decentralized problem solving than by using strong-arm tech80
niques to set limits on centralized decisions.'
Experimentalist agencies would not merely coordinate the experimentalist methods of subnational jurisdictions; agencies themselves
would adopt the new disciplines. Thus, in the new framework, agency
regulatory standard setting similarly depends on benchmarking and error
detection for the initial formulation and continuous adjustment of rules,
and on a similar combination of incentives and legal sanctions for its enforcement. Subject to some important exceptions, until recently, standards in areas such as occupational health and safety, environmental protection, the transportation of hazardous materials, and the like have been
implicitly premised on the fixity of the mass-production world. They
specify, in effect once and for all, means and ends simultaneously, and by
reference to each other. A safe construction method for workers at risk
of dangerous falls is one that provided them with safety lanyards or tethers, and other specified equipment to be worn under risky conditions;
"acceptable" emissions of certain effluents are defined as those not exceeding certain concentration levels in the environment at any one mo179. See infra Part V.D.
180. For examples of problem-solving public advocacy in the areas of health care and

low-wage labor markets, see Videotape: So Goes A Nation: Lawyers and Communities
(Site Effects 1997) (on ifie with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
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ment, or accumulating to more than specified amounts in any period.
The actual standards are often the result of a typical compromise: The
responsible administrative agencies and the advocates of those exposed
to, for example, environmental and occupational hazards urge rules that
would eliminate the risks. Producers countered that a regime that eliminated risk entirely makes production impossible: Workers completely secured against falls are so tightly tethered that they cannot construct anything and the only way to eliminate certain effluents entirely is to cease
production of the good of which they are a coproduct. The obvious compromise is to define a list of obligatory protection measures or schedule
of fines that reduce (or create financial incentives to reduce) risk without
eliminating it, yet are economically acceptable. Because it is laboriously
achieved, this compromise is seldom revisited, with the result that standard means and ends usually outlive the circumstances to which they
were applied.' 8 1
Experimentalist regulation, in contrast, would connect rulemaking
with the learning-by-monitoring institutions of firms. The fundamental
link is that most hazards are joint products of conditions that produce
waste or inefficiencies in general.'8 2 Identifying and eliminating the
sources of the hazards both raises efficiency and creates the preconditions for subsequent efficiency gains. For example, a production system
that leaks recurrently is discarding its own output while burdening the
environment; it is, moreover, an unpredictable system. Efforts to improve it could be wasteful themselves because, so long as the system is out
of control, there is no conclusive way to determine their effects. Similarly, many of the worst construction hazards result from flaws in the design of the building under construction (in the case of steel-girder erection, poor design may produce torsion at the joints which can then spring
apart with catastrophic effects for workers in the vicinity and the structure
as a whole), or from poor training in construction methods (which endangers workers and reduces the value of the finished building). Thus,
in experimentalist administration, the search for efficiency is incidentally
a search for regulatory improvements and vice versa.
The administrative agency can, in turn, use this connection between
regulatory goals and efficiency to promulgate regulations in the form of
rolling best-practice rules. Such rules require regulated entities to use
processes that are at least as effective in achieving the regulatory objective
as the best practice identified by the agency at any given time. In one
variant, the current production method that creates the lowest level of
181. The construction examples draw on proposed safety rules discussed at a meeting
of the Steel Erection Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee (SENRAC) and
reported injody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. Rev. 1, 49-55 (1997).
182. The condition might be thought not to hold for processes designed to separate a
useful resource from a useless or inherently hazardous one, but, of course, the concepts of
useful and useless themselves include potentially challengeable assumptions.
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risk is the standard all producers must meet (within a certain grace period), either by adopting those methods or devising equivalents. In another, polluters are pushed from the bottom of the heap rather than pulled toward the top: The level of risk defined by the most hazardous
operators defines a regulatory purgatory from which polluters must ascend (again within an agreed period); the acceptable minimum rises as
the worst performers improve. In both cases, benchmarking establishes
and periodically updates the standard to incorporate improvements, raising the ceiling in the one case and the floor in the other. Firms that
achieved significant improvements as part of the first, rising ceiling type
of programs of increasing efficiency, would gain a further advantage in
establishing them as public standards. Competitors would have to incur
the costs of adopting some version of the new methods sooner than market competition alone would have required, reducing risks without an
offsetting gain in efficiency, or paying a fine. In the meantime, the innovator could be innovating again. Specialist producers of equipmentpumps, valves, many kinds of machine tools, for example-that reduce
risks by increasing the reliability on which efficiency improvements ultimately depend, would, under such regulations, have an additional motive
to do what they often do in any case: Make their current products obsolete by building more capable models.
Notice that this method eliminates the problem of information
hoarding associated with many of the market-based alternatives to traditional rulemaking. In the standard market-based alternative, firms are
assigned tradable rights to emit certain quantities of pollutants in a given
period. 18 3 Those who reduce emissions below the level of their entitle183. For arguments in support of such schemes, seeJ.H. Dales, Pollution, Property &
Prices: An Essay in Policymaking and Economics 93-108 (1968); Thomas H. Tietenberg,
Emissions Trading 188-215 (1985); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming

Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1341-51 (1985). Although we disagree with the
specific form of market-based alternative to regulation, we agree with Richard Stewart's
more general observation:
The most promising solution to Madison's Nightmare is not indiscriminate
devolution and deregulation. Neither is it a constitutional counterrevolution by
the courts, nor stiffer judicial controls on administrators through administrative
law. The best solution is to adopt new strategies for achieving national goals in
lieu of the centralizing command and control techniques relied upon so heavily
in recent decades.
Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 335, 352 (1990). Notice,
finally, that in explaining the limited diffusion of market-based regulation thus far, some

authors note that a central barrier to its widespread use has been the organizational
limitation of-in our language-mass-production firms. Thus, a shift to the form of
economic organization sketched above may encourage certain forms of regulation with
affinities to market-based schemes, but not directly for the reasons normally offered by the
proposals of these latter. See Robert N. Stavins & Bradley W. Whitehead, Market-Based

Environmental Policies, in Thinking Ecologically: The Next Generation of Environmental
Policy 105, 111 (Marion R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997). For an earlier draft of
this piece that discusses the issue at greater length, see Robert N. Stavins & Bradley W.
Whitehead, The Next Generation of Market-Based Environmental Policies 17 (Aug. 15,
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ments can sell the rights to emit the difference to those firms who emit
18 4
more, and the prospect of doing so is the incentive to cut emissions.
The difficulty with this system (other than the vexing problem of determining and constantly adjusting the price for the entitlements) is that it
encourages firms to hoard the know-how they acquire in pollution reduction. The greater the gap between their knowledge and their competitors', the greater the prospective proceeds from the sale of rights. But if
this secrecy is rational for the individual firm, it is plainly irrational for
the society as a whole to pay the costs of multiple, independent reinvention of waste-reduction methods.
Rolling best-practice rulemaking and the incentives it creates are not
limited to circumstances in which the search for incremental efficiency
gains leads directly to reductions in known hazards. The method can be
used prospectively to create incentives for attractively safe products that do
not currently exist. In some production methods, hazardous materials or
circumstances do not coincide with inefficiency; instead, in these methods, the hazardous materials or circumstances are a necessary and irreducible byproduct or component of an efficient process or product. In
these cases, by definition, efficiency gains pursued along the current trajectory of technological development will not substantially reduce the
hazard. The use of fluorohydrocarbons in current refrigeration systems
or as a propellant, or of gasoline in current automobiles are examples.
The only way to eliminate the hazard is to find a substitute for the product or process of which it is a part. It is here that prospective rolling bestpractice rules play their most significant role. The traditional method of
encouraging such substitution of safer products or processes is by technology-forcing legislation that imposes fines on producers that fail to reduce hazards to a level achievable only by some (unknown) alternate
technology by a distant date. 185 These rules touch off a game of chicken:
Recalcitrant producers do nothing and encourage others to do the same
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a discussion of
non-market based alternatives, see Adam B.Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the
Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. Econ.
Literature 132, 158-59 (1995).
184. The Clean Air Act codifies a traditional pollution credit allowance system. See
42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (1994). For a moderately favorable assessment of this program, see
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 117-20 (1995).
185. For example, in Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, the
Supreme Court invalidated a decision by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) to replace a ten-part-per-million benzene exposure limit with a
one-part-per-million exposure limit because, in the Court's view, OSHA lacked an
evidentiary basis for concluding that this level of safety was reasonably necessary. 448 U.S.
607, 630-38 (1980). Although the Court did not directly address the question of whether
the technological (in)feasibility of meeting a particular standard should be a basis for
adjusting an otherwise appropriate standard, that concern no doubt played a significant
role in the Court's reluctance to approve what it deemed an arbitrarily chosen limit. See
id. at 639-40.
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in the hope that their inaction can eventually be used to persuade courts
or administrative agencies that the original goals were infeasible. Collusion against the legislative or administrative goal is easy because it is tacit,
and because potential innovators will be deterred from developing alternatives for fear that the results will fall short of the requirement. Under a
prospective rolling best-practice rule, in contrast, the best alternative solution available by a distant date would (re)set the standard from that
time on. Innovators are rewarded for outdoing the competition, and
hence encouraged to outdo one another. Only explicit (and therefore
detectably illegal) collusion could bind all from developmental activities
that would spur the rivalry of the others.
Likewise, rolling best-practice rules can be used potentially, to reduce
sources of risk in novel or experimental products, even before the precise
nature of those sources can be identified. Potential rolling best-practice
rules are useful where product life cycles are short with respect to the
time needed fully to test and improve the safety of a product under realworld conditions (computers, much software, and complex financial
products) or where initial real-world failures would be catastrophic
(pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, and products bound for space or the battlefield). The way to reduce risks under these circumstances is to characterize more and more precisely the sources from which hazards may derive
and to reduce and monitor each precisely characterized source more and
more effectively. Contaminants are much more likely to be introduced
into batches of foodstuffs at some points in processing than at others:
when harvested, during transport, when fermenting, etc. Precise accounts of potential hazards and countermeasures-including error-detection systems for maintaining and improving the countermeasures themselves-can then be developed to lower the possibilities of dangerous
damage to products of various types. 18 6 In the production of foodstuffs,
8 7
these are called HACCPs, for hazard analysis of critical control points;
the Federal Drug Administration maintains an analogous set of standard
operating procedures with regard to the production of pharmaceuticals.' 88 The potential rolling best-practice rule benchmarks these prophylactic measures and establishes them as the initial production standards in the relevant industries. As these standards help producers
increase the reliability of both products and processes, efficiency considerations again encourage compliance. Indeed, to the extent that risk reduction is a condition for creating markets in potentially hazardous products as diverse as sophisticated financial derivatives and foodstuffs,
186. For an insider's ringing endorsement of many elements of the experimentalist
regulatory methods in the approval of new drugs, see David A. Kessler, Remarks by the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 51 Food &Drug LJ. 207, 209-15 (1996) (describing the
success of the FDA in self-monitoring and comparative assessments with counterpart
agencies worldwide).
187. See 9 G.F.R. pt. 417 (1997).
188. See Kessler, supra note 186, at 207.
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regulation of this sort amounts to a form of codevelopment between producers, users, and regulators. The decomposition of as-yet undeveloped
products and processes enables producers and regulators alike to learn
from real-world experience in circumstances in which no experience with
the completed product or process yet exists.
3. Novel Forms of Organization. - Finally, to update and propagate
benchmarks, and the background understanding they suppose, while assessing compliance with them, experimentalist administration introduces
novel forms of organization. Experimentalist regulatory agencies recall
the design and problem-solving teams of learning-by-monitoring institutions in the way they pool various kinds of expertise in the evaluation of
different situations. Recall that in learning by monitoring, collaboration
among teams within a firm and between the firm and its suppliers breaks
down the distinction between the individual actors' roles.'8 9 Similarly,
from the point of view of the composition of their personnel and their
personnel's career paths, the operations of experimentalist agencies blur
the distinction between regulatory agency and regulated entity-without
obstructing public scrutiny of administrative activity. We call the ensemble of these forms peer, team, or participatoryadministration to emphasize
two points. First, in their organization, agencies will come to utilize work
teams in much the same manner that the new firms do, and thus the
agencies will be structured as participatory units. Second, and more important, peer, team, or participatory administration refers to the close
working relationship between regulator and regulated entity that will facilitate the agency's role as conduit of information. To an important degree, peer administration provides a mechanism by which agencies set
rolling best-practice rules. Agency staff, observing (or more properly,
participating in the activity of) the regulated entities first-hand, develop a
strong sense of emerging processes, and by pooling knowledge of these
processes with staff at other locations, agencies can identify emerging best
practices.
The New Deal pattern of organization-or, rather, the characteristic
dilemma of that organization-is useful as a point of contrast. On the
one hand, New Deal agencies were meant to remain distinct from the
social or economic worlds they regulated or administered; distance and
detachment were thought to be requirements if the agency was to exercise its (delegated) lawmaking authority to establish general, enduring,
and impartial rules. 190 Hence, agencies needed an extensive, professional, and independent staff, competent to gather information for
rulemaking and adjudication. But the same agencies, on the other hand,
had to deal directly and continuously with the interests they regulated.
Otherwise, no matter how well staffed, they lacked the fine-grained information about emergent possibilities or potential evasions required to ex189. See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
190. See Landis, supra note 26, at 9-14.

1998]

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTAUSM

ercise their (delegated) lawmaking authority in the interest of the particular segment of the public within their jurisdiction. Hence, agencies
needed to supplement or even supplant staff work with complex alliances
with various interests, aiming to expose what normal research alone
could not uncover. The results were continuing struggles of the agencies
to be in the worlds they regulated, but not of them, and the concomitant
oscillations of their leading officials between magisterial lawgiving and
factional politicking. Thus, as an architect of the administrative state and
founder of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), James
Landis, for example, likened the role of the administrative agency to that
of a board of directors for an industry, able to use its fact-finding powers
and panoramic perch to reach judgments more balanced and farsighted
than those accessible to more partial parties. 19 1 But as the senior operating official of the SEC, he was always playing off the independent accountants against the corporate treasurers to determine what types of corbe disclosed for purposes
porate financial information could reasonably
192
of evaluating publicly traded securities.
Experimentalism links benchmarking, rulemaking, and revision so
closely with operating experience that rulemakers and operating-world
actors work literally side by side-but, to repeat, in plain view of the public-and thus, largely overcome the distinction between the detached
staff of honest but imperfectly informed experts and the knowledgeable
but devious insiders they regulate. Inspection by peer administrators is a
characteristic institution for establishing these connections. Assume that
initial regulatory benchmarks have already been fixed with regard to, say,
forest-fire prevention or the safety-related operations of nuclear power
plants (to pick two examples to which we will return in detail in a moment) by some procedure of extensive consultation. Then the task of the
peer inspectors is to determine whether particular operating units are in
compliance with the benchmarks, and to grasp the general lessons, if any,
regarding obstacles to compliance in cases where they are not, or regarding the need to set more demanding standards, when they are. Such evaluative learning is in effect a kind of higher-order error detection: It aims
to discover why the error-detection institutions of a particular unit were
either unable to detect and correct the disturbances that obstructed compliance or were so effective that they raised performance above currently
established levels.
But of course the initial benchmarks and, more generally, standards
for purposes of environmental or consumer protection, occupational
health and safety, or the coordination of complexly interconnected products with aspects of public infrastructure (as in telecommunications) can
all be set by similar means. Thus, whereas practitioners may currently
testify at hearings or serve on ad hoc committees devoted to writing defin191. See id. at 10-13.
192. See Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis
D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn 153-209 (1984).
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itive rules, in peer administration they would serve on the standing bodies that create the framework for rules that can be periodically updated as
practice warrants, and help establish the forms of participatory review
suited to keeping the rules up to date in various settings. Peer participation on the problem-solving model could also be used occasionally to
identify areas where the administration might change its own structures
to facilitate experimentation: for example, by creating a service to help
jurisdictions that lack the experience to formulate plans for experimental
projects to do so or to aid others threatened by deadlock to advance.
Again, these services would draw on the experiences of respected practitioners. Selection would favor those who had learned to break deadlocks
not in some arbiters' way of splitting differences (which entrenches fundamental assumptions and thus, in time, obstructs wide-reaching
change), but rather by showing the parties how, in pursuing new projects
that sidestep or clarify their differences, they might come to a new understanding of those projects. Selection would also favor those who became
adept at bootstrapping planning, in which each project increases the jurisdiction's capacity to formulate a comprehensive and better directed
successor. By such means, peer administration could become at once the
frame of national experimentalism and, together with a new style of electoral politics, an instrument for connecting that frame to the local activity
it regulates.
C. Antecedents and Lessons
Just as the institutions of learning by monitoring in the private sector
have advantages which lead to their diffusion, so principles of democratic
experimentalism in administration are often sufficiently attractive to both
public and private actors to be adopted piecemeal in the public sector.
That agencies designed on conventional principles have begun to reorganize themselves along the lines described above in recent years' 93 argues for the robustness of peer administration as a general response to
problems of regulation under conditions of volatility and diversity. There
are, in addition, suggestive historical cases where measures of peer administration were adopted avant la lettre by American agencies operating
in environments which were anomalous for their day,' 9 4 but which approximated the situation administration now faces.
We begin with negative lessons by considering a classic failure, which
upon closer inspection, reveals itself to have been a near success. This
anticipatory history helps specify key preconditions for experimentalism
to thrive-most critically, some mechanism for forestalling litigation until
after an experimental regulatory regime has had the opportunity to
demonstrate its worthiness or lack thereof. We draw these lessons chiefly
from the furor over regulatory attempts to require air bags on
193. See supra Part IV.
194. See infra Parts V.C.1-4.
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automobiles during the last quarter century. We then reach back to a still
earlier antecedent in the Forest Service and forward to contemporary success stories concerning nuclear power plant safety and environmental
regulation to show how different regulatory regimes, beginning from
nearly contrary starting points, are converging on the same experimentalist methods.
1. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. - The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA, or the Agency) provides
both an illustration of administrative experimentalism that might have
been, and a cautionary tale about the capacity of current practice and
doctrine to stifle regulatory innovation in its infancy. NHTSA was created
in 1966 explicitly to bring science and technology to bear on the-problem
of reducing highway slaughter. 19 5 But in the course of fifteen years,
NHTSA's decisionmaking became so unwieldy that in Motor Vehicle
ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., it
was chastised by the Supreme Court for failing to give due consideration
to manifestly promising safety devices. 196 The authoritative study of
NHTSA by Mashaw and Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety, recounts the
Agency's decline from putative avant-garde to laggard. 197 From this history, Mashaw and Harfst draw a large conclusion. As they understand it,
American legal culture is preoccupied with individual rights and permanent contests for authority between the President and Congress on the
one side and the federal and State governments on the other. 198 Contrasting the Agency's promise with its performance, their study presents
the history of NHTSA as an object lesson in the constraining influence of
that legal culture on all forms of regulation. 199
Yet beneath, or, rather, entwined with, the story of an agency that
belied its own efforts to seek practical truth, the authoritative account
also contains a counternarrative of an agency that might have adopted
certain experimentalist methods but for the accidents of political happenstance; of an agency, moreover, that arguably did adopt an oblique
form of experimentalism in response to the State Farm decision; and, indeed, of an agency, and of a whole legal regime more generally, that
could by modest reform encourage experimentalism quite directly. Juxtaposing the actual outcome with the counterfactual alternative thus suggests how easily we might have stumbled upon a variant of administrative
experimentalism without intending to and how we might achieve one if
we did.
195. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. 103-272,

§ 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379, 1379-1401 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1994)).
196. 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983). Below we address the implications of State Farm and
related cases for the role of courts in a system of democratic experimentalism. See infra

Parts V.D.1-2.
197. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1990).
198. See id. at 22-24, 111-13.
199. See id. at 20-24 (defining legal culture); id. at 224-31 (discussing implications
of cultural constraints on agency performance).
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First the balance of failure. NHTSA was the first of the agencies
such as the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, formed at the high noon of confidence in centralized government, to complete and perfect New Deal institutions by fusing democracy with science in a new way. 200 Operating under vague and general
statutes, and formulating rules incrementally, by adjudicating individual
cases through collegial decisionmaking independent of executive direction, the previously established agencies had often seemed impervious to
the very interests they were meant to protect and all too susceptible to
those they were meant to domesticate. 20 1 With more specific mandates,
decisionmaking processes aimed not at adjudication but rather at making
general rules under conditions open to the participation of potential
beneficiaries, and directed by more powerful, hence more acceptable administrators, the new agencies were intended to reverse this relation. 202
This general reorientation went hand in hand with the reconceptualization of automobile accidents from an epidemiological standpoint. 208
In the traditional view, accidents and injuries were coincident: Drivers
and passengers were injured or killed when cars collided with each other
or with fixed objects. For the epidemiologist, the human host is only
harmed upon contact with the agent of rapid energy transference in the
environment of the collapsing car.20 4 Hence, anything that altered the
environment to prevent the agent from contacting the host prevented the
accidental harm. This, in turn, suggested that to improve highway safety
the agency should focus less on preventing car crashes-which required
laborious and unreliable efforts to change driver behavior-and more on
reducing the hazards of the automotive environment by using regulation
to encourage use of passive safety devices (self-securing seat belts or air
bags) or active ones (manually secured seat belts) to protect car occupants from the effects of the "second," internal collision. 205 As seat belts
were widely used in the late 1960s, and air bags, under development since
200. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2(b) (3),
84 Stat. 1590, 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (3) (1994)) ("authorizing the Secretary

of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to
businesses affecting interstate commerce"). From 1970 to 1990, the Clean Air Act directed

the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate statutorily specified pollutants on a
pollutant-by-pollutant basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1) (A)-(B) (1988), amended by 42
U.S.C. § 7412(b)-(f) (1994). For the authorization and purpose of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, see Pub. L. No. 92-173, § 2, 86 Stat. 1207, 1207 (1972) (codified at 15

U.S.C. § 2051 (1994)).
201. For early recognition of the problem of agency capture, see Marver H. Bernstein,
Regulating Business by Independent Commission 74-95, 169-71 (1955); Samuel P.

Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public
Interest, 61 Yale LJ. 467, 481-505 (1952) (documenting railroad capture of the ICC).

202.
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204.
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Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197, at 4-5.
id. at 3.
id.
id. at 2-4, 65-67.
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the early 1950s, were on the verge of broad deployment, 20 6 there was
nothing technologically extravagant about the approach. Nor was there
anything rash in -the agency's decision to promote these changes wherever possible by moving gradually from design standards based on equipment in current use to performance standards that would eventually spec20 7
ify the characteristics of whole automotive subsystems.
Two closely related problems thwarted the agency's projects and
turned many of its efforts down the path of self-parody. First, absent any
evidence as to whether firms could comply with agency standards if they
made reasonable efforts to do so, courts simply did not know how to evaluate the claims of those manufacturers who asserted that the standards as
written were unreasonably burdensome. The resulting ambiguities were
judicial accidents waiting to happen, and several did. To take only the
best known example, in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation,the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
NHTSA was authorized by statute to induce firms to introduce new technology, but found that Standard 208, establishing the performance criteria for passive restraints eventually to be required on new automobiles,
was defective because of three ambiguities in the specifications of the
dummy with which the safety device was to be tested. 20 8 The court found
that these ambiguities violated the statutory requirement that agency
standards be "objective," in that manufacturers using different but
equally compliant test dummies might market passive safety devices with
different performance characteristics.20 9 Eventually some might be unjustly penalized for these differences.2 10 In fact, the specifications for the
dummy had been elaborated by a committee composed of industry engineers; more important, as the agency observed, no manufacturer would
be penalized for choosing one interpretation of the specification over
another.2 1 ' But since the court believed otherwise, and since it erroneously believed that manufacturers develop equipment only after they
have perfected the corresponding test devices, it ordered that implementation of Standard 208 be delayed until the ambiguities were resolved and
manufacturers could adjust to corrected specifications. 212 This and similar decisions that overturned standards just because they were rigorous
enough to allow precise identification of ambiguities2 13 devastated
206. See id. at 85.
207. See id. at 74-77.
208. See 472 F.2d 659, 671-73 (6th Cir. 1972).
209. See id. at 675-78.
210. See id.
211. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197, at 90.
212. See id. at 91.
213. See, e.g., Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1978)
(invalidating index of road slickness because court found unsatisfactory an agency

proposal for compensatory adjustments in test procedures to account for variations over
time of given road surfaces); see also Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197, at 100-01
(discussing the Paccarcase).
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NHTSA's ability to promulgate performance standards of any kind, emboldening reluctant manufacturers to try intransigence under all possible
legal pretexts before compliance, while intimidating the rulemakers
21 4
through the prospect of endless challenges.
The second problem that thwarted NHTSA's efforts was that it found
no way to assess reliably whether the driving public would welcome its
regulatory interventions as an advance in public safety, disregard them as
inconsequential nuisances, or rebel against them as violations of an elemental freedom of movement. 21 5 Public reaction was for the agency as
unpredictable as judicial reaction, and this second unpredictability, symbolized in the disastrous episode of the interlock rule, was as intimidating
as the first. 216 In response to complex technicalities related to the
Chrysler decision, and in revision of its own earlier determinations,
NHTSA in effect required that 1974 model-year cars be equipped with an
interlock device that disabled the ignition unless the seatbelts of occupied seats were engaged.2 1 7 The public revolted. There were terrifying
stories of women unable to flee rapists and amusing ones of parking attendants driven mad by incessant buckling.2 18 Senators rose on the floor
to tell of constituents strapping turkeys and dachshunds snugly into the
front passenger seat.219 Congress then added injury to insult by amending the Agency's enabling statute in 1974.220 Instead of insulating
NHTSA from judicial review, it subjected any future passive-restraint standard to a legislative veto, and prohibited the Agency outright from re22
quiring any interlock device. '
Given these obstacles, the Agency sought politically and judicially acceptable alternatives to rulemaking as a way of demonstrating vitality if
not efficacy, and temporized issuing those standards-208 above allthat it could not abandon without publicly disavowing its original
hopes. 22 2 The search for alternatives led quickly to a massive program for
forcing manufacturers to recall and repair cars found to have dangerously defective parts.223 Politically, the campaign was welcome because as
car prices rose during the inflation of the 1970s, consumers became less
and less tolerant of defects, and let their representatives know it;224 judicially, it proved unexpectedly acceptable because courts treated the
Agency in this regard with the leniency accorded consumer plaintiffs in
214. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197, at 92-103.

215. See id. at 38, 52, 215-16.
216. See id. at 134-35.

217. See id. at 131-33.
218. See id. at 139.
219. See id. at 139-40.
220. See Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93492, § 109, 88 Stat. 1470, 1482-84 (repealed 1994).
221. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197, at 109.
222. See id. at 185.
223. See id. at 189.
224. See id. at 113-15.

19981

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM

product liability cases rather than the stringency applied to it as a defendant in administrative law matters. 225 Taking account of the response rate
to recall programs, the costs of accidents occasioned by the trip to or
from the local recall center, and the risks of introducing new defects
while repairing the known one, it is likely that the diversion produced on
balance more harm than good; but there is no doubt that it was successful, for a time, in diverting attention from the near breakdown in
226
rulemaking.
Consistent with this retreat from rulemaking, NHTSA eventually concluded that detachable automatic seat belts would not result in a significant reduction in highway deaths or injuries, and accordingly rescinded
Standard 208 in October 1981.227 The decision to abandon the standard
was in part a reflex response to the advent of the Reagan Presidency and
the era of deregulation it promised, but, perhaps in equal measure, also
the product of NHTSA's despair at finding a solution that was both innocuous and minimally effective. 228 Given the constraints, the logic behind the rescission order had a compelling aspect: If the public, out of
concern for freedom of movement and fear of entrapment, would at
most accept passive devices that could be detached by a release button in
the manner of the quintessentially active device, the manual seat belt,
why require passive restraints in the first place?
But the Supreme Court reasoned differently. In State Farm, the
Court found NHTSA's rescission of Standard 208 arbitrary and capricious
because the Agency had failed to give adequate consideration to requiring air bags or nondetachable automatic seat belts as an alternative. As
willing to punish the Agency for the ambiguities of inaction as the lower
courts had been to penalize the ambiguities of rulemaking activity, the
Supreme Court criticized the decision for assuming, on no evidence, that
the driving public would defeat passive devices just because it was technically possible to do so, and wondered why air bags, which were unintrusive to the point of invisibility, had suddenly disappeared from the menu
of possible regulatory solutions.2 29 The controversy was eventually
mooted when, responding to consumer demand, automobile manufacturers equipped new vehicles with air bags as standard equipment. Only
then, in an ironic if not pathetic gesture, Congress responded by including a provision in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991 directing NHTSA to amend Standard 208 to require air bags on

225. See id. at 151-56.
226. See id. at 167-71.
227. See Federal Motor Vehicles Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 46
Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571.208); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note
197, at 209.
228. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197, at 209.
229. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
48-49 (1983).
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all new vehicles. 23 0 The new requirement became fully effective for passenger vehicles on September 1, 1997-just after NHTSA promulgated a
final rule authorizing the depowering of air bags to prevent injuries to
children and small-statured adults. 23 '
Now consider an alternative, experimentalist outcome that is much
closer, it turns out, to actuality than this account of nearly insurmountable obstacles would make it appear. The regulatory result would very
likely have been different had just one car manufacturer been willing to
build a fleet of vehicles equipped with air bags and had NHTSA been
willing to defer establishing standards until the fleet was tested on the
road. For the experience of building and using this fleet would have put
to rest questions about the acceptability of the device to the driving public while addressing judicial concerns about ambiguity. If consumers
were willing to drive the cars it was unlikely that they would rise in protest
against regulations making air bags standard equipment; if manufacturers sincerely feared that they would be penalized for misinterpreting ambiguous performance standards, they could adopt the solution of the
pioneer.
In fact, this experiment was almost run. The then-Secretary of
Transportation, William Coleman, proposed the idea of a cooperative
demonstration project in 1975, and General Motors, long a proponent of
air bags, was willing to participate. 23 2 Indeed, General Motors had already begun in the preceding years to use its problem-solving capacities
to provide working solutions to regulatory problems. As the only car
company ready to produce cars equipped with air bags at the time of the
Chrysler decision, it helped the Agency develop dummy standards nine
months after the Court demanded clarification. 23 3 In the end, only the
accidents of national politics prevented construction of the demonstration fleet. Coleman left office when President Ford lost the election of
1976 to President Carter; under its new Secretary Brock Adams, the
Department of Transportation simply saw no need for experimentation,
arguing with almost cynical consistency both that consumers would surely
take no notice of seat belts, 23 4 and that demonstration projects were a
"weak" regulatory strategy.235
But had this test been conducted it seems likely that the Court in
State Farm would not have felt obligated to imagine all the ways, however
improbable, that the development of a novel technology might prove infeasible or unjust, and the apparent limits of American legal culture
230. See Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 2508(a) (2), 105 Stat. 1914, 2085 (1991) (codified at

49 U.S.C. § 30127(c) (1) (1994)).
231. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,960 (1997) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
232. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197, at 206, 250-51.
233. See id. at 92.

234. See id. at 206.
235. See id. at 251.
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would have been extended without having been traversed. Mashaw and
Harfst say as much: Besides advancing Standard 208, they write, "[a] similar demonstration approach might well have saved Standard 121, the
truck antilock braking standard, and yet another might have enlisted the
236
support of the tire industry for tire performance standards."
Observe as well how easy it would have been to pass from a series of
demonstration projects that almost were, to explicit modification of the
legal regime along the lines suggested above. Generalizing the experience acquired through demonstrations, all organized by utterly conventional agreement under current law, NHTSA could have developed rolling best-practice standards in tandem with pilot projects, encouraging
competitors to pool standard-relevant knowledge (as General Motors did
in the case of the dummy specifications) along the way. The Agency, and
others following its example, would have thus created a de facto regime
in which pre-enforcement challenges to the feasibility of rules and standards would be pointless because rules and standards would not exist, let
alone give rise to enforcement actions, until their feasibility was established. Should further clarification prove necessary, it would be a short
step from this regime to a statute making forbearance from pre-enforcement litigation the rule in experimentalist litigation, thus insuring that
courts decide administrative law cases against a detailed backdrop of fact.
In one regard such a shift would restore, ironically enough, the state
of affairs that had obtained in administrative law in the period before
Chrysler and related decisions-when agencies imposed order by applying
rules case by case, and courts, when invoked, reviewed the agency decisions in light of the facts. 23 7 The difference is that in the experimentalist
regime, courts would be reviewing decisions and factual scenarios produced by the articulation of performance standards, potential and prospective, inconceivable in the epoch before Chrysler. If this is the path we
take, the confusions of the last decades will come to seem more a detour
than a necessity; and doctrinalists of the future will wonder how, for a
time, courts could have inverted the very idea of thought experiment
from a technique of imagining a new possibility from an imaginary vantage point to a method of finding legal obstacles-some restricting
agency action, some obligating it-by imagining all manner of possibilities. As Paul Verkuil argued in the mid-1970s, and as Mashaw continues
to argue persuasively today, elimination of pre-enforcement litigation
would go a long way towards reducing the arbitrariness of judicial review.23 8 Moreover, as Mashaw presents no deeply entrenched obstacles
in American legal culture to doing so, it is hard to see why that culture is,
as argued in The Struggle for Auto Safety, itself an obstacle to significant
236. Id.
237. See id. at 162.
238. See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 164-80; Paul Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal
Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185, 205 (1974).
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reform. 23 9 In short, the counternarrative may, in the long run, prove
more important than the farce that obscures it. Before turning to those
reforms of the courts, we consider three more examples of past and present experimentalist administration.
2. Antecedents in the Forest Service. - The Forest Service of the United
States Department of Agriculture (the Service) attracted public and
scholarly attention in the late 1950s for its ability to adjust complex policy
goals to extraordinarily diverse local settings, largely through controlling,
and learning from, the exercise of discretion by its lowest level operating
agents, the forest rangers. As this was the period in which the view of
bounded-rationality institutions 240 was formulated, academic efforts to
grasp the success of the Service were at pains to portray its organization as
a centrally directed hierarchy of this type. Indeed, the leading study of
the subject, Herbert Kaufman's The Forest Ranger, draws heavily on the
2 41
work of Herbert Simon, a progenitor of the bounded-rationality idea.
Here, using mainly the evidence reported in Kaufman's study, we show
that this success, and especially the reciprocal reshaping of general rules
and local practice that made it possible, rested instead on methods that
foreshadow peer administration introduced into the Service at its founding. Thus, this brief example does double duty. It buttresses the claim
that experimentalism is a general system of problem solving under conditions of diversity and complexity by showing that where problems are addressed with notable success under such circumstances, the solution is by
this and not other means. It also points to the possibility that American
public administration contains an organizational tradition, rooted in a
variant of Progressivism, that might serve as one operational precedent
for an extensive system of experimentalist administration. We conclude
our discussion of the Forest Service by briefly recounting the problems
that the Service has encountered in the decades since Kaufman completed his account.
The modem Forest Service was established in 1905, when responsibility for protecting and managing the country's national forests was
transferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department of
Agriculture, which until then had been limited to gathering historical,
statistical, and technical information concerning forestry and forest products. 242 The Service was charged from its inception with pursuing various, often conflicting goals in disparate settings, and the complexity of
the tasks and diversity of the settings increased rapidly in the following
years. 243 By the late 1950s, the Service had jurisdiction over 151 million
acres scattered through forty-two states and Puerto Rico, including re239. See generally Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 197.
240. See supra Part II.
241. See Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior,
at xiv (1960).
242. See id. at 26-27.
243. See id. at 29-33.
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mote regions of the Rockies, relatively developed lands on the East Coast,
the coastal mountains of Alaska, and the tropical jungles of Puerto
Rico.2 4 4 Today, national forest lands total 192 million acres in all regions
of the country (although concentrated in the Western States and Alaska),
or nearly nine percent of the United States landmass.2 45 Within these
areas, the Service manages timber logging and sales, reforestation, fire
control, grazing, the use of watersheds and natural habitats, and recreational activities. 246 The balance of these activities varies widely from region to region, and even where it is approximately the same, differences
in soil composition, vegetation, climate, and accessibility require that similar goals be pursued by different means. 247 Once arrived at, local and
national policies must be frequently revised to take account of, among
many other things, changes in product markets that make, say, lumbering
more attractive than grazing, or developments in labor markets that
change the attractiveness of a career in the Forest Service itself to potential recruits with differing levels of education and professional
248
ambition.
From the beginning, day-to-day management of local activities was
delegated to Forest or District Rangers, each responsible for a single district within a national forest, and reporting to a forest supervisor (who in
turn reported to a regional forester with jurisdiction for several national
forests) .249 Prior experience under the Department of the Interior had
shown that efforts to control the use of public lands directly from
Washington resulted in interminable delays in granting permits and
other decisions, and obstructed conservation. 250 The result was a founding and enduring principle of delegation subject to review that was
clearly announced in a letter from the Secretary of Agriculture to the
Chief of the Forest Service in 1905: "In the management of each reserve
[now national forest] local questions will be decided upon local grounds
....
General principles ... can be successfully applied only when the
administration of each reserve is left largely in the hands of local officers,
'25 1
under the eye of thoroughly trained and competent supervisors."
From the vantage point of the organizational understanding of the
1950s, the puzzle was how the necessary exercise of local discretion could
be sufficiently controlled to ensure conformity to the central direction.
The answer, as provided in Kaufinan's account, was comprehensive written regulation, policed and updated by a system of inspections and clear244. See id. at 38.
245. See U.S. GAO, GAO/RCED-97-71, Report to Congressional Requesters, Forest
Service Decision-Making: A Framework for Improving Performance 4 (1997) [hereinafter
Forest Service Decision-Making].
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See id. at 20-23.
See id. at 25.
See Kaufman, supra note 241, at 208.
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See Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground 161-70 (Island Press 1987) (1947).
Kaufman, supra note 241, at 84.
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ances, and complemented by personnel policies that encouraged compliance by building esprit de corps.252 In the late 1950s, the regulations were
contained in a seven-volume Forest Service Manual,four volumes of which
were issued to District Rangers. 253 Continually revised, and supplemented by insertions at the regional and national-forest levels, as well as
by technical manuals prepared by the Service staff in Washington, these
volumes established procedures and standard responses for each class of
problem the Ranger might encounter. 254 In addition to uniform,
Service-wide guidelines, specific local plans for implementing policies for
fire prevention and timber management were required of all districts.
On their own initiative, other districts could implement plans for recreation, grazing, and other major Service objectives. 255 Such plans included
quantitative performance goals which set target levels for numerous areas, including timber sales, fire control, wildlife
preservation, and the
2 56
number of visitors to the forest, among others.
Conformity with the rules and plans was secured, to begin with, by
the requirement that all decisions involving the redisposition of anything
more than trivial amounts of resources be cleared in advance by superiors
(and in turn their superiors).257 Deviations were detected after the fact
by regular and extensive inspections by superiors of the work done by
their subordinates. 258 For purposes of the functional inspections looking
into all aspects of forest management, District Rangers were required to
maintain diaries recording their activities by thirty-minute intervals, as
well as detailed records of all expenditures and income, so that results
25 9
could be compared to the efforts and resources that produced them.

Homogeneity of interpretation was underpinned by a homogeneity of
outlook secured by filling entry-level professional positions with persons
sharing a common background in forestry studies, rotating recent entrants through various regions (to build loyalty to the Service rather than
particular locales), and filling supervisory jobs through internal promotion. 260 That, at any rate, is Kaufman's account, seen through the lens of

hierarchical organizational principles.
But the statements of officials and District Rangers interviewed by
Kaufman, together with administrative rules and practices under which
they operated, suggest an interpretation of much of this directive machinery as an instrument of peer administration. "Again and again," Kaufman
writes, "the researcher is told by officers in the field that they do the bulk
252.
253.
254.
255.
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id. at 95.
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of the work even though others sign the papers, and their superiors freely
acknowledge this dependency."2 61 It was the District Rangers who, for
example, recommended the issuance or denial of permits, established
the feasibility of land transactions, and furnished the plans on which production quotas and targets were based.2 62 Headquarters relied so openly
on the judgment of local officials that new procedures and equipment
were only introduced after field testing in pilot ranger districts, and in
consultation with those who participated in the experiments. 263 In sum,
"leadership decisions about what the Forest Service can and should do
2 64
rest in the last analysis on what the field men tell the leaders."
This dependence on local information in turn calls attention to a
lesser role for the Manual than it plays in Kaufman's account and transforms the role of inspections and diaries. Thus, because field officers
objected to its unwieldiness, the Manual remained incomplete. Indeed,
plans to add three additional volumes were abandoned in the late 1950s
in favor of a project to reduce and simplify the existing ones.265 Inspec-

tions, accordingly, appear to have been less occasions for verifying compliance with a master plan than a method of pooling and evaluating experience from the whole Service. Because of the policy of internal
promotion, most inspectors had been District Rangers, 2 66 and this experience, combined with the activity of inspection itself, put them in a good
position to identify and propagate good practices and criticize deficient
ones; and as a rule the emphasis was more on the former than the latter.
"[T]he stress in inspections is on training," Kaufman writes, "and the inspectors may be said to constitute an itinerant school .... "

267

The high-

est officials of the Service, moreover, were quite explicit in distinguishing
investigation, defined as the search for "something that's dishonest or
otherwise wrong," from inspection, whose purpose was "to see how together we can do a betterjob."268 Given this distinction, it is unsurprising
that field officials, "rather than fearing inspection, tend[ed] to welcome
the opportunities it afford [ed] them to keep abreast of developments in
261. Id. at 192.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 189.
264. Id. at 192.
It would be an exaggeration to say that the Rangers are consulted about every
decision affecting the management of their districts, but there can be no question
that consultation on many matters of concern to them is common enough to lend
credibility to the impression that the Rangers participate actively in the formation
of administrative policy for national forest administration.
Id. at 189.
265. See id. at 95.
266. See id. at 144-45.
267. Id. at 216.
268. Id. at 142-43 n.7 (quoting Letter from the Chief of the Service to the Regional
Forester of Region 2 (Feb. 21, 1955)). A regional regulation defined the purposes of
inspection as 90% training, 5% fact-finding, and 5% reporting and recording. See id.
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the organization... and to give their own ideas to their superiors at first
2 69
hand."
In a setting where inspection was a rudimentary form of information
pooling, activity diaries documented de facto organizational routines and
allowed comparative evaluation of their effectiveness in the context of
local circumstance. 270 In other words, defects in reporting often revealed
defects in operation. Thus, the sharpest criticism was reserved for District
Rangers whose confused or incomplete procedures, as reported in their
own logs, made risky situations more dangerous still, whatever the actual
outcome, 271 and conversely, commendations were directed to those who
2 72
planned what they did and did what they planned.
Such benchmarking was further facilitated by the Forest Service pol273
icy of transferring Rangers from one district to another every few years.
This policy facilitated error detection as the new Ranger might see mistakes that the previous Ranger, entrenched in habit, had failed to notice.
This practice also allowed the Service to benchmark the performance of
each Ranger against the Ranger previously responsible for that district.
Furthermore, the exposure of each Ranger to a variety of local conditions
built a base of diverse experiences which could be called upon when responding to new or fluctuating conditions.
In sum, despite Kaufman's disposition to understand the Forest
Service according to the paradigm of a large-scale hierarchical organization, the facts he discloses tell a different story. The Service discovered
that it could best coordinate national policies with local circumstances by
a decentralized experimentalist system of error detection through information pooling and benchmarking.
Yet, if the early experience of the Forest Service is an antecedent of
experimentalist public administration, its more recent experience could
be read to suggest limits of experimentalism, in so far as experimentalism
is inspired by the Progressive experience. Since its inception, the Service
has been charged with managing its land "for six renewable surface
uses-outdoor recreation, rangeland, timber, watersheds and water flows,
wilderness, and wildlife and fish." 274 The potential for conflict among

these uses is obvious, and that conflict has been realized in recent decades: Timber production on Forest Service land has increased dramati269. Id. at 145.
270. See id. at 130-34.
271. "It is . . . difficult," one General Integrating Inspector admonished a District
Ranger, "to tell from diaries and other records who is Fire Boss on individual fires. I
wonder if the same difficulty is present among your men actually on fires?" Id. at 145.
272. See, e.g., id. at 148 ("W- is very interested in work planning and has done a
good job of making this style of planning into a useful tool to help him administer the
district. The monthly plans were followed reasonably well and accomplishments are
satisfactory.").
273. See id. at 176-83.
274. Forest Service Decision-Making, supra note 245, at 4.
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cally. 275 Meanwhile, other developments have stressed competing uses.
Most notably, the enactment of environmental protection statutes such as
the National Environmental Policy Act,27 6 the Endangered Species
Act, 277 the Clean Air Act,2 78 the Clean Water Act,279 and the Wilderness
Act, 28 0 placed higher priorities on the nontimber uses of Forest Service
land. Recreational use has also increased dramatically in just the last decade (although timber production has experienced a sharp decline in that
same period, partly due to court orders based on environmental protection statutes).281 In principle, the Forest Service's historical commitment
to decentralized decisionmaking should have positioned it well to respond to the new conflicts-for its own and other agencies' experience
demonstrate that local flexibility plays a key role in accommodating conflicting demands by uncovering new possibilities. But in practice the new
priorities were less amenable to such solutions for a number of reasons.
First, Congress's continued insistence on emphasizing timber production often crowds out other uses. 282 Second, the underlying concerns
of environmental protection legislation are generally best managed by
focusing on ecosystems as the relevant geographic unit.28 3 Yet, national
forests under Forest Service management typically constitute fragments
of larger ecosystems that are divided among private landowners and
other federal agencies 28 4 -typically the National Park Service, the Bureau
of Land Management, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. 285 The Forest
Service has experienced severe difficulties coordinating its activities with
other agencies, partly because of failure to consult from the outset of
projects, 28 6 and partly because the various agencies collect data in noncompatible formats and have not yet developed the means for meaningful pooling of information. Finally, the sheer procedural burden of complying with (or in some cases failing to comply with) Congress's often
275. See Paul Roberts, The Federal Chain-Saw Massacre: Clinton's Forest Service and
Clear-Cut Corruption, Harper's, June 1997, at 37, 41.
276. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1994)).
277. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
278. Pub. L. No. 84-159, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
279. Pub. L. No. 80-845, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
280. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1131-1136 (1994)).
281. See Letter from Mike Dombeck, Forest Service Chief, to General Accounting
Office (Apr. 21, 1997), in Forest Service Decision-Making, supra note 245, at 130.
282. See Forest Service Decision-Making, supra note 245, at 64.
283. See Bradley Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 43 & n.235,

76 (1997).
284. See Forest Service Decision-Making, supra note 245, at 75-76.
285. See id. at 23.
286. See id. at 84-87.
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contradictory mandates exacts a heavy toll on the Forest Service:
"[C]onducting environmental analyses and preparing environmental
documents consumes about 18 percent of the funds available to manage
the national forests and approximately 30 percent of the agency's field
resources." 2 87 The net effect of all this confusion has been to dissipate
the efficiency and creativity gains that decentralization promises.
Although the Forest Service remains highly decentralized, 28 8 it has, of
late, exhibited signs of paralysis more typically associated with rigid centralized bureaucracies. A recent General Accounting Office study concludes "that the Forest Service's decision-making process is clearly broken
and in need of repair."28 9 More ominously, a cover story in the June 1997
Harper'sportrays the Forest Service as the corrupt servant of a timber industry that lobbies Congress to provide large subsidies for logging in
Forest Service lands, with expedients such as fire-salvage and disease-control used to justify clearcutting in forests that would otherwise be protected by environmental laws. 290
These developments might be read as an inevitable consequence of
Progressivism's faith that scientific management will produce a single,
best solution, when in fact conflicting goals will be pursued by conflicting
interest groups. 29 1 Whatever the merits of this critique as a general matter, however, it hardly applies to the particular case. In his administration
of national lands, Pinchot pursued an approach nearly the opposite of
this portrayal of Progressivism. Recognizing that conflicting goals and
changing knowledge would render once-and-for-all rules ineffective, he
sought a corrigible system: Pinchot favored public ownership of lands,
short-term leases rather than long-term leases or outright sales of resource-rich property, an obligation by leaseholders to exploit resources
immediately as a means of preventing speculative occupation, periodically adjustable fees, and a ban on forms of use, such as overgrazing, that
would lead to irreparable harm to the environment. 292 Moreover, anticipating the dangers of overlapping administrative authority, Pinchot advocated integration of all public land questions under the supervision of a
single federal department. 293 Thus, the current crisis in public land management seems more nearly a consequence of disregard for Pinchot's

287. Id. at 28.
288. See id. at 20.
289. Id. at 12.
290. See Roberts, supra note 275, at 38. The G.A.O. confirms the emphasis on timber
use. See Forest Service Decision-Making, supra note 245, at 53-56, 64.
291. See James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the
Limits of American Government 115-23 (rev. ed. 1998).
292. See Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920, at 66-90 (1959).
293. See id. at 72.
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principles of corrigibility294 than an indictment of other-worldly technocratic optimism.
3. Nuclear Power Plant Safety. - We turn now to a more recent and
more nearly complete example of experimentalist administration. Recently, there has emerged a new system of benchmarking regulation of
the nuclear power industry housed in the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO, or the Institute), founded and financed by the utilities themselves in 1979-nine months after the Three Mile Island disas295
ter-to reduce the potential for catastrophic accidents in the industry.
A memorandum signed in October 1988 between INPO and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) creates the framework for a "continuing
and cooperative relationship" between the two "in the exchange of experience, information, and data related to the safety of nuclear power
plants." 29 6 Under this agreement, the NRC, in effect, retains the formal
authority to promulgate regulations, but either adopts the standards in
training, maintenance, and other matters elaborated by INPO, or simply
acknowledges best practices defined by the Institute without further formalizing them. 29 7 There are no civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance with INPO standards, 298 but INPO can suspend the membership of
see, to ensure that
uncooperative utilities and has found means, as we2will
99
the operating goals it sets are carefully respected.
In practice, INPO's chief activities consist of pooling the industry's
operating experience, establishing benchmarks that distill the lessons it
contains, and then evaluating individual power plants according to their
ability to meet the relevant benchmarks.3 0 0 Operating information is
gathered initially through the Significant Event Evaluation-Information
Network, or SEE-IN. 3 0 ' This is "an industry-wide effort to systematically
collect, analyze, and share the industry's experience with safety-related
problems."3 0 2 INPO officials sift SEE-IN reports to distinguish harmless
disruptions of operations from dangerous ones.3 03 Thorough analyses of
the causes of the dangerous disruptions, and ways of preventing them,
are then circulated as Significant Operating Experience Reports, or
SOERs. 30 4 Industry Operating Experience Reviews are then conducted
periodically to assess the ability of particular plants to make effective use
294. Pinchot himself was forced from office by President Taft. See George E. Mowry,
The Era of Theodore Roosevelt 254 (1958).
295. See Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other. The Transformation of Nuclear
Safety Since Three Mile Island 1 (1994).
296. Id. at 195 n.39.
297. See id. at 38-40, 195 n.39.
298. See id. at 91.

299. See id. at 107-09.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See id. at 75-87.
See id. at 126-27.
Id. at 126-27.
See id. at 127-28.

304. See id. at 128-29.
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of the information provided by SOERs and other means to improve their
own affairs.8 0 5 For purposes of this review, a team of specialists in a variety of areas evaluates the plant's troubles since the last INPO inspection,
paying particular attention to the plant's own reports on how it has responded to SOERs.3 0 6 As many as six of the inspectors operate as experts
on loan from their companies.30 7 The team spends a week preparing at
INPO headquarters in Atlanta, and then spends two weeks of twelve-hour
days doing "'nothing but watch[ing] what is going on at the plant.' 30 8
In particular, as in the case of error detection in firms, the inspectors are
"always asking the 'Why?' question."3 0 9
The results of the report are made available to the CEO of the utility
operating the power plant and to that utility's board of directors to ensure that criticism is not blunted as it passes up the managerial hierarchy.310 The rankings naturally expose managers to intense peer pressure.
In addition, INPO ranks all plants with respect to a number of summary
measures of operating safety, and reports these rankings annually to a
meeting of the utility CEOs. 3 1 ' These reviews, finally, are supplemented
by continuing analysis of accident data and development of standards.3 12
Participants in these activities are drawn from utilities, as are some fraction of INPO's full-time staff.3 13 In addition to providing information to
the plants, results of INPO evaluations are communicated to the NRC,
the federal agency responsible for monitoring reactor safety.3 14
As measured by two broad substantive indicators, INPO is an unqualified success story. The two measures are the number of "scrams," or
rapid reactor shutdowns, and the number of safety system actuations.
Both represent a gauge of the frequency of emergencies and are therefore inversely correlated with overall reactor safety. Between 1980 and
1990, the number of scrams per unit decreased by eighty percent, and the
number of safety system actuations decreased by sixty percent between
1985 (the first year such measures were taken) and 1990.315
Still, one persistent criticism of INPO remains. Because it is not itself
a government entity, INPO's activities are not subject to all of the usual
responsibilities associated with such entities; most importantly, its reports
305. See id. at 137-38.
306. See id. at 141.
307. See id. at 54.
308. Id. at 141 (quoting INPO inspector).
309. Id. at 144, 147.
310. See id. at 98-99.
311. See id. at 104-06.
312. See id. at 128.
313. In 1991, for instance, one in seven staff members were on loan (for up to two
years) from nuclear power facilities. See id. at 57.
314. See id. at 195 n.39.
315. See id. at 183.
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are not directly available to the public.3

16

Thus, critics note that the pub-

lic reports produced by the NRC present sanitized versions of INPO's
data, thereby shielding the plants from public scrutiny.317 On the other
side of the question is the view that some degree of confidentiality facilitates full, open self-criticism by the plants. In addition, given the public's
likely reaction to even extremely small increases in the risk of the very
large harm that a nuclear power plant accident would occasion, general
release of INPO assessments might be misunderstood and misused by the
public. This in turn would divert plant staff from safety improvements
and other operations, causing them to pay excessive attention to public
relations.
It is difficult to judge the merits of this debate at its most abstract.
Surely there are contexts in which confidentiality breeds correctives.
Public overreaction to potentially catastrophic harm, no matter how unlikely, has arguably distorted public policy in the past. 3 18 But it is a staple

of democracy that in most contexts publicity encourages change for the
better. Into which category particular aspects of nuclear power plant
safety inspection fall strikes us as just the kind of question that can only
be answered by experience and experiment.
But as regards the operation of INPO, now it seems that the criticism
of secrecy is misleadingly narrow, while the Institute's secretive handling
of information unjustifiably disparages the citizens' ability to deliberate
about matters that concern them viscerally. The criticism is misleading
because it slights the fact that INPO's reports do reach important watchdog groups, including not only the NRC, but also utilities (often themselves publicly accountable) and public service commissions.3 19 Fears of
potential conspiracy thus come down to the much more limited claim
that citizens living near reactors have a need for direct access to all information. To provide anything less is not to flaunt unaccountability. But
INPO's reticence seems disproportionate as well, for, as we will see next,
public disclosure of environmental hazards comparable to those posed by
nuclear power stations has often proved an effective instrument of
3 20
regulation.
4. Innovative EnvironmentalRegulation. - Many of the cases of precocious or emergent experimentalism discussed so far were set in settings
316. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871,
880 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that commercial character of information
voluntarily submitted to government exempts INPO reports from requirements of
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1994)).
317. See Matthew Freedman &Jim Riccio, What the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Won't Tell You: Aging Reactors. Poorly Trained Workers, Pub. Citizen, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at
10, 10-11 (also available at <http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/nuclearsafety/
INPOartice.html>).
318. See Stephen G. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation 19-20 (1993).
319. See id.
320. See infra text accompanying notes 328-333.
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that combined bureaucracy and disorganization in ways inhospitable,
even inimical, to innovation. If experimentalism has prospects of succeeding in such settings, we argued, it is likely to prosper almost everywhere else as well. The circumstances of environmental regulation, by
contrast, combine aspects of locality and generality that invite experimentalist information pooling.3 21 On the locality side, it is necessary to take
full account of local topography, wind conditions, and economic activity
to determine the exposure of a particular population to various environmental risks. Effective reduction of such risks requires full attention to
the local complexities of industrial production, sewage disposal, power
generation, or traffic patterns from which they arise. On the generality
side, the epidemiological determination, say, that a substance is toxic or
otherwise hazardous, and in what concentrations, requires the pooling of
evidence from many different and dispersed sources. The same sort of
information pooling is necessary for estimating feasible reductions in particular environmental harms and for ascertaining the most effective
methods of achieving such reductions.
The incentives for mutual learning and monitoring are particularly
strong in environmental matters, moreover, given the poorly confined or
even unconfined nature of hazards such as air or water pollution. For
example, coal-burning plants in the Midwest produce acid rain in the
Northeast and Canada. In the worst case, one locale's indifference to its
environment puts all the others at terrible risk. The existing regulatory
regime does more to obstruct than to further such learning. It typically
sets fixed emissions standards for particular processes, and divides responsibility for controlling pollution in the air, water, and other media to
different regulatory authorities. Obtaining permits for the processes in
use at any production site therefore requires a laborious round of agencies, and abatement of pollution at the prompting of authorities in monitoring one medium can easily lead to additional problems in areas where
there is less vigilance.3 22 If public and private actors were not drawn to
forms of democratic experimentalism to reconcile the needs of local and
global learning under these conditions, they would be unlikely to give
them much consideration anywhere else.
We conclude this subsection, therefore, by noting the recent spread
of forms of self-, state, and federal environmental regulation whose experimentalist features may be cohering into a system of learning by monitoring by a peer inspectorate along the lines we saw in our discussion of
INPO. The prospect of such an outcome is especially striking because it
arises in part from systematic public disclosure of alarming, potentially
catastrophic hazards: the same kind of information, we just saw, some321. See Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow, Introduction to Thinking Ecologically,

supra note 183, at 1, 4.
322. See id. at 9 ("We 'fix' our air pollution problems with scrubbers that create a
sludge that becomes a land disposal issue which, if improperly handled, may run off into
streams, becoming water pollution.").
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times said to obstruct reform by private actors when revealed to the public. We begin with a review of the innovative, if barebones, national system of benchmarking self-reported releases of toxic substances-the
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)-and the efforts at self-regulation it has
provoked on the part of the chemical manufacturers. Then we consider
the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act of 1989323 (TURA), which,
as the most developed of several similar state regimes, requires not only
that firms report their use of certain toxic substances, but also that they
formulate and periodically revise plans to reduce that use in consultation
with a peer inspectorate created for this purpose.
Finally, we examine the Program for Regulatory Excellence (XL)
and the Common Sense Initiative (CSI) of the federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). XL is a pilot project that waives many current
permitting requirements. It allows firms greater flexibility in defining the
precise means and ends of their regulatory performance in exchange for
commitments to improve on that performance and commitments to provide sufficient information to facilitate monitoring their actual behavior.
CSI invites proposals for regulatory reform of this general kind-some
eventually requiring waivers, others not-from teams of stakeholders in
six industrial sectors. But the limits of XL's authority to authorize experimentation are vague, as are the conditions under which proposals for
reform formulated under CSI can actually be tested in practice. Neither
project makes provision for benchmarking or any other form of information pooling by which the EPA, together with the affected actors, might
devise standards for judging the suitability of revisions of current rules.
These deficiencies explain why, so far, XL counts many more failed negotiations than successful ones, while CSI promises reforms without realizing them. Together TRI, TURA, and the federal programs suggest additional, complementary lessons about the possibilities and limits of the
incremental introduction of experimentalism in our federalist polity.
a. TR. - TRI was created under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986.324 The Act and TRI were, like
the creation of INPO after Three Mile Island, a response to catastrophe:
in this case, the explosion in 1984 of a Union Carbide facility in Bhopal,
India that killed many thousands of persons, mostly through release of
toxic methyl isocyanate gas. 325 Unlike the familiar regulatory regimes defined by the Clean Air Act 326 or the Clean Water Act,3 27 the Right-toKnow legislation neither fixes targets for the reduction of aggregate levels
of pollution, nor requires specific pollution-abatement efforts by particu323. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. xx (Law. Co-op. 1996).

324. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
325. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the
Development of Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 251, 264
n.58 (1993).

326. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
327. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994).
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lar classes of polluters. Rather, in establishing TRI, the Act requires only
that private and government-run facilities meeting statutory size requirements report estimates (calculated by EPA methods) of the amounts of
some 650 chemicals they transfer off-site, or routinely or accidentally release.3 28 Since passage of the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, facilities

must also report transfers within the plant and efforts at pollution reduction and recycling.3 29 These reports are then made publicly available in
both raw form and as tables comparing amounts released by substance,
facility, industry, and location.33 0 In addition, since 1989, the EPA has
published an annual summary of emissions, with a comparison to previous years. Failure to file a report as required by the Act may result in
penalties, but inaccuracies in reporting do not. In fact, the EPA does
little to verify the accuracy of emissions reports, and has no inspection or
other enforcement authority directly related to TRI. 331 Citizens, how-

ever, may sue firms for failure to comply with TRI's disclosure provisions, 33 2 and the data obtained can then be used to establish violations of
other, substantive statutory obligations, or as a lever by which to apply
public pressure for improvements. TRI is thus environmental "regulation" in the minimal sense of formally requiring disclosure of a body of
comparative information from which environmental rules and standards,
fixed or rolling, might eventually be fashioned or enforced.3 3 3 Its operation therefore constitutes a rough test, under admittedly favorable circumstances, of whether benchmarking in general-and benchmarking of
"alarming" information in particular-can play the central role that we
328. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c) (1994) (referring to chemicals on the list in Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., Toxic Chemicals Subject
to Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
(Comm. Print No. 99-169, 1986), as well as subsequently listed chemicals).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 13106 (1994).
330. The latest available complete compilation contains a useful overview of TRI. See
U.S. EPA, EPA 745-R-97-005, 1995 Toxics Release Inventory Data Release (1997) (also
available at <http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/tri/pdr95/drhome.htm>) [hereinafter 1995
TRI Release].
331. SeeJanice Mazurek et al., Shifting to Prevention: The Limits of Current Policy,
in Reducing Toxics: A New Approach to Policy and Industrial Decisionmaking 58, 80-85
(Robert Gottlieb ed., 1995).
332. The citizen suit provision is found at 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1994). In Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, No. 96-643, 1998 WL 88044 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998), the
Supreme Court held that the respondent lacked standing to sue a defendant firm for past
violations of its disclosure obligations because the relief sought would not redress the harm
alleged, but there is no question that the statute validly confers standing for suits against
firms that persist in their noncompliance.
333. For an intriguing proposal to make TRI the basis of a rolling-rule regulatory
system in which the bottom-quartile performers would have to achieve median
performance within a set period, with the regulatory authorities devoting a maximum of
attention to these minimum performers, see Archon Fung & Dara O'Rourke, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the
Success of the Toxic Release Inventory 14 (Dec. 10, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
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have attributed to it in guiding and synchronizing performance-improving efforts and rules to encourage these efforts.
Three results suggest that it can. First, the collection and publication of TRI data immediately discipline polluting private actors: Public
comparisons of polluters compiled by journalists or community activists
from TRI data lead to significant declines in the share value of publicly
traded firms that show poorly.33 4 Some of this decline might simply reflect investors' fears that bad publicity, however unfounded, always means
costly trouble. But it is at least as likely to reflect a cold-eyed calculation
that facilities listed among the worst polluters of their locale or type are
not well controlled by managers, and may therefore suffer from problems
not directly connected to pollution as well. Once it is clear that a poor
pollution ranking leads to costly penalties in financial markets, and from
there to clean-up expenses, managers have strong incentives to avoid the
costs either by reducing environmental burdens in advance of the disclosure or (given negligible penalties for inaccurate reporting) shading their
estimates of toxic releases to obscure their true situation. Investors might
reasonably conclude that management that did neither was simply unaware of the extent of the problem in comparison with other facilities.
This conclusion might just as reasonably prompt the more general concem that management might be ignoring problems unrelated to pollution as well. In any event, details of the connection between financemarket discipline and TRI data aside, commentators agree that "public
release of information about discharge of toxic chemicals has by itself
spurred competition to reduce releases, quite independently of government regulation."3 5
Beyond this immediate discipline, Bhopal and TRI have had secondorder effects on the behavior of the actors by inducing changes in industry associations and the information they pass among firms. Where
Three Mile Island led to INPO, Bhopal and TRI have led to the creation,
within the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) of a "Responsible
Care" program, launched, as the head of the Association confessed, because "the industry had no choice." 3 36 This program encourages firms:
1) to link pollution-prevention efforts to the core disciplines of errordetection and elimination which they apply to managing their production processes; 2) to involve suppliers and distributors in these expanded
efforts at continuous improvement; 3) to set target dates for installing
334. See generally James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market
Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 98 (1995).
335. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 184, at 106. The year-to-year comparisons show
substantial decreases in most categories. See 1995 TRI Release, supra note 330, ch. 5.
336. After Bhopal, the public ranked the chemical industry just behind the tobacco
industry in terms of threat to the public health and the environment, according to the
Association's own surveys. See Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right
to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act, 11 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 217, 309 (1996).
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these new disciplines; 4) to monitor progress3 37
towards their goals; and 5)
to document and disseminate best practices.
In theory, then, Responsible Care could in time become the armature of monitored self-monitoring with a family resemblance to the INPO
system. Assessment of the gap between this theoretical possibility and
current practice is, however, impossible based on currently available evidence. On the one hand, certain associations, such as the Society of
Organic Chemical Manufacturers, make compliance with Responsible
Care disciplines within fixed time limits a condition of membership,3 3 8
and at least some companies-Union Carbide, to take a chastened and
chastening example 3 3 9-publicly
report progress towards the
Responsible Care standards as well as performance by TRI measures. On
the other hand, the trade associations do not seem to be organizing the
kinds of practices on which INPO depends: systematic inspections of facilities, comprehensive reporting on hazardous disturbances, and analysis
of countermeasures taken by the facilities. Instead, the CMA, for example, has thus far emphasized self-monitoring by firms and minimized the
need for any systematic review of these results, except by such amorphous
entities as company-appointed Citizen Advisory Panels drawn from the
communities in which participating members operate. Environmentalists
plausibly suspect that these panels may be denied relevant information
and dominated by company interests. 3 40 Peer pressure, public opinion,
or the discovery of further benefits to pollution-control measures could
of course lead to more rigorous benchmarking of problems and countermeasures, but this outcome is no more automatic than was the adoption
of the Responsible Care program in the first place.
Third and concurrently, as the EPA itself has noted, in making possible comparisons across regions and facilities, the release of TRI information has allowed federal, state, and local governments to cooperate with
the public and industry to "evaluate existing environmental programs,
establish regulatory priorities, and track pollution control and waste reduction progress."3 41 At the state level above all, the boldest of this collaborative redirection of regulatory activity has gone to the creation of
just the kinds of review and information-pooling services which even the
337. The elements of the Responsible Care program can be found at the CMA
website. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, Responsible Care: A Public Commitment (visited Jan.
23, 1998) <http://www.cmahq.com/cmaprograms/programs-index.html> (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
338. See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, Responsible Care: A Guide to
SOCMA's Membership Requirements (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.socma.com/

respnble.hml> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
339. See Union Carbide, Union Carbide Responsible Care Information (visited Jan.
23, 1998) <http://www.unioncarbide.com/respcare/1996/uccres.html> (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
340. See Robert Gottlieb et al., Greening or Greenwashing?: The Evolution of
Industry Decisionmaking, in Reducing Toxics, supra note 331, at 170, 196-97.
341. 1995 TRI Release, supra note 330, ch. 2.
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largest trade associations have not (yet) undertaken to provide, and
which may always be beyond the reach of industry associations in sectors,
such as injection molding or metal plating, characterized by small, dispersed facilities. Partly by complementing, partly by competing with (and
thus forcing emulation by) industry associations in the provision of services, programs in states such as Massachusetts, Oregon, New Jersey,
Washington, and Minnesota are likely to shape the emergent regime of
environmental regulation and accentuate its experimentalist features.34
b. TURA. - One of the most established, comprehensive, and influential of such programs was created by the Massachusetts TURA of
1989. 34 3 Because of the scope and integrity of this founding Act, the relation among the parts of the Massachusetts regulatory system and their
connection to federal benchmarking are particularly clear. We turn
briefly to TURA and its operation, therefore, for a first impression of one
variant of a more developed experimentalist regime of environmental
regulation.
As an initial matter, TURk broadens and extends TRI. It broadens
TRI by requiring firms to report not only toxic releases, but also use or
generation of toxics in any stage of production. 344 TURA further requires that the reports on use of toxics be connected to plans for usage
reduction.3 45 Thus, under the Act, firms meeting statutory requirements
regarding size and line of business must annually file a Toxic or
Hazardous Substance Report listing the amounts (in excess of certain
minima) of designated toxics used as inputs to processes, generated as
byproducts, or shipped as end products. In addition, the Report must
estimate changes in the amount of toxic byproduct and emissions generated per unit of product as compared with the preceding year, and specify whether the changes were due, for example, to altered inputs, new
production processes, improved operations, reformulation of the product, recycling or other extension of the usefulness of toxic substances, or
other modifications of the manufacturing setup.3 46 These reports then

form the starting points for biannual Toxics Use Reduction Plans centered on "a comprehensive economic and technical evaluation of appropriate technologies, procedures and training programs for potentially
achieving toxics use reduction for each covered toxic or hazardous sub342. For the general features of these laws as well as a sketch of their differences, see

Robert Gottlieb et al., New Approaches to Toxics: Production Design, Right-to-Know, and
Definition Debates, in Reducing Toxics, supra note 331, at 124, 143-48. "By the 1990s,"

they note, "states and local communities had become actors in their own right in the toxics
policy arena." Id. at 144.
343. See id. at 146 (stating that TURA "became more a harbinger of changes at the
state level than an isolated case of innovative legislation passed by a state known for its
strong environmental and public interest groups").
344. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 211, § 10 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
345. See id. § 11.
346. See id. § 10a, b.
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stance."3 47 On the basis of this benchmarking survey of possibilities,
firms specify in the Plan particular measures to be adopted, the schedule
for implementing them, and two- and five-year targets for toxic use reduction.3 48 Although TURA establishes the general goal of reducing use of
toxics in Massachusetts by fifty percent by 1997, 349 and penalizes "willful"
violations of the requirements to report toxics use and plan for reduction,3 50 the Act sets no more specific performance standards nor does it
penalize failure to act on reduction plans. Thus, rather than fix objectives, and compel their attainment, TURA furthers the TRI strategy of
using the obligation for self-monitoring to induce firms and citizens to
acquire information that reveals problems and possibilities for their solution. TURA provides an additional possibility for citizen involvement by
providing a right of citizens to sue to have firms comply with the Act's
largely procedural requirements. 3 5 1
At the same time, TURA extends and helps formalize industry efforts
at improved environmental performance both by creating a peer inspectorate to review the usage reduction plans, and by enabling provision of
35 2
ancillary technical consulting services to aid firms in their formulation.
The peer inspectorate is created by requiring that the accuracy of Plans
be certified by a toxics use reduction planner, then by making completion of various training programs a condition for initial or renewed certification as a planner. Two possibilities are anticipated. The first is that
the prospective planner complete satisfactorily a comprehensive program
in toxics use reduction planning organized by the Commonwealth. In
that case, the planner may certify the reduction plan of any firm submitting one. The second option is for the planner to demonstrate, for purposes of initial certification, two years of practical experience in toxics use
reduction in a particular firm. In that case, the planner can only certify
plans of his or her employer. The training requirement of the two paths,
and the experiences of the two types of planners, converge, however, as
participation in continuing-education classes in the subject is a condition
for re-certification after two years in both cases.3 5 3 The Act accordingly
347. Id. § 11(3)a.
348. See id. § 11.
349. See id. § 13. Note that the target is precatory, chosen, evidently, more to
establish the need and starting point for self-evaluation than because a fifty percent
reduction is the "right" amount. A fifty percent reduction is just the halfway point between
the trivial and the unattainable: a decrease large enough to command attention and
underscore the problem at hand, yet not so large as to demand the impossible.
350. See id. § 21b.
351. See id. § 18.
In case private actors systematically refuse to act on the
information provided, the Act does reserve to the Commonwealth the right to set
pollution-reduction standards in particular lines of business if a majority of firms in those

activities fail to reduce toxics use at rates documented regionally or nationally, or in
related activities in Massachusetts, see id. § 15, but thus far no use has been made of this

power.
352. See id. §§ 12, 6, 7.

353. See id. § 12.
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establishes a Toxics Use Reduction Institute (TURI) at the University of
Massachusetts at Lowell to develop the curricula and provide the courses
required for certification or re-certification as a planner, or generally to
inform industry or the public of developments in this area, and to conduct research necessary to these activities. 35 4 It also establishes an Office
of Technical Assistance (OTA) to assist firms (particularly small, first-time
filers) in meeting their TURA obligations, and to help coordinate the
provision of relevant services by the public and private sectors. Confidential information obtained by the OTA in the course of consultations with
a firm is not reported to the Commonwealth Department of
Environmental Protection unless the firm agrees, or unless the information concerns an imminent threat to public health. 355 The training of
planners, submission of plans, and provision of technical services, furthermore, is coordinated with existing reporting and inspection regimes
to minimize the burden of regulatory compliance.3 56 Taken together,
plans, planners, TURI, and OTA create an inspection regime in which
current conditions in individual firms or industrial segments can be compared with each other and with academic understanding of best practices, even as that understanding is corrected by scrutiny of innovation in
firms.
Finally, applying the pragmatist principles of adjustment of means
and ends to the institutions created by the Act itself, TURA provides a
high-level governance structure that periodically suggests modifications
of the new state services and reporting requirements in the light of its
evaluation of progress towards the Act's original reduction target.5 57 An
Administrative Council, consisting of state government officials with responsibilities in the environmental area, presents an annual review of
progress towards the overall goal and suggests possibilities for improvements in, and better coordination 358 of, the programs concerned with
toxics use reduction. 35 9 An Advisory Board composed of two officials and
thirteen representatives of environmental, business, and other interested
groups, creates a forum for users of the program to comment directly on
its operation and to create, if necessary, ad hoc committees to recommend changes.3 60 The Act is self-financing in the sense that the costs of
training inspectors and providing other services are to be paid by the
proceeds of a "toxics use fee" on the large toxics users subject to it,3 6 ' and
the governance bodies can easily monitor the relation between costs and
revenues.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See id. § 6.
See id. § 7.
See id. § 8.
See id. § 12.
See id. § 3().
See id. § 4.
See id. § 5.
See id. § 19.
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Substantial evidence in the aggregate and at the firm level suggests
that this apparatus works. From 1990 to 1995-the period for which
TURA data exist-the use of toxic chemicals fell by twenty percent in
Massachusetts, and the generation of toxic byproducts by thirty percent,
after adjustments to take account of changes in the levels of production.3 62 Beyond this overall result, it is clear that the requirement to plan

reduction of toxics use has enabled firms to discover significant net benefits to doing so and to value the public institutions that facilitate the planning.

63

The peer inspectorate and related programs were crucial to the

positive outcomes. Of all the services provided to facilitate planning, the
responding firms were most enthusiastic about toxics use planner training, followed by site visits from the OTA, while firms were least enthusiastic about the provision of toxics use reduction information by their own
trade associations. 36 4 Nor were these benefits offset for the firms by the
costs to them of meeting the new reporting and planning requirements.3 65 A summary measure of the favorable balance of costs and benefits of toxics use reduction planning to the firms is that eighty-six percent of all respondents said they would continue to plan even if there
3 66
were no longer a requirement that they do so.

c. Project XL and the Common Sense Initiative. - In the wake of this
and related experience, the EPA has launched, by its own, plainly incomplete count, thirty-nine programs to fashion an experimentalist regime at
the federal level.3 67 Two of the most prominent and widely noted pro362. See Monica Becker & Ken Geiser, Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Program,
Evaluating Progress: A Report on the Findings of the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction
Program Evaluation at 21-22 (Mar. 1997). Ambiguities in the 1987 baseline data make it

impossible so far to give a precise estimate towards the overall goal of a 50% reduction of
toxics use. See id. at 24-25.
363. Thus, a phone survey of 434 representative 1993 TURA filers found that 70% of
the respondents identified toxics reduction opportunities as a result of the planning
activities. See id. at 6. Eighty percent of this group then implemented some part of their
TURA plan. 67% of the implementers reported cost savings in areas such as materials use
and waste disposal, 66% noted improvements in worker health and safety, see id. at 26, and

43% registered benefits in the form of reduced costs of regulatory compliance, see id. at
27.
364. See id. at 35.
365. For example, an in-depth study of 21 representative firms included in the

gener-al survey found that even the most onerous single regulatory obligation, filing the
toxics use report itself, could be completed at a cost of about $500 per report and was not
"significantly" burdensome for a majority of respondents. See In-Depth Investigation of

Toxics Use Reduction in Massachusetts Industry iv, 17 (Massachusetts Toxics Use
Reduction Inst., Methods and Policy Report No. 16, 1997). One of the three firms that did
experience a significant burden in compliance produced unusually varied and complex

products, which made tracking of toxics correspondingly harder; because of peculiarities
in the overlap between federal and state listings of toxics, the other two were required to
file in Massachusetts a federal EPA form not required of them by the EPA itself. See id.
366. See Becker & Geiser, supra note 362, at 32.
367. U.S. GAO, GAO/RCED-97-155, Report to Congressional Requesters,
Environmental Protection: Challenges Facing EPA's Efforts to Reinvent Environmental
Regulation 5 (July 1997) [hereinafter Environmental Protection]. The EPA's estimate
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grams, Project XL and the Common Sense Initiative (CSI), encourage
firms, singly or in sectoral groups, to propose and eventually to test experimentalist reforms. Other programs encourage similar initiatives by consortia of states collaborating in various ways with regional and national
offices of the EPA.3 68 Still others focus on the reorganization of the
EPA's own regional offices to respond to and foster state-level experimentalism.3 69 This flotilla of programs is evidence of the compelling attraction of the experimentalist alternative. But its wavering course and halting progress call attention to the difficulties of proceeding from
piecemeal demonstration of the feasibility of this kind of reform to its
generalization. We focus on XL and CSI because, as the most advanced
and publicly visible of the programs, their record sheds the most direct
light on these difficulties and hence the federal prospects for
experimentalism.
Project XL is a pilot program for encouraging and supervising pilot
programs 70° It allows the federal government to authorize state regulatory bodies to permit the entities that they regulate to adopt environmental performance strategies which deviate from traditional requirements,
on the condition that "superior" environmental benefits result and detailed records of environmental performance are made public.3 7 1 Project
XL substantially extends TRI and TURA in offering private actors, by
means of waivers, a more comprehensive version of the core experimentalist bargain of greater autonomy in the determination of precise ends
and means of environmental regulation, in return for increased
monitorability. But it differs crucially from these programs in providing
for neither benchmarking, nor a peer inspectorate, nor any other systematic form of deriving rolling rules of fair and effective behavior from
emerging practice.

counts "high-priority" as well as "other significant actions," but not "less centralized"
projects that the agency is conducting through its program and regional offices. Id. The
uncountable proliferation of programs is itself an indicator of disorder. See id. at 6, 7, 33.
368. For summaries of the National Environmental Performance Partnership System
formed in 1995 between the EPA and the states, see id. at 26. For more information on the
Performance Partnership Grants, which allow eligible states and tribes to combine funds
that would be due them under separate environmental laws into a single fund for purposes
of experimenting with more flexible, combined regulation of the relevant areas, see id.
369. See id. at 27, 29-30.
370. There is no direct legislative authorization for the project. The EPA announced
Project XL in May 1995 to implement President Clinton's plan, announced in a March 16,
1995 document, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, to create innovative alternatives
to command-and-control environmental regulation. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL)

Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282-283 (1995).
371. See id. at 27,287. The legal authority for the EPA's ability to waive statutory and

regulatory requirements is dubious. Indeed, the EPA proposes to grant waivers principally
by failing to bring enforcement actions and by seeking special regulations and even
legislation where needed. See id. (stating, euphemistically, the "EPA will use enforcement
mechanisms to facilitate the projects").
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In the absence of any standards of comparison, discussions between
a private actor and the state, and then between both of these and federal
authorities, become an extended negotiation to agree on a distinct, quasiprivate regulatory regime. Government waivers are piled atop waivers
and private undertakings atop other undertakings. Such negotiations are
by their nature arduous and costly. They require exchanges so intimate,
particular, and extended between the state, the private actor, and other
concerned parties, as almost inevitably to suggest to some of the participants that others are colluding against them, even when they are not. No
wonder that Project XL has so far been of interest chiefly to very large,
capable corporations whose constant product and process innovation
make regulatory permitting under fixed rules a potentially paralyzing
burden. No wonder, too, that relatively few such corporations have been
able to negotiate successfully waivers and reporting regimes that meet
their own requirements and those of both levels of government and the
other parties. While the EPA set an initial goal of fifty projects,

72

as of

the end of 1997, only seven XL projects had been finally approved; three
were listed by the EPA as "facilitated" but not yet final; nine had reached
the intermediate "development" stage; and thirty XL proposals had been
3 73
rejected or withdrawn for a variety of reasons.
A brief look at a typical failed negotiation involving the Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M) facility in Hutchinson, Minnesota,
shows why, stripped of a pooled, background understanding of what results can be achieved and what risks are worth taking, bargaining in isolation is likely to fail.3 7 4 At Hutchinson, the company proposed to keep
combined or multimedia emissions to a level below existing regulatory
limits in return for waivers from the standard permitting procedures. Negotiations failed, for one thing, because the EPA could not provide 3M
with satisfactory assurances that compliance with XL would immunize the

372. See id. at 27,283.
373. See Information on Specific XL Projects (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://
199.223.29.233/ProjectXL/xl_home.nsf/all/xl_info> (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
374. By way of contrast, an even briefer look at one of Project XL's showcase
successes, Intel's $1.3 billion, 720-acre Octillo semiconductor facility in Chandler, Arizona,
shows that given great resources and needs, it is, just barely, possible to strike
experimentalist regulatory bargains in isolation, creating a novel, multilevel regulatory
regime almost from scratch. A copy of the Intel Final Project Agreement can be found at
Project XL: Final Project Agreement (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://199.223.29.233/
ProjectXL/xl_home.nsf/all/intelfpafinal.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Critics of the Intel XL agreement focused, even in this nearly exemplary case of
collaborative rulemaking, on what proved to be the weak points with the program as a
whole: concern both with the level of environmental performance to which the agreement
holds the company and with the enforceability of the XL agreement as a whole. See Cindy
Skrzycki, The Regulators: The Perils of Reinventing, Critics See a Playground for Polluters
in EPA's XL Plan, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1997, at DI.
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3 75
company from civil liability for technical violations of existing statutes.
For another, there was disagreement as to the level of "superior" performance expected as a condition of the waiver.3 76 3M claimed to be outperforming current standards, but refused to guarantee that it would increase or even maintain this level of "superiority" under the new
arrangements. This uncertainty was compounded by disputes among the
regulatory entities over the allocation of authority among the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency and the Washington and regional offices of the

EPA. 37 7 Both sources of confusion were in turn the fruit of the initial

decision by the federal level of the EPA to declare itself open to experimental reform without providing any but ad hoc means for establishing
mutual accountability and coordinating its own decisions with those3 78of its
field offices, let alone other government entities or private actors.
The CSI, established in 1994, has had, if anything, more difficulty
than Project XL in moving from experimental idea to actual experiment.
Much of the reason is manifest in a complex, ambiguous hierarchical
structure, apparently intended to encourage a form of information pooling, that in fact discourages it. At the top is a thirty-two-person council
composed of representatives of industry, small business, labor, federal,
state, and local government, environmental justice groups, and community-based and national environmental organizations. 379 Under the aegis
of this council are six sectoral subcommittees grouping stakeholders from
automobile manufacturing, iron and steel, metal finishing, computers
and electronics, printing, and petroleum refining. Each sectoral subcommittee in tm organizes project groups and teams that elaborate detailed
reform proposals and may undertake pilot programs to test them. Reform recommendations based on the studies and experience of the project groups, passed through the sectoral subcommittees, must be ap375. SeeJeffrey P. Cohn, Clearing the Air, Gov't Executive, Sept. 1, 1997, available at

1997 WL 9254804.
376. See Janet Pelley, Project XL Founders in Minnesota; Critics Call for National
Legislation, 30 Envl. Sci. & Techn., 428A, 428A-429A (1996) (observing the inherent
ambiguity in XL's requirement of "superior" performance).
377. See generally EPA Regulatory Reinvention Efforts: Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th
Cong. (Nov. 4, 1997) (statement of Peder A. Larson), available at 1997 WL 14152790
(offering state perspective).
378. For an analysis of the Hutchinson failure, see Environmental Protection, supra
note 367, at 36. An interim report of a continuing and incisive research project explains
how, inter alia, 3M was the victim of its own experimentalist success. See Alfred A. Marcus
et al., Advising, Monitoring, and Evaluating a Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Pilot
Project for Flexible, Multi-media Permitting 7-8 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
379. For an overview of the structure, see U.S. EPA, The Common Sense Initiative
(visitedJan. 22, 1998) <http://vvv.epa.gov/commonsense/bckgrd.htm> (on file with the
ColumbiaLaw Review). For a description of the CSI Council, see U.S. EPA, Common Sense
Initiative Council (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/commonsense/council/
index.htm> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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proved by the council as a whole before being forwarded to the EPA as
Common Sense Initiatives.38 0 Hence, in addition to all of the difficulties
of achieving consensus regarding concrete measures, there is the imponderable difficulty of anticipating which projects, and what forms of presentation, will be acceptable to the superintending council, not to mention the EPA itself. The predictable result is concentration of the activity,
such as it is, in the project groups-often, as in the case of metal finishing, in programs of self-monitoring, reporting, and standard setting with
clear affinities to TURA 3 8 1-and indecision at the top.3 82 Worse still, it
may be that project groups and especially pilot projects keep some or
much of their results to themselves, guarding against the possibility of
higher-level interference, but also fragmenting and occluding information instead of pooling it.
The difficulties of XL and CSI point to what could prove to be a
characteristic political dilemma in the diffusion and generalization of experimentalist methods. After the failures of standard programs have
opened the way to alternatives, and these have progressed far enough to
promise large-scale feasibility, public and private actors will often divide
on what comes next. Those most inconvenienced by the current regime,
or ideologically opposed to any form of government regulation, will urge
abolition of the rump of traditional rules as a precondition for further
and conclusive reform. One of their chief arguments will be that the
experimentalist success would become self-reinforcing if only the obstacle
of current law (whose costly disutility it dramatizes) were abrogated. On
the other side will be those who see themselves as beneficiaries of the
current rules, or of regulatory protection against market forces in general. They will argue that the early successes could come undone if the
old rules are discarded before new ones-demonstrably ensuring that the
380. The structure and the reporting relation among the levels is summarized in

Environmental Protection, supra note 367, at 25.
381. For the metal finishing activities of CSI, see U.S. EPA, Common Sense Initiative
Metal Finishing Sector (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://wW.epa.gov/commonsense/
metals/index.hun#anchorprojects> (on file with the Columbia Law Reiew). Underlying
many of the projects is a picture of the "tier structure" of the industry in which first tier
firms are "consistently in compliance with regulatory requirements and are proactive in
making environmental improvements to move beyond compliance." U.S. EPA,
Performance Tiers as a Tool for Action (visitedJan. 22, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/oppe/
isd/tier.htm> (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Fourth tier firms "are 'renegade'
shops that are out of compliance, make no attempt to improve, and often escape
enforcement attention." Id. Many projects aim at moving firms between these extremes to
learn from higher ranked ones, and to force the lowest ranked to improve or exit the
industry. See id. at para. 6. The model is thus related to the maxi-min strategy derived
from the toxic release inventory data described above. See 1995 TRI Release, supra note
330, at 355.
382. See Environmental Protection, supra note 367, at 37 & n.8 (reporting the result
of an outside evaluation of 0S1 commissioned by the EPA that "concluded that EPA should
provide more guidance on the types of recommendations and projects that the agency
would find most useful for CSI" and noting the EPA's own general concurrence based on
its "ongoing review").
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new regime is, indeed, self-reinforcing-are in place. Caught in this to
and fro, politicians and administrative officials will temporize, waiving the
rules on all manner of conditions to placate those who want to try new
things, but keeping the rules on the books to appease those who fear
wholesale deregulation. Meanwhile, the authorities will hope that amidst
the waiving there emerges just the experimentalist solution that conciliates both camps. The result will be the profusion of experimentalist activism in the small, and institutional immobilism in the large, that we observe in the EPA programs.
The experimentalist program we are advancing suggests a response
to this dilemma. At almost any point in shifting from traditional to experimentalist regulation, it is possible to advance still further by extending
the benchmarking apparatus, thus providing the instruments and the impetus for the actors themselves to demonstrate new possibilities for solving problems within current rules or devising alternatives to those rules.
This is the lesson of TRI and TURA. Imagine, then, for example, that
Congress amended the legislation governing the TRI to include the planning, peer-inspectorate, and inter-agency coordination features of TURA.
In that case, actors nationwide would, as in Massachusetts, rapidly learn
which kinds of public and private services and reporting regimes favor
comprehensive environmental improvements, and the best of these could
then be used to create a framework for an experimentalist framework for
changing the traditional rump. Yet, whatever the advantages of such a
system, the notion that it culminates in a frameworkfor aframework suggests
why, in the end, even augmented information pooling can only be a palliative, not a definitive solution. Eventually, the traditional rump stands in
the way of further experiments. What then?
Here is where the basal ideas of experimentalism matter. Within
representative democracy, "experiments" conducted within the confines
of existing law, but with a view to changing existing law, are likely to turn
into lobbying efforts rather than directly deliberative experiments. Those
who entertain truly innovative plans that might put themselves and their
ideas at risk will hold back for fear of overstepping legal boundaries.
That is certainly part of the lesson of XL.38 3 Many of those who participate in these confined "experiments" will do so in order to advance ideas
they firmly hold, not to test them. That such participation leads to more
maneuvering than forward motion is surely part of the lesson of CSL Put
another way, the effort to advance experimentalism by sparing it political
conflict over the rump of rules leads to a paralyzing politicization of the
experiments.
The alternative is to apply experimentalist principles of accountability as much to projects that challenge the rump of rules as to those that
383. Recall that the EPA has cobbled together its waiver authority from a combination

of its inherent prosecutorial discretion and its offer to seek changes in the law. See
Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,287 (1995).
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do not. Imagine that the EPA asked Congress for explicit authority for
itself and associated state entities to give temporary waivers from certain
statutory permitting requirements for firms that meet generally applicable, rolling rules regarding environmental performance and reporting.
This would create an open competition to devise a rolling alternative to
current practice, acceptable to a wide range of public and private actors.
Congress would, in the end, decide if the winner was an improvement
sufficient to warrant a definitive switch. Experimentalism would be a new
form of lawmaking, not a new method for influencing the lawmakers. If
experimentalism, as we are projecting it, has a future, then environmental regulation is one of the first areas where, beyond the morass of waivers
and pilot programs for pilot programs, we should see this kind of change
taking place.
D. The Role of Courts in the NationalExperimentalistSystem
Even more than the other branches, the courts3 84 are the institutions

in which existing conceptions of constitutional democracy appear to flow
seamlessly into experimentalism. "Experimentalist courts" are thus
nothing more than traditional Article III courts transformed by the new
methods of organization in the political branches of government and society around them. Experimentalist courts, like the traditional courts of
constitutional democracy, function by a form of direct deliberation:3 8 5
Citizens, as individuals or groups, speaking with the authority of their
own experience, can demand that the government give reasons for its
actions. In constitutional and administrative law litigation, such claims
will ultimately be grounded in both traditional and experimentalist
courts in norms of due process, freedom of expression, and equal protection, broadly understood as necessary elements of democracy, as well as
the more concrete doctrines applying these and other textual guarantees.3 8 6 But whatever the nominal source of the citizens' right to reasoned decisionmaking, the courts, experimentalist and conventional, are
the place where individuals can insist that the polity, and the government
that works in its name, justify again, by reference to its deepest values and
its best understanding of relevant experience, the justifications given so
384. For ease of exposition, we concentrate on federal courts, although a shift to

experimentalist institutions at all levels of government would necessarily have an impact on

state courts as well.
385. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication As Representation, 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 312 (1997) (arguing that even traditional courts should be seen as democratic

institutions).
386. In most cases challenging agency action, the textual source of the entitlement

within the current system is the Administrative Procedure Act's authorization for judicial
review of agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law ... contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity,... in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right, ... or without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1994).

1998]

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALTSM

far for particular actions. It is in the courts, therefore, that experimentalism manifests its continuity with constitutional democracy, and constitumanifests its most directly deliberative and experimentional democracy
3 87
talist aspect.
The novel features of experimentalist courts result from their relations to the other experimentalist organs of government: Congress, state
and local governments, and administrative agencies. As these entities
adopt experimental methods, they come to elaborate new understandings of fundamental principles in the course of seeking solutions to concrete problems. The ebb and flow of reason giving is the political process
of directly deliberative polyarchy. In effect, it obliges the actors to elaborate fundamental principles while assessing the practical consequences of
different rules of order. This process substantiates the sovereign intent,
the means associated with it, and the authorities' fidelity to the constraints imposed by both. Accordingly, a two-fold transformation in judicial decisionmaking serves as both a precondition and consequence of
this enlarged role for social self-explication.
First, the courts must develop an explicit understanding of fundamental legal norms deeply entrenched yet always provisional in the sense
that the means by which core values are both protected and ultimately
defined are deliberately exposed to experimentalist understanding. By
insisting that actors respect the central experimentalist condition of declaring goals and measuring results, the courts can declare and defend
inchoate rights without pretending to anticipate the manifold consequences of the finding.
Second, experimentalist courts defer to the political actors' exploration of means and ends only on the condition that the actors have in fact
created the kind of record that makes possible an assessment of their
linking of principle and practice. The system that experimentalist judicial review enables thus introduces constitutional values into the political
decisions of everyday life while bringing the lessons of everyday life into
the discourse of constitutional value. Put another way, experimentalist
courts can serve democracy better not only because they presume to provide fewer definitive answers to legal, social, and ultimately political questions, but also because they can inquire into more of the political actors'
own deliberative capacities.
Judicial review by experimentalist courts accordingly becomes a review of the admissibility of the reasons private and political actors themselves give for their decisions, and the respect they actually accord those
reasons: a review, that is, of whether the protagonists have themselves
387. It is true, of course, that members of Congress devote considerable resources to
constituent services, but these services do not include redress of most asserted legal
wrongs. Indeed, under traditional separation-of-powers principles, it would be
inappropriate for Congress to attend to individual grievances. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (deriving a generality
requirement from the prohibition on Bills of Attainder in Article I, Section 9).
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been sufficiently attentive to the legal factors that constrain the framing
of alternatives and the process of choosing among them. Constitutional
review in particular becomes ajurisprudence of impermissible arguments
and obligatory considerations-the former forbidding the actors to pursue ends found to be unconstitutional; the latter enjoining them to give
particular attention to their choice of means when constitutional values
appear to be at risk.
This Section focuses on the current problems courts face in construing ambiguous statutory and constitutional text, and the way the redistribution of reason giving in experimentalist courts provides a partial solution. Succeeding Parts rely on nascent constitutional doctrine to
illustrate how experimentalist methods can reveal the boundaries of the
legitimate zone of constitutional experimentation in federalism, separation of powers, and most important, a reinterpretation of the idea of individual rights that accompanies the new jurisprudence.38 8
1. The Dilemma ofjudicialReview as the Muddle of Means and Ends. Under current conditions, the indeterminate relation of legislative means
to ends bedevils judicial review of administrative action and the constitutionality of legislation. Absent well-articulated connections between
means and ends that the political actors have themselves elaborated, the
courts must speculate about their relation. This speculation typically
takes the form of balancing policy objectives against prima facie affronts
to the legal order. Yet, because open balancing embroils the court in
political decisions, it balances surreptitiously through the use of complex
rules that determine the degree ofjudicial scrutiny to which an individual
case will be subjected. But because the application of these tests in turn
involves a suspiciously political calculus, the court must then defend the
tests and categories in a form of second-order balancing.
Consider the paradigmatic difficulty of determining the relation between the means and ends of a particular law, starting with ends. A
straightforward way to know whether a law's ends are constitutional is to
determine the legislature's intent in enacting it. But there is no simple
way to make this determination: The majority that voted for a bill is composed of legislators who cast their vote for various reasons, 89g among
which may be the desire to occlude the true reason for the vote. The
alternative to looking to declared or subjective intent is to infer the socalled "objective" intent from the statute itself. This is, of course, ajudicial construction: Given the means chosen by the legislature, the courts
388. See infra Part VI (federalism), Part VII (separation of powers), Part VIII

(individual rights).
389. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[t]he number of possible motivations... is not binary, or indeed even finite"); Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 702-03 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(ridiculing the notion of a law's actual purpose); see also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
317-24 (1986) (arguing against a "speaker's meaning" approach to statutory

interpretation).
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infer the statute's purposes or ends. But this maneuver of inferring the
ends from the means yields a determinate result only if it is possible to
assess the significance of the means without referring back, in circular
fashion, to the indeterminate ends. 390
Yet scrutiny of means does retrace the circle. A court bent on sustaining legislative power can simply define the statute's objective as the
accomplishment of whatever it is the statute happens to accomplish. 39 1
Conversely, if a court first divines a legislative goal, then whatever means
the legislature chooses, the court can devise other, less menacing ones,
depending on its view of the legitimacy and urgency of the goal to be
achieved. Suppose, for example, that the Supreme Court decides that
preferential hiring of minority contractors is allowable as a means, provided that it is essential to achieving the allowable end of reduction of
39 2
racial discrimination in the contracting industry in a particular city.

Or suppose, to return to the State Farm case, the Court finds that a particular, passive automobile safety restraint is an acceptable means to the end
of increasing highway safety, provided that there is no better one. 393
Given a court's limited fact-finding capability-its limited ability to explore alternatives-how can it know that means are not sufficiently
closely tied to ends?
Under current practice in both the administrative and constitutional
law contexts, the Court speculates about what are essentially empirical
matters, asking questions about the advantages and disadvantages of alteratives that the protagonists might well have asked but did not Was
official discrimination in fact severe enough in the city in question 3 to
94
justify the inevitable social and individual costs of affirmative action?
Were passive restraints such as airbags feasible and therefore preferable
to rescission of Standard 208?s95 Thus, in scrutinizing means by, for example, inquiring whether a statute is "narrowly tailored" to further a constitutional end, the Court in effect balances its estimates of the constitutional harm entailed by the legislative solution against its estimates of the
greater costs (or benefits) to society that result from pursuing a constitutionally preferable (or equivalent) one. 39 6 The balance will often appear
390. But see, e.g., City of Richmond v. JAL Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(describing the least restrictive means test as a means of "smok[ing] out" impermissible
motives).
391. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (upholding as
rational exemptions from a ban on pushcart vending for two identifiable vendors on the
ground that the city could rationally conclude that these vendors "had themselves become
part of the distinctive character and charm that distinguishes the Vieux Carre").
392. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506.
393. See supra text accompanying note 229.
394. In Croson, the Court decided no. See 488 U.S. at 498-506.
395. Recall from our earlier discussion that the State Farm Court said yes. See supra
text accompanying note 229; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983).
396. See Ely, supra note 2, at 105-06.
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capricious or partial because the standards for measuring costs and benefits of means can easily appear to have been derived from evaluations of
the worthiness of ends. Thus, if the Court sets an extraordinarily high
value on a particular vision of racial justice, almost any affirmative action
program can be judged to produce benefits on balance greater than
costs. In finding otherwise, by this logic, the Court subordinates racial
justice to other values (including a competing vision of racial justice itself), even though it purports to answer the empirical question whether
the challenged program could have achieved its worthy goals by other
means. However, there is no satisfactory reason why the Court, rather
than the legislature, is the appropriate institution to raise and answer
such empirical questions and then make and compare the estimates of
benefit and harm to which the answers lead. For these reasons, such scrutiny evokes the menace of the countermajoritarian difficulty. No wonder
the Court is at pains to disguise the extent to which its formal constitu3 97
tional tests rely on balancing techniques.
The Court's efforts to reduce the need to engage in this suspect balancing by reducing its cause-its own uncomfortable position as clarifier
of ambiguous authoritative meaning-lead to unpalatable results in representative democracy. One strategy is to require the legislature to articulate its purposes upon enacting legislation, and therefore disallow
(re)interpretation of those purposes before a court responding to a subsequent constitutional challenge. This suggestion has been current for a
quarter century;3 98 the Supreme Court has followed it in some cases subjecting legislation to heightened scrutiny of constitutionality.3 9 9 But a determined legislature could circumvent such a prohibition simply by declaring a purpose that immunized its legislation from later judicial
challenge. Hence, the Court has not embraced a general exclusion of

397. For example, Justice Scalia sometimes voices strong objections to balancing, see
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (1996) (rejecting an explicit balancing
approach to determine reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment); Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897-98 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(ridiculing the process of balancing incommensurate qualities), even if he recognizes, in

unguarded moments, that strict scrutiny itself is a form of balancing, see Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-88 (1990).

398. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 28, 44-46 (1972). Similarly, Cass Sunstein has argued that "[m]any
constitutional provisions require government to identify a public value that can be used to

support government action."

Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private

Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1133 (1986). His more recent work, however
embraces the claim that requiring agreement as to purposes among judges will often
frustrate the goal of agreement as to the bottom line. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at

20-21.
399. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-32, at 1606-09 (2d ed.
1988).
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justification of legislation by afterthought, for fear that the obligation to
40 0
give binding reasons could be reduced to a formality of drafting.
Courts recur to a second, closely related but equally unfeasible, strategy in developing canons of restrictive statutory interpretation said to
serve the constitutional value of clear authoritative meaning, even if these
canons are not directly required by the Constitution. 40 1 Thus, judges attempt to constrain legislatures to purge their enactments of ambiguity by
disallowing references to legislative history or by imposing plain statement requirements. 40 2 But these techniques attribute to the Court a fictive capacity to determine which meanings are plain; more troubling still,
they attribute to the vacillating and divided legislature we know a
superherculean capacity not only to solve problems without recourse to
ambiguity, but also to anticipate which solutions the Court will accept as
unambiguous. It takes great confidence indeed in the authority and interpretive constancy of the judiciary (and a peculiar mixture of little and
much faith in the judiciousness and integrity of elected representatives)
to assume that, by itself, the intimidating prospect of a Court sworn to
extirpate legislative ambiguity will produce effective and unequivocal
legislation.
Given the persistence of these fundamental dilemmas of interpretability, the Court in practice faces a familiar Hobson's choice. It can defer
to political decisions however arrived at, knowing that deference invites
caprice and manipulation by the lawmaker. Or it can scrutinize the decision in the light of its balancing techniques. But this scrutiny threatens to
paralyze or disqualify democracy.
The Court's response is yet another balancing act: In effect, acknowledging that, case by case, it must be either too deferential or too
intrusive, the Court aims to strike an acceptable balance between these
excesses in the aggregate of its decisions. It does so by categorizing cases
either as calling for deference to political decisions or as calling for close
supervision. Upon determining that deference is called for, the Court
insists only that it be able to discern a "rational basis" for legislation (in
constitutional law) 403 or evidence of "reasonable" agency decisionmaking
400. See Ely, supra note 2, at 125.
401. In the federalism context, the Court has imposed a rule that, absent a plain
statement, Congress will be presumed not to have exercised the power to regulate in areas
traditionally regulated by the states. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)
(invoking this rule to hold that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply

to state judges).
402. For a catalogue and critique of conventional textualist theories, as well as a
defense of a somewhat unconventional theory, see generallyJohn F. Manning, Textualism
As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1997); see also City of Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994) ("[I]t is the statute, and not the
Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law.").
403. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (rational
basis review in equal protection); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938) (rational basis review of economic legislation).
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(in administrative law).404 The standards applied in the case of such deference are very deferential indeed. In the constitutional area, the Court
will simply assume that the legislature has chosen to pursue a permissible
end, and then hypothesize a route from chosen means to that end. Thus,
to take an infamous example, if the optometrist and ophthalmologist
lobby manages to obtain legislation that favors their interests over those
of opticians, the Court strains to imagine a world in which the law is public regarding rather than a private deal. 40 5 Or, to choose an equally noto-

rious example from the realm of administrative law, if manufacturing interests persuade a new administration to reinterpret an environmental
statute in a manner that permits more pollution, the Court will characterize the shift as a policy decision within the broad scope of the statute, thus
avoiding the need to interpret the statute definitively itself.40 6 In both
constitutional and administrative law, such deference is the rule. Only in
cases raising matters of exceptional urgency does the Court apply its techniques of weighing means and ends under the more demanding and forbiddingly named tests of strict scrutiny (in constitutional law) and hard
look review (in administrative law).407
But the categorization of particular cases as calling for either deference or close scrutiny is, at best, a political makeshift. It demonstrates to
the polity that the Court is aware of its place in the constitutional order,
even if by a sad paradox each decision taken by itself seems to suggest
that it is not, and even if, by a more perilous paradox, the balancing act
underscores just how much that order depends on the Court's ability to
maintain its poise. Indeed, on rare occasions we actually see the Court
teetering. It worries that the application of a standard in a particular case
will undermine the integrity of the standard in others. 40 8 The Court's
404. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
405. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).

406. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58, 866.
407. Strict scrutiny applies to laws infringing or unequally burdening fundamental
rights and those employing suspect classifications such as race. See Tribe, supra note 399,
§ 16-6, at 1451. State Farr exemplifies hard look review, see Peter L. Strauss, Considering
Political Alternatives to "Hard Look" Review, 1989 Duke LJ. 538, 539, in which the
reviewing court asks the nominally procedural question whether the agency gave adequate
consideration to the issues raised by its decision. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystilying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and
Comment Rulemaking, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483, 491 (1997). The Court has not announced

formal criteria that determine when it will engage in hard look review as opposed to
deferring per Chevron.
408. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), is an almost
comical example. The Court first declines to find that mental retardation is a suspect
classification calling for strict scrutiny, expressing the fear that such a finding would open
the floodgates to other suspect classifications, and thus lead to unwarranted judicial
interference with political decisionmaking. See id. at 445-46. But the Court goes on to
find that the particular classification at issue fails even the minimal test of rational basis
scrutiny, see id. at 447-48, in effect subjecting the ordinance "to precisely the sort of
probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny," id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring
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falterings reveal its fundamental dilemma. For if the Court abandons deference too often for the alternatives of heightened scrutiny or hard look
review, and in the bargain recognizes openly that it is engaged in balancing incommensurate public and private goods,4 09 it interferes with the
political process and risks its own legitimacy. But if the Court chooses
deference instead, it risks protecting itself at the cost of the fundamental
values it is meant to safeguard.
2. Experimentalismand the Giving ofReasons. - The foregoing difficulties are not of the Supreme Court's own making; rather, they result from
the nature of the processes the Court must review, and which by doctrinal
assertion alone it cannot reform. We contend that as the polity adopts
experimentalism, courts can avoid the worst features of oscillation between deference and intrusion. For democratic experimentalism can
clarify the relation of means and ends in a way that judicial exhortation
and intimidation cannot. Experimentalism provides the polity with the
institutional means to ask the questions that courts otherwise need to, but
cannot ask, in hard cases, and to ask them in the way most relevantconnecting means to ends-to practical decisions and judicial review.
Experimentalism clarifies authoritative meaning so as to reduce recourse to, and the capriciousness of, statutory interpretation and the balancing tests with which it is associated, because it does away with the
spurious precision of once-and-for-all solutions to problems of administrative and constitutional order. As a result, many issues that daunt judicial review in its current form often do not even arise under experimentalism; and when they do arise, they call forth a judicial response that
casts the courts in a new, less precarious role.
Consider the case of the environmental statute used to illustrate deferential administrative review. 4 10 The statute provided for stringent emissions licensing requirements
to be applied to what the statute called a
"stationary source." 411 The controversy surrounded the definition of this
term. Prior to the Reagan administration, the agency treated each pollutin the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,
225-26 (1992) (StevensJ, dissenting) (expressing concern that the Court's upholding of
limitation on speech would dilute strict scrutiny).
Nor is this phenomenon limited to constitutional law. In the administrative law
context, the Court sometimes strains mightily to avoid classifying a case as calling for
deference. For example, in MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994), the
Court analyzes the contents of old and new dictionaries to conclude that the word
"modify" encompasses minor but not major change. See id. at 225-29. This maneuver
enables the Court to refuse to defer to the agency's interpretation of "modify," on the
ground that "an agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference when it
goes beyond the meaning that the statute can bear." Id. at 229 (citing Pittston Coal Group
v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988), and Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
409. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a

particular rock is heavy.").
410. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
411. See id. at 840.
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ing device as a single stationary source for a variety of purposes. The new
administration wished to employ a "bubble concept," in which the entire
plant was treated as one stationary source. 4 12 This redefinition of the
statutory term allowed firms to meet licensing requirements more easily
by using low-level emissions-producing devices to offset the effects of dirtier ones.4 13 Given the ambiguity of the regulation, it seemed that the
Court had little choice but to defer.
Under democratic experimentalism, in contrast, this sort of problem
typically would not arise because Congress and the agencies would play
quite different roles. The very idea of statutory authorization for the
agency to license plants based upon their compliance with agency-set
emissions standards would be replaced by a statute authorizing the
agency to coordinate industry, state, and local efforts to establish a rolling
best-practice requirement. Some jurisdictions might initially define emission sources as points or discrete pieces of equipment, while others might
define them as areas or bubbles. The differences could persist until it
were demonstrated that one regime or the other produced the superior
(rolling) standard. The search routines and comparisons that set such
requirements would supplant agency-set limits; and, should Congress
nonetheless choose to trigger certain (other, rolling best-practice) requirements with a term like "stationary source," the same search routines
and comparisons would inform the agency and the court as to whether a
standard more stringent than the bubble concept were possible. 41 4 If
one jurisdiction could regulate pursuant to a single-source interpretation
of stationary source, then regulated entities in other jurisdictions would
have little cause to complain.
Under current practice, when an agency's regulatory approach is
challenged as illegal, it typically defends itself by arguing that the practice
falls within the band permitted by the standard-setting statute even if
other practices also fall within that band. 415 The courts must then determine the meaning of the statutory or regulatory command-a task that is
problematic in the ways we just saw.41 6 By contrast, under a statute authorizing experimentalist administration, the courts do not themselves
412. See id. at 840 (defining bubble concept), 857-89 (describing shift under new
administration).
413. See id. at 853-59.
414. It might be thought that the choice between regulation per the bubble concept

and regulation per point sources poses a simple policy choice between more or less
pollution. But this is not obviously so; state and local experimentation might reveal that,
under some circumstances, a bubble concept in fact produces incentives that result in less
total emissions than the alternative point source regulation. See Donald Kennedy, Valuing
Nature, 16 Stan. Envti. LJ. at xi, xii(1997) (grouping the bubble concept with other
market-based approaches that create incentives for firms to reduce pollution). But cf.
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked; What's
Failed; What Might Work, 21 Envtl. L. 1549, 1624 (1991) (contrasting bubble concept with
"a market approach").
415. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.
416. See supra Part V.D.1.
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supply authoritative meaning; the agencies and other actors jointly provide the baseline through rolling best-practice standards.
Noncomplying entities then would have the burden of showing that
the standard selected by the agency is not in fact superior to their own, or
of showing that local circumstances render solutions that were adopted
elsewhere infeasible for them. Courts would be required to exercise
some judgment, but thatjudgment would be considerably less speculative
than under existing practice. The courts would not be charged with determining whether the practice designated by the agency is in fact besthow could a court know better than an agency? Instead, the court's task
is to inquire whether the agency in fact undertook the kind of information organizing and coordinating effort necessary to generate rolling
best-practice standards. And in the case of entities or jurisdictions that
claim that their local circumstances make the standard practice inapplicable, the burden would be on these entities and jurisdictions to show why
this is so, by showing that they undertook the sort of searching comparisons conducted by firms engaged in learning by monitoring.
The system of judicial review is thus procedural in the sense that it
asks what the entities, jurisdictions, and agencies did to look for solutions,
rather than whether the solutions were the right ones. However, because
the preferred procedures of democratic experimentalism so closely tie
means to ends, procedural review resists transformation into an empty
formalism. Practical exploration of alternatives by the primary actors obviates much interpretive balancing of means and ends by the judiciary,
and does so in a way that allays fears of a pro forma manipulation of the
record.
Judicial review of experimentalist administration avoids the extremes
of deference and intrusion. We have just considered a case that would,
under the present regime, be treated under a rule of deference; under
experimentalism, the same approach applies in cases that would, under
the present regime, be treated as calling for hard look review. Seen
through the lens of democratic experimentalism, the flaw in the agency
process in a case such as State Farm4 17 (the paradigmatic hard look case)
is not so much the failure to consider a particular alternative regulation
as it is the decision to structure the regulatory process as a search for a
definitive standard. If NHTSA had established a rolling best-practice
standard, automobile manufacturers would have had a financial incentive
to find optimal solutions, and judicial review would have proceeded
along the general lines described above.
Recall that cases like State Farm present the question whether an
agency regulation ought to be invalidated for the agency's failure to consider some particular alternative. 4 18 An experimentalist court hearing
417. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29

(1983).
418. See supra text accompanying notes 226-231.
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such a claim typically would not need to speculate about such matters,
because an experimentalist agency will itself generate the information
that bears on the court's assessment of the consideration of alternativesnot because the agency labors under the watchful eye of the courts, but
because that information is crucial to regulation itself. The consideration
of alternatives is not a mere appendage to the regulatory agenda;
benchmarking and error detection by comparison are the very stuff of
experimentalist regulation. Judicial review would then look to see
whether the agency used procedures that enlisted the regulated entities
and the intended beneficiaries as partners in the search for solutions. A
claimant would not state a case justifying relief merely by alleging that the
agency failed to consider some particular alternative to the regulation
ultimately adopted and deemed suitable by the reviewing court; instead,
the reviewing court would look to see whether the process was structured
in such a way as to produce alternatives and comparisons. When agencies
function according to experimentalist principles, judicial review of
agency action is thus unlikely to disrupt agency proceedings.
3. A PartialReconceptualization ofJudicialReview and Rights. - As the
foregoing analysis makes clear, experimentalist legislation and administration will not eliminate the need for judicial action, but the new forms
do partially transform judicial action. An experimentalist court seeks to
give effect to important legal norms, without presuming to know their full
implications for particular circumstances. The experimentalist court enlists the actors' particular projects in its elaboration of general norms. To
do so, the court first identifies circumstances that threaten constitutional
and other important legal values; it then commands the actors to meet
this menace by means of their choosing (with due consideration to the
choices of others in like circumstances) and subject to the court's review.
In Part VIII, we detail how the Court has already authorized such an exploration of countermeasures to potential constitutional wrongs under
the name of "prophylactic rules," and show that the justification for this
approach can sensibly be extended to the mass of constitutional values.
For now, however, we focus on those aspects of experimentalist judicial
review that illustrate the new division of deliberative labor between the
judiciary and other actors. As our examples in the previous section were
drawn largely from administrative law, here we focus on constitutional
cases.
By way of illustration, consider a stylized version of one of the most
vexing constitutional questions of our time: To what extent may government classify persons by race as a means of combating present racism and
the present effects of past racism? The question calls for an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection and
raises profound philosophical and political issues. Yet, it also raises important practical questions, and an experimentalist judiciary would enlist
society at large in connecting the practical to the philosophical. Thus, in
the case of an urban affirmative action program, an experimentalist court

19981

DEMOCRATIC EXPFRJMENTALSM

would oblige the city to canvass current and potential affirmative action
programs for city employees and contractors, as well as race-neutral
means for achieving the same objectives. In choosing one or some amalgam. of several programs, the city would have to give reasons for its
choice, rooted in the particulars of local experience and reflecting the
diversity of local views. In justifying its choice, moreover, the city would
have to explain-again by reference to alternatives practiced elsewherewhy the forms of participation used to assess local conditions and potential local remedies are in fact suited to those conditions. In correcting
the operation of the affirmative action program, the city would furthermore present a review of all these matters from the point of view of participants, pleased and not, and a record of the response to that review.4 19
Abstracting from this example to the process ofjudicial review more
generally, we see that the actors use the record of their evolving purposes
as the guide and measure of their action. As a consequence, a re.iewing
court has relatively little need to fear that it is being duped by empty
declarations of harmless intent, or that it will have to fill a vast interpretative void by hypothesizing as to legislative purposes. If the gap between
actions and the record is large, then the actors have failed to meet their
obligation of self-explication, and their after-the-fact justifications-always suspect-are more suspicious still. If the gap is acceptably small,
then the record reveals the intent as it was interpreted in action; and,
being itself an exegesis of the facts, it neither requires nor admits an after-the-fact supplement.
Stripped of the confounding complexity of means-ends scrutiny in its
familiar forms, an experimentalist review moves in the direction of an
express jurisprudence of excluded or impermissible reasons. 420 At any
moment, such a jurisprudence gives substance to the constitutional obli419. The post-Croson literature suggests the kinds of information that city
policymakers ought to compile. See, e.g., George R- La Noue, Standards for the Second
Generation of Croson-Inspired Disparity Studies, 26 Urb. Law. 485, 533-35 (1994)
(discussing the various problems of disparity studies and suggesting solutions for
policymakers); Daron S. Fitch, Note, The Aftermath of Croson: A Blueprint for a
Constitutionally Permissible Minority Set-Aside Program, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 555, 576-84
(1992) (discussing use of statistical and anecdotal evidence in proving past
discrimination).
420. Several commentators have recently noted that the Supreme Court has itself
been moving in this direction precisely because of the circularity problems identified here.
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 297,
338 (1997); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing- The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 Hastings LJ. 711, 712-13 (1994). Stephen Gottlieb has called
attention to this point as a general matter, see Stephen E. Gottieb, Compelling
Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 917, 919-20 (1988); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of
Balancing Significant Interests, 45 Hastings L.J. 825, 860-66 (1994), and of course, there
are areas of constitutional law, such as the First Amendment's protection of free speech,
that have been long understood to be concerned primarily with illicit government
purposes, see generally Tribe, supra note 399, §§ 12-2 to 12-4, at 789-804.
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gation that citizens be treated as free and equal by saying what motives
42 1
violate that requirement.
In determining, next, whether permissible reasons have been accorded the respect due them, a court need no more reconstruct the
whole history of decisionmaking in a matter under consideration than an
agency does in determining compliance with the obligation to benchmark and the rolling standards that result. Where judicial review of
agency action is at issue, the process takes place at a metalevel: The court
reviews the agency's decisions about how to regulate, given the choices
faced directly by regulated entities. The court looks to the record of the
agency's successive organizations of information pooling, and especially
its (changing) responses to challenges and proposed alternatives. This
form ofjudicial review resembles the new method of regulating nuclear
utilities. It judges the safety and reliability of the responses by analyzing
how they respond to potential hazards and actual threats, given an extensive record of both, and a record not only of reactions to them but of
efforts to improve those reactions. 4 22 Where there is no agency interposed between the actors and the court-as in the urban affirmative action example-the court monitors the pooling of information as though
it were an agency, but applies, of course, the less detailed criteria found
in broad constitutional guarantees, as against relatively concrete (experimentalist) statutes. In determining, for instance, whether the city adopting affirmative action measures has chosen means appropriate to the allowable end of reducing discrimination, the court, like a hypothetical
regulatory entity, looks to the pool of experience upon which the city
itself has been drawing: the affirmative action plans of like cities and
their justifications, the exact form of benchmarking, the participatory
methods, and the corrections to these.
Thus, the court judges the parties' abilities to gather, summarize,
and use information by their ability to learn from their mistakes while
drawing on the efforts of others in their situation to do likewise. Plaintiffs
will strive to enlarge the circle of comparisons to include cases with out421. A substantive jurisprudence of this stark kind is foreshadowed in the Court's
recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), invalidating Colorado's state
constitutional amendment denying cities and other subdivisions of the state the authority
to prohibit discrimination against gays and lesbians. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court self-consciously avoids the customary preoccupation with the appropriate level of
scrutiny, finding instead that the Colorado amendment is best seen as a fulfillment of the
goal of harming gays and lesbians for the simple purpose of harming them. See id. at
1628. Whatever else one might say about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
the Court says that the purpose of harming an identifiable group is a constitutionally
illegitimate one. See id. Of course, the Romer opinion does not entirely escape the
dilemma of modern judicial review, because Justice Kennedy must infer the amendment's
purpose in part from the means it uses, and he predictably encounters a different
characterization by the dissent. See id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Colorado amendment was not motivated by "desire to harm," but instead by desire to
"preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority").
422. See supra Part V.C.3.
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comes that favor their cause. To be convincing, they will have to show
that at least some other jurisdictions have found the comparisons they
contemplate compelling enough to consider acting on them. Defendants
will present reasons based in their own experience for disallowing those
comparisons. To be convincing they will have to show that these reasons
are consistent not only with the other reasons they give for their actions,
but also with those actions (and responses to the reactions they provoke)
themselves. In this to and fro, it is the primary actors that define the
range of alternatives to be considered in an evaluation of the appropriateness of ends to means, further publicizing the variety of possibilities in
the process; and in deciding whether due consideration has been given to
these alternatives, the court refers to standards of care and attentiveness-the ability to learn and learn to learn-that emerge from the practice of the relevant parties themselves.
The resulting convergence ofjudicial and practical reason giving appears most dramatically in the formulation of concrete plans of action.
Even traditional courts often directly involve the parties in the formulation of remedial decrees. This is most often true in institutional reform
litigation: Upon finding that a city deliberately operates a racially segregated school system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause or that a
state operates an overcrowded prison in violation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, courts routinely solicit remedial plans from
423
the plaintiffs and (respectively) the school board or prison officials.
Experimentalism generalizes and radicalizes this procedure. It asks
courts to involve the parties in exploring the realm of possibilities at the
earlier stage of determining whether there is a legal violation.
For trial courts, experimentalism can transform the role of the judge
from the traditional Anglo-American model of passive referee 4 24 into an
active problem solver, acting in cooperation with lawyers and the network
of social problems and services in which legal problems are embedded.
For example, in the last decade, over 150 drug courts have been created,
and an equal number are planned. 425 These courts treat nonviolent
crimes committed by drug addicts as symptoms of the addiction, rather
than merely as violations of the criminal code. Social workers, medical
personnel, and a sophisticated computer database give the judge the kind
of information necessary to decide whether and how treatment may be
more appropriate than prison; frequent follow-ups by the court ensures
423. See, e.g., Hart v. Community Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 769, 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(Weinstein,J.) (ordering implementation of school district's proposed remedial plan upon
receiving detailed report of special master and after extensive consultation with parties),
aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
424. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1031, 1042-43 (1975) (arguing that ajudge in the American adversarial system is ill

equipped to play an active role in development of the case).
425. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Justice for Junkies: Brooklyn's Drug Court Marks a

Year of Sending Addicts to Rehab, Not Prison, Village Voice (New York) , June 3, 1997, at
50.
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that addicts continue their prescribed treatment, and that treatment facilities serve their assigned functions, rather than simply acting as alternate
warehouses to prison. 426 In this setting, the judge acts as coordinator of
information, as stem parental figure to addicts who repeatedly fail to fol42 7
low through on treatment, and as cheerleader for those who succeed.
The one thing the judge does only rarely, however, is, in a word, judgein the sense that the judge rarely purports to make a legal or factual determination based on competing presentations. 428 But, unlike other contexts in which the judicial system skips the adjudication phase, such as
plea bargaining, in a drug court the judge plays an extremely active role
4 29
in implementing and overseeing resolutions.
In those circumstances in which the court is not a part of the social
arrangements it superintends, experimentalist judging will often consist
of instructing the primary social actors to devise solutions. As a striking
example of the convergence of approaches, consider the decision of the
European Court of Justice in Union Royale Beige des Socigts de Football
Association (ASBL) v. Bosman.430 The court faced a challenge to, inter alia,
regulations promulgated by national and international soccer organizations requiring the payment of large transfer fees (up to eight times a
player's annual gross salary) when, upon the expiration of a professional
player's contract, he wished to play for a new club. 43 ' The court interpreted Article 48 of the European Community as including a prohibition
on "rules applied without discrimination which hinder freedom of movement,"43 2 and accordingly held the transfer rules invalid in the case of a
Belgian soccer player who found himself unable to play for a French club
because of the prohibitive cost of the transfer rules. 43 5 However, the
court recognized that the soccer organizations were legitimately concerned that without some form of regulation, the teams playing in the
richest markets would win the bidding war for the best players and
thereby reduce the overall quality and competitiveness of play.434 Finding that the transfer rules were not the only feasible means of preventing
this occurrence, 43 5 the court ruled them invalid.43 6 The court did not,
however, order the organizations to adopt any particular remedy. In426. See Christopher S. Wren, New Court Lets Drug Addicts Choose Treatment
Program Rather Than Jail, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1997, at B3.
427. See Gonnerman, supra note 425, at 50.
428. Both of the authors had this reaction after observing a session of the Brooklyn

Treatment Court.
429. Interview with Judge JoAnn Ferdinand, Criminal Court of the City of New York,
in her Brooklyn Treatment Court Chambers (Dec. 1, 1997).
430. Case C-415/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645.
431. See id. 1 9-10, at 1-4934-35.
432. Id. 165, at 1-4991.
433. See id. 248, at 1-5025.

434. See id. 1 218, at 1-5014.
435. See id. 1 219-27, at 1-5014-18.
436. See id.

248, at 1-5025.
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stead, it noted that the objective of competitiveness could be achieved by
revenue sharing, as that method in fact was in use "in specific areas by the
associations and clubs concerned." 43 7 Having set this benchmark, the
court made clear that it would not presume to devise solutions for the
actors:
Which system the associations and clubs put in the place of the
... transfer rules with their system of transfer fees is in any event
a matter for them themselves. The only condition imposed by
Community law in that respect is that the right of players to freeby Article 48 of the EC Treaty,
dom of movement, protected
43 8
must remain guaranteed.
As we explain in greater detail in Part VIII, American constitutional
doctrine anticipates a similar form of experimental elaboration of legal
norms in its concept of prophylactic rules. 43 9 The basic notion, elaborated in Miranda v. Arizona" 0 and other cases involving the rights of
criminal suspects, has several components. First, prophylactic decisionmaking allows that some circumstances pose special risks to constitutional
rights and values even if the Court cannot identify a clear violation. Second, this allowance obligates the government to meet minimum protec-

tive standards established by the Court. Third, the Court's chosen standards are understood to be mere minima; the Court encourages different
jurisdictions to experiment with other means of protecting the vulnerable
rights and values. It should be immediately apparent that this approach
may be used whenever the Court is uncertain about the application of
general norms to particulars-and that this circumstance describes nearly

all adjudication.
Thus, as a matter of substance, experimentalist judging focuses on
the permissibility of reasons, and responses to threats to fundamental
legal norms. As a matter of procedure, experimentalist judging focuses
on participation; but where traditional procedural jurisprudence seeks
the eternal requisites of fair process, 44 1 experimentalist courts ask
whether the parties whose actions are challenged have satisfied their obligation to grant those rights of participation revealed to be most effective
by comparison with rolling best practices elsewhere.
But no matter the constraints supplied by the self-exploration and
explication of the parties in democratic experimentalism, and its approximation ofjudicial and practical logistics notwithstanding, in the end, of
course, judging the validity of reasons and the respect accorded them in
particular cases will require judgment; and as judges reflect on the rea437. Id.
438. Id.
439. See infra Part VIII.B.
440. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980)
(using the "prophylactic" label).
441. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (setting out the
elements that the Due Process Clause requires in a hearing prior to termination of welfare
benefits).
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sons given for preceding decisions, judgment will be informed by doctrine. Often that doctrine will be shaped by the need to clarify the responsibilities of actors and institutions within the architecture of an
experimentalist regime. As anticipating such doctrine is itself a way of
clarifying the experimentalist design, we present experimentalist variants
of federalism doctrine concerning the relation between national and subnational governments, and of separation-of-powers doctrine concerning
the relation between branches of government. The most controversial
doctrinal developments, in experimentalism as under current arrangements, will typically concern the definition of the rights that define the
freedom and equality of citizens, or, put another way, set limits to the
reasons permitted in directly democratic deliberation. Because it identifies and publicizes novel forms of participation, democratic experimentalism provides a mechanism by which the social actors can press the
courts for clarification of the citizens' rights of participation broadly understood. Because it allows local actors to pursue broad ends by the
means they think best, experimentalism allows judges to acknowledge the
justice of actors' demands for clarification of their participatory rights
without the courts' having to discern by themselves how this acknowledgment can be woven into the skein of practical affairs. Anticipating this
mutual redefinition of participation and rights will help clarify how experimentalism gives meaning to democracy. Before turning to these
questions of doctrine and rights, however, we address several broad criticisms of democratic experimentalism that are likely to have been crystallized by the exposition so far.
E. Criticisms and Big Worries
Any incrementalist design for polyarchy is reasonably subject to two
broad kinds of criticism. The first kind of criticism is that incrementalism, by decentralizing authority and subdividing large decisions into
small ones, directly surrenders the weak to the power of the strong. It is
often the local oligarchs, after all, who truly love their little platoon. Behind the screen of community and long familiarity, they can have their
way, excluding the little people from political participation by quiet intimidation, perhaps softening intimidation into anxious loyalty with the
small gifts of clientelism. Or it may be that decomposition of large questions into debates about small improvements disadvantages the weak because the causes of their vulnerability are so deeply and systematically
rooted that only large changes will produce improvements worth the
name. In obstructing the consideration of sweeping alternatives, incrementalism substitutes tinkering for resolute reform.
The second kind of criticism is agnostic as to the advantages and
disadvantages of incrementalism for the weak and the strong. Its concern
is efficiency, and the dangers of detour and paralysis. Going step by step
we climb, for too long, the hillock rising before us, only to discover at the
top the mountains and valleys towards which we ought to have been striv-
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ing. Thus, incrementalism invites us to celebrate timidity and inertia as
prudence and determination. The more determined we are, moreover,
to ensure that each step meets the procedural requirements of directly
deliberative democracy, the greater the chances that prudence ends in a
morass of proceduralism.
We have been mindful of these criticisms from the outset and sought
to construct democratic experimentalism to respond to them. To take
stock of the argument so far, to make explicit assumptions left in the
background, and to suggest further necessary elaboration, we respond to
them directly and briefly here.
Consider first the possible menaces to the vulnerable: exclusion and
the elimination of the possibilities of great reform in favor of a sedative
meliorism. We can be brief with regard to the danger of exclusion, as it
has been a central concern in the discussion of institutional design so far,
and we will present further arguments in Part VIII in support of rightsbased safeguards against it.4 4 2 Here we only recall the assumption underlying the conviction that decentralized experimentalism can be an instrument for increasing participation, or, put the other way, reducing exclusion, and connect that assumption to the large hopes of what is
sometimes called Enlightenment or liberal thought.
The assumption is simply that at the frontiers of human activity, efficiency gains are often achieved through new forms of cooperation that
work precisely because persons and groups previously denied a say in ordering the affairs that affect them acquire it. Given this assumption, democratic experimentalism is an apparatus for identifying these successes,
and providing the means by which their example can be used to enlarge
the circle of participation elsewhere. The assumption itself is but a paraphrase of the liberal credo that freedom is the handmaiden, slavery the
mortal enemy, of progress, for self-determination is a precondition of cooperation, and cooperation the condition ofjoint advance. 443 This is the
idea behind Adam Smith's bottom line that slavery is the dearest form of
employment," 4 and the bottom line in the anguished calculations of the
nineteenth-century elites in Western Europe and the United States that
mass democracy in some form is a precondition for national economic

442. See infra text accompanying notes 656-677.
443. See Friedrich A. von Hayetk, Law, Legislation and Liberty 14 (1973).
444. See Adam Smith, supra note 73, at 411. This is not to suggest that slavery fell of
its own inefficiency, nor that all or even many of those who opposed it did so out of
concerns of efficacy. See Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of
Abolition 184 (1977) (showing that late-eighteenth-century British abolitionism flourished
even though "slavery was more important to Britain during the last decade of the
eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth centuries, than ever before or after").
Our claim is that there is often a confluence between the economically viable and the
morally compelling.
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and military self-assertion. 4 45 And while there are many examples of servitude that paid for the masters, it is a profession of the liberal faith in the
emancipatory possibilities of world history that we regard these as exceptions to the liberal rule. Democratic experimentalism is a relentless and
deliberate application of that rule in the service of participatory selfdetermination.
If the fear of exclusion names a challenge that democratic experimentalism is intended to address, the concern about the blanket elimination of large alternatives is, in that general form, a needless worry.
Within limits set by national institutions (the Constitution, Congress, the
agencies), local governments in democratic experimentalism may pursue
generally agreed upon goals by whatever means they prefer. They must
explain their choices and provide reasons for preferring those choices
over other, plausibly relevant methods. They must agree to measures that
allow informative comparisons with others pursuing the same goals under
similar conditions; if challenged, they must show that they can give good
reasons, based upon serious consideration of periodic mutual evaluation,
for sticking to their original choices or modifying them.
But subject to these restrictions, local governments may choose radically different alternatives, and experimentalism, by design, makes it easier for them to do this than it would be in a conventional representative
democracy. Consider the archetypal case of welfare reform. A local government that chooses to address the problem by adapting and integrating
services to suit the highly specialized needs of citizen users can avail itself
of the simultaneous engineering and benchmarking capacities of the local governance council, service providers, and government agencies. Another local government, horrified at the prospect of inducing indolence
by providing welfare in the first place, can decide, on the contrary, to
provide only minimum training and job placement services (unless and
until the decision provokes emergencies or until eventual successes of the
integrative solution prompt reconsideration). Contrast this autonomy
with the possibilities in present mass democracies, where, until very recently, central welfare bureaucracies, backed by national legislatures, had
the authority to block anything like the second type of solution, and
lacked the incentives and capacity to realize a workable approximation of
the first. (We return in Part VI to the current forced-draft decentralization of welfare reform in the United States as an admonitory illustration
of the dangers of abandoning national legislative authority without sufficiently providing for an experimentalist alternative.)
A further sense in which democratic experimentalism by its very nature enlarges the range of alternatives under consideration regards the
process of problem solving by direct deliberation. Recall that this process
445. See generally Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (1963); Friedrich
Meinecke, The Age of German Liberation 1795-1815 (1977); Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1990) (1835).
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depends on drawing the participants beyond the circle of their habits and
routines by exposing them to unfamiliar projects and prospects. The diversity of their viewpoints allows evaluation of novelty, and evaluation of
novelty allows reexamination of differences. The immediate products of
this deliberation are solutions to problems and indications of organizational reforms that could prevent a similar occurrence. But why assume
that reflection on possibilities stops here? As patterns in problem solving
and institutional reform emerge, they can be formulated as coherent, if
previously unimagined, alternatives. Strategic reflection would be in this
sense ajoint product of problem solving,just as strategic reflection would
be a joint product of product development in firms that adopted learning-by-monitoring governance mechanisms. A master skill in the new
electoral politics of experimentalism would be precisely the articulation
of such patterns and alternatives as a means of furthering the life of the
local polity. Thus, because of the freedom to choose among radically
different classes of solutions to similar problems, and the possibility of
discovering new classes through problem solving itself, it is simply wrong
to say that democratic experimentalism, as we describe it, is inimical to
large choices, although experimentalism may occasionally overlook some
radical possibilities to focus on others.
The fear of paralysis through the decomposition of decisionmaking
into infinitely small steps we hold to be similarly misplaced. If all imaginable controversies of interpretation regarding the legality of substantive
and procedural proposals had to be fought out in advance of action,
then, of course, the concern would not only be pertinent but also irrefutable. But in that case we would no longer be speaking of experimentalism as we have been conceiving it. For the central tenet of experimentalism is that experience matters, or, more precisely, that the best way to
assess the viability of plausible but imprecise ideas is to test them in practice under conditions that permit learning from the experience. Experimentalism would be superfluous if its results could be anticipated by reflection. That is why we are, broadly speaking, at pains to make it hard to
stop an experiment before the fact simply by imagining possible harms,
and to make it easy to demand improvements of a local government or
administrative agency if an instrumentality of government in a like situation is in fact doing better.
As we saw in the NHTSA example, the facts are indeed on our side:
Empirically, the most effective way to challenge a government regulation
is to argue that compliance is in theory impossible. 44 6 Once someone
complies, it proves much harder to demonstrate illegitimacy. If we are
right in this, and more generally in our assumptions regarding the efficacy of the participatory safeguards (including the liberal assumption on
which all the others rest), then arguably the vulnerable will be at least as
well protected in an experimentalist regime as in one that makes their
446. See supra Part V.C.1.
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protection depend on evanescent legislative and judicial majorities. But
this is a long way from saying that experimentalism sacrifices freedom of
action out of overscrupulous regard for procedural perfection.
Behind these concerns, however, are two larger and more substantial
worries. Measured by the response they require, the response we can offer is no more than a credo. We offer this response only so that it is clear
what beliefs, in advancing the idea of democratic experimentalism
presented here, we must eventually defend.
The first of these worries surfaced as the prospect that democratic
experimentalism conceived as directly deliberative polyarchy may favor
some kinds of alternatives over others, even if some of the favored ones
count as large departures from the current situation. Specifically, the
worry is that this kind of democratic experimentalism results in local experiments that, however bold, are not likely to produce fundamental
change, while ruling out comprehensive, national experiments that
could. In its most common, radical-democratic (but also post-Marxist
and post-populist) form, the core of the argument is centralist egalitarianism. It claims that the causes of misery and exclusion in contemporary
democracies lie in inequalities in the distribution of wealth or access to
education, or as the result of these, information needed for active citizenship. Hence, a precondition of participation, and most especially of the
highly informed, directly deliberative participation envisaged in democratic experimentalism, is redistribution of assets and opportunities. As
rich and poor usually live apart, effective redistribution must be from rich
locales to poorer ones, or directly from the rich to the poor.447 An exper-

imentalism that begins by decentralizing control of (some share of) existing or marginally augmented resources to local jurisdictions will only
encourage hopes it must disappoint. Or, in those situations in which the
rich and poor find themselves grouped together, the worry goes, wealthy
individuals and large corporations will co-opt local government and turn
it to their own ends. In this view, wealth and luxury consumption must
first be taxed, concentrations of corporate power broken, and the proceeds spent on programs to improve the education, the life conditions,
and the economic opportunities of the poor, before (or at least at the
same time as) decentralized experimentalism is contemplated at all.
A first, theoretical response to this centralist egalitarianism distinguishes two possible and pernicious consequences of inequality that proponents of the argument often mix together. The first is that inequality
447. For recent proposals along these lines, see Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, The
Stakeholder Society (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 4, on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (proposing government payment of $80,000 to Americans upon reaching the age
of majority, to be funded by a wealth tax); Robert H. Haveman, Equity with Employment,
Boston Rev., Summer 1997, at 3, 6 (proposing combining guaranteed income support with
incentives for work as an alternative to policies of North America which lead to low
unemployment but high poverty rates, and to policies of Europe, which lead to low poverty
rates but high unemployment).
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reduces the power of the have-nots to assert their interests in contentious
negotiations with the haves, and allows the latter to recoup losses they
might unaccountably suffer in one round of bargaining in the next. Call
this the bargaining disadvantage of inequality. The second pernicious
consequence is the inability to escape or mitigate the consequences of
oppressive inequality because of infirmities that result from the oppressive experience itself. Thus, the degradation of slavery is said to reduce,
even eliminate, the capacity of the slave to revolt or even to seize the
advantages of manumission, just as grinding poverty, passed from generation to generation in a single community, is said to weaken the capacity of
the community and its members to take advantage of whatever opportunities for economic self-improvement or (as a condition of this) political
self-improvement that arise or might be created. This is the disenfranchisement effect of inequality. What would be the use to the disadvantaged of experimentalist multiplication of the opportunities for participation in the reorganization of services and the redefinition of rules, the
centralist egalitarian wonders, if their disadvantages generally bar them
from participating and/or render the exceptional effort ineffective?
There is, to be sure, a bargaining disadvantage to inequality; but it is
not, we think, nearly so disabling as first appearances in the setting of the
overall centralist egalitarian concerns suggest. It is tautologically, but not
therefore trivially, true that possession of private resources gives those
who have them a stronger hand in bargaining over the distribution of
public resources, and better chances of recouping bargaining losses, than
those who do not. Having private resources on which to rely in the absence of public ones, the haves drag out negotiations over the distribution of the public goods until the have-nots accept a bargain, or renegotiate an existing one, on terms dictated by their increasing desperation.
Carried to its reductio ad absurdum, this suggests a ruthlessly one-sided
politics in which the haves perpetuate their advantages by extracting an
unfair share of public goods, granting in return only the minimal concessions that permit the subsistence of the have-nots. 41 s But we know that
politics is vastly more complex, and the prospects of the have-nots far
more open in historical perspective than this idea of the mechanical reproduction of inequality allows. What is left out-and explains much of
the complex political openness we know-is the possibility of alliances
between a faction of the haves with the have-nots against another faction
of the elite, and the possibility, in moments of crisis and confusion, of
uncertainty among haves and have-nots alike as to how to define their
advantage, separately or together. The two possibilities are connected,
moreover, as the pursuit of new alliances can reveal novel solutions to
complex problems, just as the exploration of novel solutions can give rise
448. For an effort to show that bargaining considerations of this sort set the limits of
political reform in capitalist societies, see generally Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and
Social Democracy (1985).
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to new constellations of harmonious interests.4 49 As we argued repeatedly above in the discussion of learning by monitoring and direct deliberation, 450 these possibilities are likely to be especially salient in periods of
disorientation marked by the kind of volatility and diversity that recommend experimentalism. Alliances and confusion do not nullify the bargaining disadvantage of inequality, but they can transform what might
appear to be an insurmountable obstacle to any but radically redistribuive reforms into one of the many considerations that would need to be
addressed by experimentalist means in making participation in experimentalist deliberation as fair and comprehensive as it can be.
If, on the other hand, inequality regularly led to disenfranchisement,
that effect would bar reform, radically redistributive and experimentalist
alike. Imagine that misery thoroughly destroys the capacity of the havenots to imagine a better future, so that none trusts the others to conceive
in good faith a project for advancing the group. Without prospects, each
scavenges whatever is in reach, expecting everyone else to do the same.
Mutual suspicion within the group is paired with anxious, resentful dependence on the others outside, who provide what insiders cannot provide themselves. Chances for participation are squandered as carelessly
as social insurance checks. 45 1
But the facts repeatedly find against this effect even in the most extreme contexts in which it is alleged, or might, by its nature, be presumed
to occur. After the Black Death decimated England in the fourteenth
century, the English serfs, servile as they no doubt were, took advantage
of the scarcity of labor to improve their conditions of tenancy; emboldened by these successes, some banded together to march on London and
demand freedom. 45 2 When the Civil War broke the slave owners' grip on
the American South, many slaves fled the plantations, often to the amazement of masters who sincerely believed them incapable of imagining au449. For example, the farmer-labor alliance in Sweden in the 1930s, originally a
response to the Great Depression, broadened into the linked set of insurance institutions
and broadly inclusive political alliances characteristic of the post-War welfare state. See
generally Bo Rothstein, Social Classes and Political Institutions: The Roots of Swedish
Corporatism (The Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden, English Series Report No.
24, 1988) (closely analyzing the complex alliances underpinning Swedish social

democracy); see also Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to
International Economic Crises (1986) (more generally discussing the interplay of
economics and politics in the alliances of this period).
450. See supra Parts II, III.

451. Versions of this argument are familiar as claims that the poor are hopelessly
ensnared in a "culture of poverty," or, in more modem language, by lack of such "social
capital" as mutual trust. On the culture of poverty, see generally Oscar Lewis, La Vida: A
Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty-San Juan and New York (1966). On social
capital, see generally Robert D. Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions
in Modem Italy (1993).
452. See generally Rodney Hilton, Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant
Movements and the English Rising of 1381 (1973) (placing the English peasant movement

of 1381 in the context of other medieval peasant movements).
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454
tonomy.45 3 In this century, peasants in countries such as Mexico,
455
Vietnam, and Peru,
all with histories of debt peonage and other forms
of oppression, responded to land reforms offering secure tenancies by
making effective use of the new opportunities. Here and now-in situations that, however bad, are not so debilitating as these-we saw that studies of community policing in Chicago find that poor neighborhoods succeed as often as wealthy ones at running the new institutions to maximum
advantage. Strikingly similar conclusions emerge from studies of a companion decentralization of control from municipal headquarters to local
school councils in Chicago. 45 6 None of this means that oppression has
no consequences or that it is easy to establish experimentalist or other
reform institutions. 457 It does, however, mean that there is strong counterevidence to the claim that one of the consequences of oppression is to
make it impossibly difficult for the oppressed to take advantage of new
opportunities, including experimentalist ones that might be thought especially demanding.
A further, practical response to the centralist egalitarian objection is
that mass democracies in the United States and especially in Western
Europe have, in living memory, tried to address resource distribution
questions as threshold issues, with undeniable but limited and decreasing
success, as suggested by persistently high rates of unemployment in advanced welfare states. 458 Substantial resources were transferred, but the
programs rarely worked as intended. Perhaps more resources would have
produced a different result, but no electorate in any of the advanced
countries has embraced this alternative in recent years. In any event, it is
at least as plausible to argue that the difficulty came not from the level of
459
resources (when the level was high), but from their ineffective use.

453. On the interdependence of masters and slaves, and especially the possibilities for
autonomy of the latter at the time of the Civil War, see generally Eugene D. Genovese,
Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 128-36 (1974).
454. On the survival of the capacity for community action despite continuing
oppression, discussed in the classic history of the village of Anenecuilco in central Mexico
from the time of the conquest to the revolution, see generallyJesfus Sotelo Inclin, Ralz y
raz6n de Zapata (C.F.E. editorial 1970) (1943-44).
455. For detailed discussion of land reform in Peru, see Cynthia McClintock, Peasant,
Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru 319-51 (1981) (citing Samuel L. Popkin,
Corporatism and Colonialism: Political Economy of Rural Change in Vietnam, 8 Comp.
Pol. 431 (1976)).
456. For review and corroborating reanalysis based on the original supplemental data,
see Fung, supra note 135, ch. 12.
457. In the case of school decentralization, for example, one must be careful to check
the tendency towards local corruption.
458. See, e.g., Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Jobs Strategy Series;
Making Work Pay- Taxation, Benefits, Employment, and Unemployment 17-45 (1997)
(reporting on the pattern of job-related transfer payments and persistently high rates of
unemployment in some member states of OECD).
459. We are not claiming that transfer programs are, by their nature, doomed to
failure. Some succeed; others do not. What is needed is a mechanism for assessing
programs so that defenders of successes such as Head Start, which provides educational

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

Resources only count (and attract additional resources) if effectively applied, and democratic experimentalism, we have been arguing, is the way
to determine how best to apply them. From this point of view, experimentalism should appeal to any egalitarian who does not make a dogma
of centralism.
But it is possible to reformulate this first worry about the selective
nature of experimentalism so as to disassociate the criticism from any direct concern with inequality and its effects. This more general and politically agnostic version of the argument starts with the plausible assertion
that all-encompassing institutional frameworks favor some forms of action
over others. None are neutral. 460 (If there were neutral institutional
frameworks, courts would find it immeasurably easier than they do to determine the features of background social or legal order that are not, and
cannot be, implicated in alleged constitutional wrongs.) But if
frameworks are not neutral, the argument continues, a type of democratic experimentalism that, as here, weakens the directive powers of the
national legislature to the benefit of local decisionmaking is presumably
less favorable to national reform than a constitutional order, perhaps also
containing experimentalist elements, that allows rapid generalization of
local initiatives through referenda or special elections in addition to conventional omnibus legislation. Unless we know for sure that nationally
designed or imposed solutions are always inferior to those that emerge
from local initiative, is this not a dangerous form of favoritism?
An initial response to the criticism in its general form is that democratic experimentalism can help break down the very distinction between
the big politics of competing visions of national changes and their preconditions on the one hand and the little politics of local survival and
small improvement on the other. This occurs, first, through the generalization of successful local initiatives. If democratic experimentalism increases the local effectiveness of resources, it creates savings that can be
transferred to the resource-poor; if, as suggested a moment ago, directly
deliberative problem solving can suggest novel approaches at higher and
higher levels of strategic reflection, then democratic experimentalism
can be a source of ideas as to how to redeploy the savings effectively as
well. The distinction is effaced as well insofar as experimentalism disaggregates sharply contrasting projects and reassembles their elements in
novel hybrids outside the categories of familiar debate through
and social services to poor preschool children and their families, see generally Edward
Zigler & Susan Muenchow, Head Start: The Inside Story of America's Most Successful
Educational Experiment (1992), have sufficient ammunition to build upon their successes.
Cf. Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 289
(1995) (observing that Head Start is widely hailed as a success, yet chronically
underfunded).

460. For a restatement of social theory that emphasizes the distinction between
encompassing frameworks and local routines, but also emphasizes the partiality of all
frameworks, see generally Roberto M. Unger, Politics: A Work in Constructive Social
Theory (1987).
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benchmarking and simultaneous engineering. Thus, big and small politics begin to blur together as the constant reordering of local problem
solving both recombines and broadens local organizational reforms and
programmatic innovations. Fateful choices become less fateful because
they emerge, deliberately, from many smaller ones.
But a persistent critic of democratic experimentalism as subversive of
large choices may concede all this, and yet still regard the response as
evasive. This critic will insist, at a minimum, that experimentalism not
favor the local and incremental over the national and the comprehensive,
even if it does in some measure attenuate the distinction; and we have
offered no demonstration that our proposal meets this standard, or does
better than others that pretend to. Nor need we. For here persistence
reaches a self-imposed limit. Recall that the starting point of the criticism
was the plausible idea that no framework can be neutral. The critic cannot assert that national solutions are inherently better than locally derived ones, while remaining agnostic. Therefore, the most that can be
asked is that the experimentalist framework can itself be modified to accommodate "nationalizing" solutions or problem-solving methods when
these are revealed as appropriate. This, we claim it is: Experimentalism
as we conceive it can be adopted and abandoned piecemeal, as experience indicates. So, choosing experimentalism attenuates fateful choices
and is itself not a fateful choice.
But the apparently appealing idea of a politics without fateful
choices, paradoxically, evokes the second large worry. The origin of this
worry is in the conception of politics, familiar since the time of the
French Revolution and the romantic recrudescence of nationalism, as
fundamentally a struggle to realize human potential: of a social class, a
nation, humanity or, today, as ethnic group or gender or sexual orientation. Without struggle, without defiance of current authority or the doctrine thatjustifies it, there can be, in this understanding, none of the selfassertion on which self-realization depends. A politics that did not combine limit breaking in the sense of tearing down obstacles to the realization of new possibilities, and self-transcendence in the sense of becoming
the persons or group whose visionary imagination spies out behind the
current limits, is, at best, a politics of small deals-really, no politics at all.
Thus, democratic experimentalism extols a form of participation that deprives politics of its truly human significance.
This is, to be sure, a worry on a tightrope. If the search for transcendent identity in politics becomes too fixed on transcendence alone, politics is reduced to a rebellious cry against the immanence of what is. 46 1 Or

if the political quest becomes too fixed on the assertion of identity, it
becomes a call to fealty to a group with a cause-an appeal to loyalties,
461. For the latest, and perhaps most authoritative, statement of a politics of defiance
strongly inclined in this direction, see generally Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of
Adjudication: Fin de Si~de (1997).
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and their corresponding animosities, so deep that they cannot be dis4 62
cussed without raising doubts about the authenticity of the response.
Either way, as rebellious protest or as intolerant rallying cry, by making
defiance or compliance too urgent for words, the politics of transcendent
identity, unbalanced, chokes off the very discussion of the alternatives it
means to foster.
But it is unfair sport to dismiss the motivating idea of a political project by assuming that it must always be denatured in practice. No idea
can survive such unsympathetic imagination (not even ideas of politics
designed to be proof against such manipulation). A fairer response to
the worry that incrementalism robs politics of its justification as the font
of identity is to propose an alternative understanding of how we come to
be ourselves that does not depend on transcendence, yet does not indulge the world as it is. That alternative, close at hand from the earlier
discussion of pragmatism, is the view of identity as mutual self-clarification: We become most truly ourselves, and thus realize the potential to
make ourselves what we can be, by examining what we do-the things we
say, the rules we make, the institutions we build-through the eyes of
others who respond to them. We transform our identity not by fusing
with or becoming someone else, but rather by learning to criticize, remake, and affirm parts of it, and that which expresses it, from the vantage
points of others doing the same-not by the negative capability to imagine ourselves as other, but by passionate discussion of who we really are
and want to be, given what, in the experience of others in a position to
know, we really do and make. This is not the politics of authenticity, of
identity affirmed, but rather of identity as pastiche, or difference. This
hybrid conception of identity takes shape as our life projects butt up
against those of others, through the improvised incorporation of various
projects with our own as payment for our difficult progress in the
4 63
world.
462. The classic statement of politics as the undiscussable choice of loyalties-the
distinction of friend from foe-is Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (George
Schwab trans., Rutgers Univ. Press 1976) (1932). For the criticism that Schmitt's idea of
loyalty rests on more general ideas of obligation that it cannot comprehend, see Leo
Strauss, Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1932), reprinted in Heinrich
Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue 91, 94-96, 119 (J. Harvey
Lomax trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1995) (1988).
463. A familiar point of departure for this conception of self-definition is John Stuart
Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in Three Essays (Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1912). On
the notion of identity as irreducibly hybrid, see Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture
37-39 (1994). For the related idea that identity results from a succession of utterances,
each revealing the contingency of what came before and inviting a response in kind, see M.
M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael
Holquist trans., Univ. of Texas Press 1981) (1975). Note that contrasting the conception
of identity as hybrid with Mill's descriptive starting point of autonomy does not necessarily
entail rejecting Mill's prescriptive principles. See Mill, supra, at 15 (stating the thesis "that
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection").
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Dewey and the pragmatists sought, but failed, to establish a relation
between democratic institutions and the identity of the democratic citizen conceived on these lines. 4 64 Dewey, in particular, recognized the fragility of a democracy founded on the distinction between a benign elite
of experts and an ignorant mass public held docile by manipulation of
the symbols by which it affirmed its identity.465 How would the mass, in
its ignorance, recognize the benefits of manipulation, however benign?
How could the experts, isolated in their expertise from all the experience
of the mass, know that their designs were indeed broadly beneficial
rather than merely self-serving? The way to overcome the distinction, he
thought, was to make the public expert by affording the citizens the
means to acquire expertise. This democratization of expertise, Dewey
thought, would go hand in hand with the creation of a system of government which encourages inquiry into the effects on the developmental capacities of the individual of "every institution of the community when it is
recognized that individuality is not originally given but is created under
the influences of associated life."4 66 But in his programmatic writing,
Dewey focused almost exclusively on the elaboration of a project of comprehensive educational reform designed to form the citizen experts of
the new democracy. 467 Of the actual institutions of self-government he
said little, preferring to exult instead at the prospect of a public of scientist-poets, enlightened by the reading of good newspapers and enlarged
in their sympathy with the multitude by their reading of Walt
4 68
'Whitman.
464. See generally Eric A. MacGilvray, The Priority of Philosophy to Democracy:
Some Consequences of Pragmatism for Democratic Theory (May 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (contrasting Dewey's views with other
conceptions of pragmatism).
465. See Dewey, supra note 62, at 185-214.
466. Dewey, supra note 56, at 197-98.
467. See id. at 81-88, 118-123 (discussing a pragmatist curriculum).
468. See Dewey, supra note 62, at 184.
Here is as good a place as any to note the kinship between our proposal for directly
deliberative democracy and certain strands of participatory democracy within the skein of
Progressive thought in the early decades of this century. Two Progressive institutionbuilding movements in particular stand out. The first, and more remote, was centered in
Rochester, New York, and aimed to create "social centers" where the largely immigrant
urban working classes could learn that they were capable of taking part in democratic
deliberation by actually doing so: participating in debates on important questions of the
day with one another, university teachers, and local politicians. On the movement, see
Kevin Mattson, Creating a Democratic Public: The Struggle for Urban Participatory
Democracy During the Progressive Era 48-67 (1998). The Rochester Board of Education
made public school buildings available for evening meetings upon petition of interested
groups, see id. at 52, and within these social centers civic clubs were formed for the express
purpose of public debate, see id. at 54-55. "Most important of all," Mattson notes, "citizens
learned that they themselves could create a deliberating, democratic public." Id. at 59.
If this social-center movement was much closer to the familiar ideas of the polis and
the town meeting than to our conception of problem-solving deliberation, the distinction
between the two was, for at least some of the participants, more a matter of nuance than
principle. Mary P. Follett, for instance, who made strikingly original observations on the
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deliberative inventiveness of such groups, participated in the Boston equivalent of the
social-center movement, in the Roxbury neighborhood, see id. at 89-90. That experience
helped to change her from a partisan of a centralized, technocratic state, see id. at 88-89
(citing Mary P. Follett, The Speaker of the House of Representatives 314 (1896)), to a
partisan of radical decentralization and participation who wrote that "[y]ou cannot
establish democratic control by legislation . . .; there is only one way to get democratic
control-by people learning how to evolve collective ideas." Id. at 91 (quoting Mary P.
Follett, The New State 159 (1918)).
The second social-unit movement, centered in Cincinnati, Ohio, aimed to give
institutional substance to the ambition of decentralization and participation. The
movement grew out of turn-of-the-century efforts to coordinate the work of doctors and
public-health professionals with the activities of poor communities to address problems
such as milk-borne tuberculosis and high rates of infant mortality, especially in New York
City and Milwaukee. See Patricia Mooney Melvin, "A Cluster of Interlacing Communities":
The Cincinatti Social Unit Plan and Neighborhood Organization, 1900-1920, in
Community Organization for Urban Social Change 59, 61-69 (Robert Fisher & Peter
Romanofsky eds., 1981). See generally Wilbur C. Phillips, Adventuring For Democracy
(1940) (describing the social-unit movement). The lesson of this on-again, off-again
collaboration was the mutual dependence of the parties: The professionals were blind
without the local knowledge of the neighborhoods and tenements, and the inhabitants of
the latter were powerless without the expertise of the professionals. Even technical
questions regarding such matters as the efficacy of pasteurization-was it a necessary
condition for guaranteeing the safety of milk, or just one sanitary measure among many
needed to reduce transmission rates of tuberculosis and other diseases?-were paralyzingly
controversial in the absence of practical tests. But with such practical tests, the concerned
communities easily resolved such problems. (In the particular case, pasteurization was
indeed useful, but not indispensable to public health if other sanitary measures were taken
from the farm through the food-processing chain). See id. at 18-47.
This second social-unit movement sought to formalize and democratize collaboration
between professionals and communities by establishing in each locale a citizens' and
occupational council to directjoint efforts. Election to these councils was indirect. On the
citizens' side, neighborhoods of some 100 families and interested citizens elected "block"
councils of up to 10 members. The executive head, or block worker, of the block council
served as its modestly paid administrative officer, responsible, for instance, for passing
information to the neighborhood and collecting information via surveys or discussion
from it. The block worker also acted as the block council's representative to the
encompassing citizens' council. On the professional side, the doctors, teachers,
merchants, electricians, nurses, and members of other trades and callings resident in the
district elected vocational councils from their peers. The executives of these then
represented the group on the general occupational council. The citizens' council and the
occupational council together formed a bicameral general council, which was the supreme
organ of governance in the district, ideally with control over all public moneys spent there.
See id. at 149-52, 183-89. "Under this plan," wrote Wilbur Phillips, journalist and social
activist, who formulated the idea and became its leading protagonist, "the physicians of the
district were to constitute, as it were, a democratically organized Department of Health; the
social workers, a democratically organized Department of Social Welfare, etc." See id. at
152; see also S. Gale Lowrie, The Social Unit-An Experiment In Politics, 9 Nat'l Mun.
Rev. 553, 554 (1923) (describing the political structure); id. at 555 n.1 (noting the
similarity of the scheme to ideas advanced by Follett).
With the help of prominent Progressive intellectuals such as Herbert Croly, Editor of
The New Republic, and philanthropists such as the wives of Thomas W. Lamont and Daniel
Guggenheim, Phillips built a national organization to test the feasibility of the idea at a
promising location. Gifford Pinchot, whom we met as the architect of the decentralized
Forest Service, was national director of the organization, although he seems to have played
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no active role in it. See Phillips, supra, at 148. The city of Cincinnati, already known in
Progressive circles for the quality of the coordination among its philanthropic service
providers, volunteered as a test site. See Lowrie, supra, at 557. Within the city, the
Mohawk-Brighton district outdid other neighborhoods in its enthusiasm for and
dedication to the proposal, and had already begun neighborhood work in connection with
a branch public library. See Lowrie, supra, at 559. And it was there, at the end of 1917,
about a year and a half after the formation of the national social-unit organization, that the
experiment was begun. See id.
The promising but inconclusive results of the three-year experiment underscored
both the strengths and the limits of the social-unit idea. The changing role of doctors,
carefully documented in a studiously even-handed study of the effects of the program on
the provision of local services, illustrates both aspects. On the one hand, "[t]he standards
of preventive medicine, as carried on by the physicians group, grew slowly but fairly
steadily, affecting a far larger percentage of the citizens, through the health services, than
in the usual type of neighborhood health work," and there was a "worth while [sic] amount
of consultation among the physicians in the district, within their own group, and a very
commendable study of literature and statements from other health organizations."
Courtenay Dinwiddie & Bennet L. Mead, Community Responsibility A Review of the
Cincinnati Social Unit Experiment with Statistics of Health Services In the Unit District 48
(1921). These broad results were especially remarkable because the physicians'
professional organization gave only grudging support to the project, see id. at 40-44, and it
could be supposed that the interests of the doctors, "as members of a group of private
practitioners, professional men with habits and traditions of exaggerated individualism,"
were presumably in direct conflict with the interests of members of a neighborhood
organization campaigning for the prevention of disease. Id. at 48 n.*. On the other hand,
even in this, its most successful area of endeavor, see id. at 48, the project remained closed
in upon itself. See id. (noting that "[tihe extent of consultation with city and national
advisory medical committees has been slight, and the opportunities for improvement of
medical diagnosis, of supervision and of study of material were far greater than the
accomplishments"). More damaging, no method, beyond debate with the citizens' council
and block workers, was found to challenge and correct the decisions of doctors and other
local professional groups, whose de facto monopolies in service provision gave them a
commanding position in many situations. Because of this isolation from the larger public,
whose experiences might have enriched and profited from those in Mohawk-Brighton, "a
few obstructionists" in, to continue the example, the medical group, had "the power to
block progress for so long." Id. at 46; see also Lowrie, supra, at 566 (discussing the dangers
of unchecked local professional power).
In the end, a combination of municipal and national politics stopped the social-unit
movement before its defects could be addressed. The local difficulties were rooted in the
growing fears of the established municipal service providers: Above all, the health
department worried that the success of the social-unit project in one district was creating
the nucleus of a counter-administration that could usurp its role in Cincinnati. Amidst the
red scare that swept the United States in the aftermath of World War I and the Bolshevik
revolution in Russia, it was child's play for the threatened officials to cast their opponents
as socialists masquerading as democrats. Despite a referendum in the Mohawk-Brighton
district that found heavily in favor of the project, the plan was decried by the mayor as "a
government within government, a step away from Bolshevism," and doomed. Jesse
Frederick Steiner, Community Organization: A Study of its Theory And Current Practice
355 (1930); cf. Sabel, supra note 103, at 87-92 (describing similar, if less virulent reactions
by public officials to the creation of a participatory para- or parallel public administration).
Where was John Dewey, whose pragmatism was a pervasive aspect of Progressive
thought in this period? Here as in so many other settings in an epoch he helped define,
Dewey was at once omnipresent and absent. He was a major influence on Follett, see
Mattson, supra, at 99, and the social-center movement, having himself been influenced by
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To be sure, the institutions of democratic experimentalism provide
no guarantee that overworked, self-interested citizens will, from the start,
understand their individual interest to be inextricably linked with the
good of the community, but then neither do our existing institutions.
Experimentalism at least holds the possibility of providing the public mirror of mutual private self-examination needed to make good on Dewey's
promise. Its institutions enlarge, perhaps vastly, the circle of expertise by
revaluing in the problem-solving setting, forms of knowledge that were
previously discounted, and thus encouraging the participants to learn still
more. They diminish the hold of great symbols by calling attention to
and scrutinizing the many separate facets of life that the large symbolic
tokens condense to the point of indistinguishability. They do this not by
attempting-as though such a thing were possible-to substitute analysis,
purged of poetry, for figurative expression. The method, instead, is to
use the differentiations of benchmarking, with its metaphoric and analogic play of similarity and difference, to uncover possibilities that deductive analysis overlooks and that great symbols obscure. For persons, connected to one another through the institutions of pragmatist sociability,
the result is a politics of continuing exploration of difference through
acknowledgment of diversity. Such a pragmatic view of politics and identity is not higher, truer, or more prudent than the familiar romantic one.
But it is no way lesser, either; and we invoke it to suggest the prospect that
democratic experimentalism, far from betraying our deepest intuitions of
the meaning of politics, may provoke a reexamination of them.
F. ConstitutionalScope
We began this Article by lamenting the breakdown of the defining
features of American constitutional government, using the discomfort of
existing constitutional law as an indicator of the extent of the breakdown.
Our program thus far has focused on what may appear to be, from the
perspective of constitutional law narrowly construed, matters of no great
moment: We have proposed new organizing principles to be adopted by
Congress and implemented by national agencies, state and local bodies,
and the courts. How does such a program respond to constitutional
concerns?
Jane Addams and her settlement houses, see Alan RyanJohn Dewey and the High Tide of
American Liberalism 149-53 (1995). Moreover, Dewey's daughter went to observe the
social-unit experiment in Cincinnati first hand. See Dinwiddie & Mead, supra, at 71. But
Dewey himself, oddly and yet somehow characteristically, remained, so far as we can tell,
silent, perhaps indifferent to the lessons of a variant of experimentalism in practice.
In presenting these more or less distant antecedents to our own project we do not, it
goes nearly without saying, intend to claim historical authority for our endeavors, nor to
assume the burden of Progressive failures. The history matters because it attests to the
perennity of the problem of reconciling democratic participation with the exercise of
technical expertise. The (likewise perennial) hope of democratic experimentalism is to
politicize the technocracy and transform the meaning of politics through practical

collaboration.
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As a threshold matter, we must, of course, show that democratic experimentalism is consistent with our constitutional tradition-for we have
not proposed supplanting the existing Constitution with a new one. This
is not a trivial burden, for our design principles challenge basic assumptions about the Constitution we have. For the most part, we treat states
as, in principle, no different from localities in seeming violation of core
notions of state sovereignty. We elevate direct democracy to a status
equal with, and in some instances superior to, representative democracy,
in seeming violation of the Constitution's system of checks and balances.
And we authorize the courts no less than the legislature to adopt experimentalist attitudes, in seeming violation of the principle that the courts
stand as defenders of the most deeply entrenched values against experimentalist onslaught by the political branches.
In the succeeding Parts-on federalism, separation of powers, and
judicial protection of individual rights-we endeavor to show that our
design principles do not contradict the best understanding of the
Constitution we have; indeed, in each section, we argue that something
akin to democratic experimentalism has been nascent in constitutional
doctrine for quite some time. We do not claim that the best understanding of the Constitution requires democratic experimentalism. Ours is a
program to be adopted by democratic means, not judicial imposition.
Nonetheless, we do not merely contend that democratic experimentalism
can be made to fit the procrustean bed of constitutional law. At its
broadest, our argument is that democratic experimentalism would revitalize the central institutions of American government, and do so in a way
that is in harmony with the most attractive features of those institutions.
VI.

FEDERALISM

Resurgent constitutional debate about federalism, understood
broadly as the doctrine regarding the proper distribution of authority between the federal government and the states, is both a leading example
and a symbol of the disarray of our general understanding of the institutions created and recognized by the Constitution. Some affirmation of a
sphere of activity reserved to the discretion of the several states seems
necessary to sustain the commitment to check the potential menace of a
powerful national government by defending a zone of prior, naturally
vital state sovereignty which it cannot invade. But in practice, for half a
century, the judiciary itself has criticized every effort to discern the
boundaries of this prior and natural zone for capriciously limiting the
capacity of the federal government to regulate some matter of national
interest. Yet the judiciary has been unable to abandon the quest for a
domain of state sovereignty not itself derived from the fugitive distinction
between federal and state powers-even as the flows of national and international commerce cut new channels in the landscape of authority.
Hence, the Supreme Court oscillates, sometimes rapidly, sometimes
slowly, between revisionary revivals of the distinction and weary criticism
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of the revision. 469 Surely, it is a sign of deep disorientation repeatedly to
assert a doctrine that is independently unsustainable merely because its
negation would jeopardize a larger claim of which it is held to be part.
By contrast, in democratic experimentalism, the states and other subnational jurisdictions have (at least) a Madisonian centrality to public action. 470 Their purpose, we saw, is to act as the chief instrument of public
problem solving given the manifest limits of central direction. At the
limit, the national government supplements and assists the smaller units
in this system, not the reverse. But in democratic experimentalism, in
contrast to the successive judicial syntheses of the recent past, these subnational jurisdictions do not have natural boundaries to their power.
Rather, the fluidity of the divisions of authority among them, and between them and the national government, are necessary to their purpose,
not evidence of their irrelevance. For it is only by continually adjusting
these boundaries that the jurisdictions can, in fact, be effective problem
solvers. This reversal of perspective recasts and renders tractable the
problem of federalism. Its central theme, from the vantage point of democratic experimentalism, would no longer be the (impossible) search for
immovable boundary stones marking the limits of federal and state
power, but rather the definition of general standards for determining the
just and effective division of sovereignty with regard to particular public
problems.
In this Part, we show that such general standards are inherent in the
idea of experimentalism as we have defined it; that they establish potentially far-reaching (if self-imposed) limits on the power of Congress to
foist its will on the states; and that these limits include the requirement
that Congress allow substantial latitude to subnational jurisdictions to determine for themselves how best to cooperate to realize experimental

goals.
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that, but for a quirk of interpretation, the Supreme Court might have established the precedents for an
experimentalist doctrine of cooperative federalism in New York v. United
States.47 1 The Court had before it legislation obliging the states to respond to the problem of disposal of low-level radioactive waste, and authorizing them to form jurisdictions of the dimensions they severally or as
regional groups found appropriate. 472 The Court invalidated the legislation because of the form of the obligation, 473 missing a chance, we will
469. See infra Part VIA.
470. Madison's evolution from 1787 Federalist to 1800 Republican should not
obscure the fact that even in the earlier period he saw the division of authority between
state and national governments as a crucial means of ensuring democratic accountability.
See Banning, supra note 24, at 294-333. From this vantage point, the nationalizing
tendencies of Hamilton were the anomaly in need of explanation.
471. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
472. See id. at 150-54.
473. See id. at 177.
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argue, to connect limits on what Congress may order states to do with the
articulation of standards for the division ofjurisdiction between state and
national entities. Criticism of that decision provides the occasion for us
to sketch the rudiments of cooperative federalism here. As prologue, to
fix ideas, we evoke the confusion of current federalism debate; as
afterword to our counterview, we note again, that practice is outrunning
preaching, in that crucial elements of a regime of cooperative federalism
are anticipated in current legislation.
Finally, although our concerns in this Part are largely doctrinal, we
are, in conformity with the architecture of our overall argument regarding the relations between an experimentalist Congress and local governments, agnostic in the end as to whether the judiciary should enforce any
of the Constitution's federalism norms. Certainly there is considerable
historical support for the claim that Congress is better suited to consider
the interests of the states, even after the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment. 474 The argument in this Part is that Congress would act
consistently with the best understanding of federalism by fostering democratic experimentalism, and that if the courts decide to enforce federalism norms, they would do well to focus on the concerns we identify
below.
A. The Arc of Federalism
Today, again, once-moribund questions of federalism haunt judicial
debate. After the 1985 Supreme Court ruling in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,475 the notion that the judiciary would impose limits on national legislative authority in favor of state sovereignty
appeared to be breathing its last breath. Garciaheld that if an affirmative
power delegated to Congress by Article I authorizes regulatory competence, the Tenth Amendment poses virtually no bar to exercising the delegated power in derogation of state sovereignty. 4 76 Because Congress enjoyed virtually plenary power under the Commerce Clause, Garcia was
understood by the Court itself as abdicating judicial authority to enforce
constitutional norms of federalism. 47 7 As the Garciamajority recognized,
this left Congress, through the representation of the states in the Senate,
as the chief guarantor of state sovereignty. 4 78 The Garcia dissenters, by

474. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-48 (1985);

Paul Brest, Congress As Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine,
475.
476.
477.
478.

21 Ga. L. Rev. 57, 74-75 (1986); Wechsler, supra note 29, at 54-64 (1961).
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
See id. at 549-50.
See id. at 548.
See id. at 550-54.
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contrast, believed that the Court had left the fox in charge of the chicken
coop.

4 79

But shortly after Garcia,the Court began to revive judicial protection
of state sovereignty. In 1991, in Gregory v. Ashcrofl, the Court invoked
many of the principles rejected in Garciain holding that in the absence of
utterly unequivocal statutory language, Congress would not be deemed to
have intended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 480 to apply to
state judges, as that would constitute an infringement of state sovereignty.48 ' Although Gregory was a statutory rather than constitutional
case, 48 2 the writing was on the wall: All of the members of the Garcia
majority remaining on the Court dissented in Gregory.483 One year later,
in New York v. United States, the Court announced that principles of federalism forbid the national government to "'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes .... ,,484 Three
years after that, in United States v. Lopez, the Court invalidated a federal
statute imposing criminal penalties for possession of a handgun in the
vicinity of a schoolyard. 485 For the first time in over half a century, the
Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause by attempting to regulate an activity that bore an insufficient connection to interstate commerce. Stressing the states' traditional role in education and punishing crimes of violence, the Court appeared to revive for Commerce Clause purposes the distinction between
traditional and nontraditional state functions that the Garcia Court had
rejected for Tenth Amendment purposes. 486 And in 1997, the Court
again invoked principles of federalism to invalidate portions of two popu-

479. See id. at 560 (Powell,J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's decision effectively reduces the
Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.").
480. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
481. 501 U.S. 452, 457-64 (1991).
482. For an argument that a clear statement requirement ought to be a key
component of the constitutional protection for federalism, see Tribe, supra note 399,
§ 5-8, at 316-17; Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 186-88.
483. Compare Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell,J., joined by Berger, C.J., Rehnquist, J.,

and O'Connor, J., dissenting, thus leaving a majority of Blackmun, Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Stevens, J.), with Gregory, 501 U.S. at 474 (White, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part). See also id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).

Between Garcia and Gregory, Justice Brennan retired and was succeeded by justice Souter.
484. 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992); see also id. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
485. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
486. See id. at 580-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
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Restoration Act 48 7 and the
lar federal statutes: the Religious Freedom
488
Act.
Prevention
Violence
Brady Handgun
Thus, the pendulum of interpretation cuts its familiar arc. If the recent cases appear to undermine Garcia,it should be recalled that Garcia
itself expressly abandoned the states'-rights-protective decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 489 which in turn had overruled the narrower interpretation of the Tenth Amendment given in Maryland v.
Wrtz.4 90 The periodic doctrinal reversals mark time.
B. New York v. United States
To illustrate the potential of democratic experimentalism to escape
such temporizing, we focus on the question at issue in New York v. United
States. In New York, the Supreme Court invalidated a scheme with many
of the hallmarks of democratic experimentalism because it held Congress
had exceeded its authority in giving impermissibly direct orders to the
states. 49 1 In this section, we will argue that the Court in this case was both
too solicitous of state sovereignty and not nearly solicitous enough: Too
solicitous because it focused on formal indicia of state autonomy and apparent insults to the sovereign dignity of the states; not nearly solicitous
enough because it neglected to recognize that the challenged legislation
invited the states to act as independent collaborators with the federal government and one another in developing solutions to their mutual
problems. In our alternative framework, it is these substantive limitations, if any, that mark the boundaries of permissible government interference with state sovereignty.
The dispute in New York arose out of a crisis caused by the shortage
492
Because the nation posof disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste.
Congress enacted a
waste,
the
sessed insufficient facilities for processing
to increase their
states
the
number of provisions designed to encourage
4 93
by the
submitted
proposals
Based on
waste-processing capacity.
487. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb-4 (1994). The Court held that, as applied to state and
local government, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172
(1997).
488. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). In Printz v. United States, the Court held that the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act's requirement that local law enforcement officials
perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers violated the
anticommandeering principle of New York. 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376-78.
489. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (relying on Tenth Amendment to hold unconstitutional
application of Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), to
states in areas of traditional government functions).
490. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding, as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause,
application of Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-219 (1994)), to states).
491. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992).
492. See id. at 149-51.
493. The first set of provisions was enacted in 1980, in the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (repealed 1986). Additional
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National Governors' Association, the congressional response placed refacilities or to join
sponsibility on each state to develop its own disposal
49 4
with neighboring states in a regional compact.
Congress provided several kinds of incentives for compliance. States
or regional compacts that developed adequate disposal capacity would be
permitted to surcharge (and eventually exclude) waste generated outside
the state or compact 49 5-a power that the dormant Commerce Clause
would otherwise bar the states from exercising.4 96 Some of the money
collected through such surcharges would be transferred to the federal
government, and then paid out to the states if they met a series of deadlines for developing disposal capacity. 4 97 Noncomplying states would
thus be subject to serious financial penalties for failure to meet the statutory deadlines. 4 98 Finally, the statute provided that a state which neither
joined a regional compact nor developed in-state disposal sites by the
1996 deadline,
upon the request of the generator or owner of [in-state] waste,
shall take title to the waste, be obligated to take possession of
the waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or indiof
rectly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence
499
the failure of the State to take possession of the waste.
Although the Court upheld the other provisions, it invalidated the "take
title" provision on the ground that it was the equivalent of an order by the
federal government commanding a state to pass legislation, a power the
Court believed the federal government lacks. 50 0 The Court stated:
The take title provision appears to be unique. No other federal
statute has been cited which offers a state government no option
other than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress. Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside
Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of
state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution. 50 1
Under existing constitutional doctrine, the decisive fact in the above
passage is that the state government is given "no option other than" implementing federal legislation. For, as New York itself makes clear, where
Congress does give the states alternatives, even onerous ones, it can remeasures were passed five years later in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.c.
§ 2021 (1994)). See New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.
494. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151-52.
495. See id. at 152.
496. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (barring state
discrimination against interstate commerce in waste disposal).
497. See New York, 505 U.S. at 152-53.
498. See id.
499. Id. at 153-54 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C) (1994)).
500. See id. at 176-77.
501. Id. at 177.
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quire that the states implement federal legislation as the price of declining these alternatives. Thus, as alternatives to implementing federal legislation, Congress may offer states the possibility of forfeiting federal funds
to which they would be entitled if they did choose implementation, or the
(menacing) possibility of federal preemption.5 0 2 Even at this general
level of analysis, therefore, the requirement that the state be given the
option of refusing Congress's orders appears to be little more than a formality. Closer examination confirms that this is so.
Take conditional exercises of the spending power. 50 3 Although theoretically subject to constitutional limits, the power to attach strings to
federal grants to the states enables Congress to dictate state policy to a
considerable degree. 50 4 In an era of scarce governmental resources, few
states can afford to forego federal funds as the price of avoiding implementing federal imperatives. A state that decides to refuse federal funds
essentially opts to subsidize the states that accept federal funds, because,
of course, the state's refusal does not result in a diminished federal tax
burden for its citizens. This is a steep price to pay.
Conditional preemption also exacts a high price. Conditional preemption provides that, if a state does not regulate according to federal
standards, its citizens will be subject to direct federal regulation. 50 5 To be
sure, the direct federal regulation must be of a kind otherwise in the
federal government's power, typically under the rubric of the Commerce
Clause. But even after Lopez, this is a minor constraint. Even if Congress
is not the only enforcer of federalism norms (as Garcia suggests), it is
certainly the principal one. 50 6 In this sense, each additional instance of
federal (as opposed to state) regulation shifts the federalism balance away
from the states. Conditional preemption thus forces the states to choose
between two threats to their sovereignty: They must either accept the
indignity of implementing federal regulation or acquiesce in the displacement of their authority by the federal government.
This is not to say that conditional spending and conditional preemption are cost-free endeavors for the federal government. In the case of
the former, the federal government must allocate sufficient funds to
make the states a financial offer that they will have difficulty resisting.
Similarly, conditional preemption requires the federal government to
provide the funding to make credible the threat of regulation by a federal
agency should the state decline to implement the federal regulations at
502. See id. at 171-72 (upholding a conditional exercise of the spending power); id.
at 173 (upholding conditional preemption).
503. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
504. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987) (declining to decide
outer limit, if any, of requirement that condition of funding be relevant to activity being
funded, while upholding the conditioning of highway funds on states' raising their
minimum drinking age to twent-one).
505. See New York, 505 U.S. at 173.
506. See Wechsler, supra note 29, at 49-82.
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issue. Thus, both conditional spending and conditional preemption are
effective tools only to the extent that the federal government puts its
money where its mandate is. But this need to ante up has not prevented
the federal government from using these tools effectively to discipline
50 7
state behavior.
Yet, the New York Court is prepared to accept these methods of discipline as the background conditions for modern federal democracy. It
simply asserts that conditional funding and conditional preemption "offer[ ] the States a legitimate choice rather than issuing an unavoidable
command," adding that these mechanisms "have now grown commonplace." 508 The Court does not even ask whether, much less argue that,
the states' choice is a real one. The Court essentially assumes that the
greater power to deny funds or preempt entirely includes the lesser
power to fund or preempt conditionally.
The Court likewise notes and appears prepared to tolerate more subtie insults to the states' sovereignty. In arguing on behalf of the anticommandeering principle of New York, Justice O'Connor observes that when
the federal government issues directives to the states, state officials must
divert time, energy, and resources from state priorities and redirect them
towards federal priorities. 509 This perturbs states in the setting of their
own agendas and blurs the lines of governmental accountability.5 10 Yet,
choices made as a result of such intentional or unintentional derangement of the states' agenda are no more-and no less-an expression of
autonomy than choices made under the threat of losing funding or losing
regulatory authority entirely. To the extent that the Court's federalism
doctrine is not a mere formality, it appears that the Court is at once
overly protective of, and callously indifferent to, the states' freedom of
action. 5 1 '
But if the Supreme Court's anticommandeering principle does not
actually protect states' rights to set and execute their own agendas, what
is it designed to do? As in much of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence, the wellspring is not the desire to protect particular powers of
507. For example, even though the legislation upheld in Dole only attached
conditions to five percent of federal highway funds, within four years of the enactment of
that legislation, all fifty states had adopted the twenty-one-year drinking age, up from only
sixteen states the year prior to enactment. See Aggressive Driving: Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 105th
Cong. (July 17, 1997) (statement of David F. Snyder, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Am. Ins.
Ass'n), available at 1997 WL 11235113, at 22.
508. New York, 505 U.S. at 185.
509. See id. at 168; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
510. See New York, 505 U.S. at 185-86.
511. Cf. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
1911, 1954-88 (1995) (arguing by analogy to unconstitutional conditions doctrine that
conditional spending ought to be invalid if federal government would lack power to
impose condition directly).
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the states, but rather to respect their historical position with respect to
the federal government. Otherwise, it would be hard to make sense of
the judicial preoccupation with the dignitary interest of the states. Their
prerogative to be shielded against any exercise of federal power that manifestly treats them as completely subordinate units of the national government apparently aims to preserve their status as the legatees of the thirteen original states that ratified the Constitution, acting as independent
sovereigns, and reserving for themselves an impregnable residuum of autonomy.5 12 According to this view, the federal government simply lacks
the authority to invade that residual area of state authority no matter how
expedient it may be. What looks like protection for the "feelings" of the
state,5 1 3 is thus really the consequence of treating state autonomy as an
inviolate historicalprinciple. This brings us full circle to the dilemma of
modem federalism sketched at the outset of this Part: Fidelity to constitutional history requires, in extremis, defense of state sovereignty, yet nothing in the historical understanding provides a guide to substantive under5 14
standing of that defense that is workable under modern conditions.
Further doctrinal oversights5 15 and confusions concerning the
Articles of Confederation aside,5 16 all this points to the conclusion that
512. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121 (1996) (arguing
that Article V's amendment mechanism was meant to be exclusive, in part as a means of
preserving state sovereignty).
513. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 Harv. L.
Rev. 102, 132 (1996) (discussing limits of state sovereign immunity).
514. See Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 133, 173-75 (1997) (book review) (observing the difficulty of constructing a
coherent account of state sovereignty under modem conditions).
515. The New York majority does not seem to notice that international law, which knits
sovereign nations together much more loosely than the American Constitution binds the
states, depends for its enforcement largely on national implementing legislation-what the
Court would call commandeering. See Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States. An Essay
on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of
Federal Power, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 493, 525 (1993); see also George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 331, 403-04 (1994) (arguing that the principle of "subsidiarity" of the
European Union would be an inappropriate model for as integrated a system as the United
States). But see Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 Tex. L. Rev.
795, 831-36 (1996) (invoking the European Union's subsidiarity principle as a model for
the United States). And when Justice Breyer, dissenting in the sequel to New York, calls the
Court's attention to the European model, see Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365,
2404-05 (1997) (BreyerJ., dissenting), the majority simply dismisses the examples because
they are foreign. See id. at 2377 n.11.
516. The Court's failure to provide an adequate distinction between direct and
conditional imperatives points to a more significant difficulty. The assumption that
requiring the states to implement a federal program infringes state sovereignty may be
unwarranted, at least in many cases. For one thing, as Justice Stevens notes in dissent in
New York and again in Printz, the federal government had the authority to require state
regulation under the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution expanded national power
by giving the federal government authority to regulate primary conduct without the states
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the New York Court focuses on the wrong criterion. The question should
not be whether the federal government gives the states a nominal altemative to regulating according to federal standards. Rather, as we argue in
the next section of this Part, the question should be whether the federal
government has treated the states purely as instruments of its national
will, or by contrast, as partners in policy formulation and implementation. The availability of alternatives matters in answering this question,
but only when it counts as evidence of the choices that matter.
C. Toward a New DelegationDoctrine
Under existing doctrine, federalism acts largely as a side constraint
on legislation of national scope. In contrast, in democratic experimentalism, federalism is an essential ingredient of the national framework.
Congress authorizes and helps finance experimental elaboration of programs, and the state and local governments actually do the experimenting. Should such a vision become reality, a revised federalism doctrine-whether judicially enforceable or not-would defend a zone of
active and substantive collaboration between the two by imposing a
double limit on the power of Congress .to delegate authority to the states
and other local governments. The first limitation requires that when
Congress delegates authority to the states, it must provide some guidelines as to the objectives that the states will pursue. It cannot simply pass
the buck by declaring local governments responsible for attending to the
well-being of citizens. Rather, it must announce general, yet limited
goals. The warrant for this, we find, in an extension of traditional
nondelegation doctrine. The second limitation is that Congress may not
provide too much guidance: It must leave some important aspects of policy setting for the states themselves, and do this without surreptitiously
introducing preferences for some means over others. We find the warrant for this in a rectification and extension of the commandeering doctrine evoked in New York. It is in the band between these limits that democratic experimentalism thrives.
Nondelegation may seem an odd place to begin a discussion of experimentalist federalism. The traditional nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating lawmaking authority to an administrative
agency without specifying at least a broad policy objective the agency
should pursue. 5 17 For a delegation to be effective, there must be a "declared policy by Congress and its definition of the circumstances in which
acting as intermediaries. It is quite strange to treat the legislative mechanism of the statecentered Articles of Confederation as an affront to state sovereignty. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Printz, 117 S. Ct. at
2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Levy, supra note 515, at 515-22 (arguing that
framers' intent does not support result in New York).
517. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935) (invalidating
congressional delegation of authority to regulate oil production to the President, in the
absence of standards to guide the President's discretion).

1998]

DEMOCRATIC EXPERJMFNTAL[SM

its command is to be effective."5 18 In part because of its historical association with heightened review of economic legislation during the Lochner
era, the nondelegation doctrine, since 1937, has rarely been invoked
when administrative discretion has not affected protected private
rights. 519 Nonetheless, its basic underpinnings rest on a widely accepted
insight. Nondelegation doctrine seeks to serve democratic values by ensuring that Congress itself makes (and thus takes the heat for) important
decisions of policy.5 20 In the setting of democratic experimentalism, this
requires that Congress must take seriously the obligation to connect the
national and the local by setting priorities in the sequence of reform and
innovation, by making use of emerging local results to reframe large
problems (without precluding their subsequent redefinition through local adjustment). As the zone of democratic experimentalism is intended
to be wide, the nondelegation doctrine would be evoked sparingly, to
compel deliberation in Congress where political expediency might work
against it. Below, we will see that the helter-skelter decentralization of
welfare reform to the states is an example of the abdication of delibera521
tive responsibility to which this approach would apply.
Whether or not New York v. United States was rightly decided, commandeering of state and local policymakers 22 is bad for the republic,
whether the democracy is representative or experimental. Under what
conditions, after all, might Congress prefer to instruct the states to enact
legislation containing terms dictated by Congress itself, rather than sim518. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941) (finding no
violation of nondelegation doctrine in Congress's authorization of fact-finding by the
Department of Labor).
519. See Ely, supra note 2, at 131-84 (arguing for a partial revival of nondelegation
doctrine); Tribe, supra note 399, § 5-17, at 366. But see Stewart, supra note 31, at 1695-97
(arguing against such a revival).
520. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that ensuring "that important
choices of social policy are made by Congress" is a central function of nondelegation
doctrine).
521. See infra text accompanying notes 547-561.
522. By focusing on state and local policymakers, we mean to distinguish New York v.
United States from its sequel, Printz -: United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) for we accept
the proposition, advanced by the government but rejected by the Court in Printz, that some
duties may be classified as ministerial, and we see no important difference between
assigning such duties to state or local, as opposed to federal, officials. In rejecting this
distinction, the Court expressed skepticism about nondelegation doctrine generally. See
id. at 2380. Because we are more hopeful about the possibility of some form of
nondelegation doctrine (even if a nonjusticiable one), we find the Court's complete
rejection of the policymaking/ministerial distinction unpersuasive for our purposes. On
the other hand, we acknowledge that a properly experimentalist approach to
administration would take advantage of local knowledge by leaving some of the details of
even seemingly ministerial tasks to local discretion. By this acknowledgment, however, we
do not mean to concede that local law enforcement officials asked to perform background
checks must, as a matter of constitutional principle, be consulted about the propriety of the
very goal of limiting access to handguns.
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ply enacting legislation with those terms? Two troubling possibilities
come to mind. First, Congress may believe that it lacks the affirmative
constitutional authority to legislate directly. Second, in the case of legislative programs requiring funding, Congress may not have the political
wherewithal to make the necessary appropriation. Neitherjustification is
satisfactory. The first suggests that Congress is merely circumventing the
limits on its affirmative powers,52 3 the second that Congress abdicates its
fiscal responsibilities.
One problem with traditional federalism doctrine, as we suggested
above, is that it does not go far enough. A prohibition on outright commandeering may block flagrant circumventions of congressional authority and evasion of responsibility, while also banishing explicit affronts to
the idea of state autonomy. But it still tolerates control of the states by
conditional federal spending, threats of preemption, and interference
with agenda setting. In an experimentalist democracy, dependent on the
innovative vitality of autonomous local government for learning, these
intrusions would be prohibited by an anticommandeering doctrine as
well. In drawing the line defining impermissible commandeering,
Congress (or, in the justiciable variant of this theory, the Court) would
focus on whether the states have been given a substantial role in shaping
the federal policy they are to implement, and, in particular, whether the
conditions imposed on their receipt of federal funds unduly limited their
freedom to experiment. This would be a substantive standard for federalism, not a formal, historical one.
Notice, too, that federal programs defined by a broad policy goal
with the obligation to benchmark do not pose as great a threat to state
agenda setting as does a highly detailed directive. One of the principal
advantages of performance standards (including broad federal directives
to states) over design standards, we saw, is that the former enable the
regulated entity (including states) to use simultaneous engineering methods to achieve the stated goal in the manner most consistent with the
current, effective disposition of the entity's other operations.5 24 Thus,
under democratic experimentalism, congressional delegation that meets
the noncommandeering tests also responds directly (if partially) to the
concern about the disruptive effect of federal agendas on state agendas,
because the directive is sufficiently open and the agenda sufficiently
adaptable to minimize disruption.
The anticommandeering principle, as we would see it practiced, finally, does not require that all discretion be ceded to the states. Congress
could often choose, for example, between delegating a matter to an (experimentalist) administrative agency or to local governments, provided
that the one collaborate with the other in either case. Our anticommandeering principle only requires that when the federal government
523. See Baker, supra note 511, at 1954-88.
524. See supra text accompanying notes 183-192.
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does find it attractive to enlist the states directly in its regulatory programs, it does so by offering them the possibility of true cooperation.
For example, in South Dakota v. Dole, the Court upheld a federal statutory provision that denied federal highway funds to states that permitted
persons under the age of twenty-one to buy liquor. 525 New York v. United
States expressly relies upon Dole to uphold the conditional spending at
issue there.5 26 Assuming, however, that the states cannot generally afford
to forego federal highway funds, the provision at issue in Dole works just
as effectively to commandeer the state legislative process as did the taketitle provision in New York. In practice, it acts as a directive from Congress
to the state legislatures, instructing the latter to set a minimum drinking
age of twenty-one. Under the version of the anticommandeering principle that we propose, this statute should have been rejected by Congress
for treating the states as servants rather than as partners of the federal
government as surely as if Congress had simply enacted a statute requiring each state to enact a statute setting the drinking age at twenty-one.
In the experimentalist alternative, Congress would have established a
broader goal: highway safety. 52 7 Consider a hypothetical statute requiring each state to reduce its rate of highway fatalities to no greater than a
rate determined by reference to the experience of other states or lose a
fraction of its highway funding reflecting the degree to which the state
falls short of the target. States would be free to set the minimum drinking age below twenty-one, but only if they found some equally or more
effective means of avoiding highway fatalities. Such legislation would encourage learning, as different locales experimented with various solutions
and benchmarked the results. The states would, finally, be true laboratories of democracy because many eyes would be turned to the outcome of
the experiments.
Experimentalist criticism of the condition upheld in Dole shows further that requiring Congress to delegate experimental policymaking as
well as policy-implementation authority can help purge legislation of surreptitious, even impermissible preferences, and ensure that Congress is
actually pursuing a power delegated to it by Article I. Suppose that
Congress's real reason for seeking a national drinking age of twenty-one
was the belief that consumption of alcohol is always immoral but espe525. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
526. 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992).
527. We recognize that Congress will inevitably have some latitude to manipulate the
level of generality at which it specifies a policy objective. Shall it specify the goal as
highway safety, or, more generally, as preventing accidents, or, ess generally, as preventing
accidents caused by drunk driving? But some purposes-those that build in the means of

achieving them, such as "preventing accidents caused by youthful drunk driving"-will be
recognizable as shams, and it is to the task of identifying such sham purposes that judicial
energy might be usefully directed. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading
the Constitution 111 (1991) (arguing, in the individual rights context, that courts should
be skeptical of characterizations that appear to have been concocted for the litigation at
hand).
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cially so for persons under the age of twenty-one. Such a policy objective
may not be within the scope of the Commerce Clause and arguably contradicts the Twenty-first Amendment. Yet, under traditional principles,
the tying of the condition to the spending power essentially suffices to
insulate it from review. By contrast, the relatively broad policy of reducing highway fatalities more clearly falls within the rubric of the
Commerce Clause. Moreover, under a flexible mandate such as the one
hypothesized above, the states are not required to regulate alcohol at all,
so long as they find some effective means of reducing highway fatalities.5 28 If a state, convinced of the ill effects of alcohol consumption, preferred to reduce highway fatalities by restricting the driving age rather
than by other means, and could show that this was among the effective
ways of achieving the overall goal, then, as argued above, it would be
allowed to do so.
This first articulation of a revised anticommandeering principle is
necessarily tentative and sketchy. To repeat, we recognize the strength of
the arguments against any judicially enforceable federalism limits. However, whether or not it is judicially enforceable, an anticommandeering
principle that is sensitive to the distinction between treating states as servants and treating them as partners seems, from the vantage point of experimentalism, especially appropriate.
Moving to a regime of democratic experimentalism dissolves what,
from the perspective of the Court's existing doctrine, must be a puzzle.
The puzzle is why Congress may not commandeer the states, or why-put
the other way around-it must give them at least a formal role in national
programs, if it may take the more intrusive step of direct preemption.
This is, at bottom, the question with which the Court struggled in New
York v. United States and again in Printz v. United States. For us, however,
preemption no longer appears as an alternative to implementation
through the states; for, under an experimentalist regime, preemption is
simply another word for federal regulation, which in turn gives to states
and localities a substantial role in policy formation and implementation.
Hence the solution to the problem of the legitimacy of administrative
agencies converges with the reformulation of principles of federalism.
D. Experimentalist Federalismin Existing Legislation
Even as the Supreme Court has been adopting rules of constitutional
law designed to protect a residuum of state sovereignty, Congress has
been devolving power to the states at an accelerating pace. In the case of
528. Of course, in the example we have chosen, there is a multistate dimension to the
highway safety problem: As the Court recognized in Dole, the existence of neighboring
states with different drinking ages creates incentives for youthful drivers "to combine their
desire to drink with their ability to drive." Dole 483 U.S. at 208. While this fact may justify
the formulation of regional alcohol policies, it does not alter the degree to which the
conditions at issue in Dole were coercive.
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the Clean Air Act 529 and the educational-standards bill called Goals
2000,530 congressional devolution of authority to the states can be construed as an incipient form of experimentalist federalism based on models of cooperation among levels of government better suited to problem
solving under current conditions than the dignity-based model of federalism on which the Supreme Court appears to rely. In the case of welfare
reform, devolution amounts more nearly to abandonment by the federal
government of responsibility for the poor. Contrasting the former cases
with the latter illustrates how the ensemble of conditions on experimentalist lawmaking elaborated above distinguishes forms of decentralization
aimed at encouraging local and joint learning from those where that aim
is pretextual. This contrast points towards the kinds of debates over federalism likely to erupt in coming years as the tension between judicial and
(different) congressional understandings of decentralization are articulated under the pressure of events.
Consider first the Clean Air Act and its amendments. Regulation of
air quality might be thought to be a quintessentially federal function.
Pollution generated in one state causes harm in other states (and indeed
nations). This is especially true of air pollution, which once released,
cannot be locally contained. Yet, state democratic processes will undervalue out-of-state harms, because the harmed are not typically represented in the state political bodies. For example, legislatures in industrial
states may be more willing to permit manufacturers to discharge pollutants into the air that come back to the earth in other, states as acid rain
than to allow pollution of local streams and rivers. National (or interna53
tional) regulation appears to be the appropriate solution. '
Nonetheless, effective pollution regulation must also take into account local variations. Externalities aside, differences in topography and
population density, as well as in the sources, and hence, the fluctuations
in the level of pollution, may make standards that are reasonable for one
region unreasonable in another. Thus, an effective regime of air pollution control should consider the problem at a variety of jurisdictional
levels. That is what Congress has done through the Clean Air Act.
Under the Clean Air Act, the federal government establishes a
broadly defined emissions standard, but leaves to the states authority for
creating plans for "implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of
such primary standard."53 2 The program of cooperative federalism
utilizes key features of democratic experimentalism. For example, the
state plans must establish means of collecting and making available information about the program's success.5 33 Strikingly, the Act provides that
as a prerequisite to an agency's eligibility for funding as a regulator of air

529. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
530. 20 U.S.CA. §§ 5801-5932, 5951-5985, 6061-6084 (West Supp. 1997).
531. See David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 39-40 (1995).

532. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
533. See id. § 7410(a) (2) (B).
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pollution, it must assure the federal administrators that the "agency provides for adequate representation of appropriate State, interstate, local,
and (when appropriate) international, interests in the air quality control
region." 534 The Clean Air Act thus establishes a program of joint federal/state responsibility that functions largely according to principles of
democratic experimentalism.
Congress has used the model of cooperative federalism in other areas as well. Education, traditionally a state function, is a prominent example. Under the Goals 2000 legislation, states are encouraged to meet
broad education goals in core academic subjects and to promote "bottom
up" reform of education.5 35 Here, states play a vital role in the formulation of goals. Federal standards are quite broad: States must improve
their content standards and must set specific benchmarks by which to
measure progress. 53 6 The principal substantive statutory requirement for
the Secretary of Education's approval of a plan is that it hold "reasonable
promise" of promoting student achievement. 537 On the other hand, participation rights are guaranteed in mandatory terms: "Each State improvement plan shall describe strategies for how the State educational
agency will involve parents and other community representatives in plan53 8
ning, designing, and implementing the State improvement plan."

A plan like Goals 2000 would survive a challenge under New York v.
United States, but only, it appears, because it uses the mechanism of conditional funding. Were it a direct command of the federal government it
might well run afoul of the Court's anticommandeering principle. Indeed, it might then also be suspect under Lopez, because like the statute
invalidated in Lopez itself, Goals 2000 represents an intrusion into the
traditionally state-controlled domain of education. 53 9 Yet, in our view,
the validity of a program like Goals 2000 should not turn on the formalism of counting it as an exercise of the spending rather than the commerce power. Instead, Goals 2000 and other programs of cooperative
federalism in the area of education 5 40 ought to pass constitutional muster
because they advance rather than impede the goals of federalism understood as experimentalist collaboration between the states and the federal
government.
The 1996 reform of the nation's welfare laws is in many ways the evil
twin of legislation like Goals 2000. It has been advertised by its supporters as devolving power to the states. In a technical sense, this may be
correct: States play a larger formal role in the formulation of welfare
534. Id. § 7405(a) (2).
535. See 20 U.S.G.A § 5886(h).

536. See id. § 5886(k).
537.
538.
539.
540.
Stat. 568

See id. § 5886(n) (2) (B).
Id. § 5886(f).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See The School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-239, 108
(codified at scattered sections of 20 U.S.CA. (West Supp. 1997)).
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policy than they did under the old regime, and they appear to have considerable policy-setting discretion. However, because the new legislation
imposes arbitrary (and unrealistic) goals with inadequate funding, the
powers of self-determination it gives states are illusory. Indeed, it gestures
at experimentalism as a pretext for punitive moralizing that restricts the
freedom to innovate while excusing the national government of responsibility for the results.
The 1996 Welfare Reform Act abolished the principal cash aid program for poor families, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), along with a variety of other federal programs that we shall not
discuss directly here.5 4 1 Under AFDC, states were required to set statewide eligibility requirements and benefit levels as a condition for reimbursement by the federal government of a portion of the resulting expenditures. In this sense, AFDC was an "entitlement" program: All
persons meeting criteria in a state plan that satisfied the federal limits
were entitled to receive payments.5 42 Within fairly strict federal standards, 543 AFDC thus also offered states an incentive to provide at least
minimal benefit levels for their most destitute residents. 544 Even with
such incentives, however, the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s substantially eroded the value of AIFDC. Measured in 1993 dollars, the average
545
monthly AFDC benefit declined from $676 in 1970 to $373 in 1993.
The new legislation replaces federal reimbursement of state entitlement payments to qualifying families with block grants to the states.
These grants are determined by a funding formula that is not adjusted for
inflation. 54 6 Thus, population growth plus any increase in the price level
will reduce the real value of benefits per recipient in the absence of offsetting savings in program expenditures. Congress expects the savings to
come from a shrinkage in the welfare rolls as recipients move into the
workforce. Indeed, the statute requires that by the year 2002, fifty percent of recipient families must include an adult working at least thirty
541. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 2105, 2112-61 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-619, 1308 (West Supp. 1997) (repealing AFDC, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-617 (1991))). The Act also abolished Emergency Assistance to Families with
Children, and JOBS, a work and training program for welfare recipients. See id. § 103
(repealing 42 U.S.C. §§ 606(e) (1), 681-686 (1994)). Further, it cut funding for food
stamps, see id., limited the availability of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for children,
see id. § 212, and eliminated legally resident aliens' eligibility for SSI or food stamps, see
id. §§ 400-402.
542. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (repealed 1996).
543. See id. § 602(a).
544. See id. § 603 (setting forth the funding formula).
545. See House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., Overview of Entitlement
Programs: 1994 Greenbook 325 (Comm. Print 1994); see also David E. Rosenbaum,
Welfare: Who Gets It? How Much Does It Cost?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1995, at A23
(describing data from 1994 Green Book).

546. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 603(a) (1) (B) (West Supp. 1997).
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hours per week, with transition percentages in effect until then. 547
Congress apparently assumes that most of these people will obtain private
sector jobs, as the Act appropriates very little money for job creation.
Other requirements, such as the provision that a family may receive federal funds for no longer than a total of five years (with permission to
states to exempt only twenty percent of the caseload)5 48 also point to a
cost savings achieved either by a transition to work or, more ominously,
by exiting the state or sinking into destitution. While early experience
provides a basis for cautious optimism that, at least while the national
economy is booming, states will find effective means of moving recipients
from welfare to work, 549 the new legislation provides little in the way of
funding for programs that accomplish this, nor does it address the group
action problem that welfare presents at the national level: the possibility
that states with a substantial number of persons who appear unemployable will abandon them in the (vain) hope that they will migrate to neighboring states with more generous programs.
Even putting to one side questions of the adequacy of funding under
the new legislation, and its likely consequences should the robust economy slacken, welfare reform is decidedly less experimentalist than the
regime it replaced. Under section 1315 of the Social Security Act, the
Department of Health and Human Services had the authority to grant
waivers of federal eligibility rules to experimental state programs
designed to move people from welfare to work. 55 0 The Clinton Administration was especially aggressive in granting such waivers. Prior to the
1996 legislation, it had approved seventy-eight welfare reform experiments in forty-three states. 551 The new law permits states with valid waivers to continue their approved programs until the waiver's original expiration date, 552 but at that point the states will have to comply with the
very stringent requirements described above.
Similarly, the Family Support Act of 1988, which sought to move
AFDC recipients to work, also provided for the creation of the kind of'
information infrastructure upon which democratic experimentalism
thrives. It is worth quoting one section in full:
Performance Standards
547. See id. § 607.
548. See id. § 608.
549. See Jason DeParle, Getting Opal Caples to Work, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1997,
(Magazine), at 33 (describing welfare reform in Wisconsin); see also Administration for
Children & Families, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Change in Welfare Caseloads
Since Enactment of the New Welfare Law (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://
www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/augjul.htnl> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting
sixteen percent decline nationally).
550. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C.A. 1315 (West Supp. 1997).
551. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, HHS Fact Sheet (U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., D.C.), Aug. 22, 1996, at 5.
552. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 615(a) (1).

19981

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM

(a) Development of standards; recommendations; periodic review and modification.
Not later than 4 years after the effective date [of a provision
of the Family Support Act], the Secretary shall(1) in consultation with the Secretary of Labor, representatives
of organizations representing Governors, State and local program administrators, educators, State job training coordinating
councils, community-based organizations, recipients, and other
interested persons, develop criteria for performance standards
with respect to [experimental job training programs] that are
based, in part on the results of the studies conducted under [another provision of the Fanily Support Act], and the initial State
evaluations 553
(if any) performed under [a repealed section of the
U.S. Code].
The provision went on to require that information collected from
the states be used in the regulatory formulation of performance standards,5 5 4 and form the basis for proposals to Congress regarding techni555
cal assistance to the states in the meeting of performance standards.
The new legislation phases out and then repeals this exercise in democratic experimentalism. 5 56 In its place the new law directs the Secretary
of the Department of Health and Human Services to compile annual
rankings of state performance, 557 to develop innovative means of disseminating information, 55 8 and to develop innovative "outcomes measures."5 59 In time, these provisions may blossom into the necessary information infi-astructure, but as with experimentalism more generally, the
560
question will be resolved in practice.
Whatever its other merits, in its setting of fixed, statutory time limits
and proportions of recipients that must be working, the new legislation
flies in the face of the localism that ostensibly animates it, to say nothing
of the experimentalism advocated here. The new legislation does not set
mere preliminary benchmarks to be replaced by rolling best-practice
standards. Instead, it sets rigid requirements that many critics claim to be
based on unrealistic assumptions.5 6 ' Moreover, should the critics' predic553. 42 U.S.C. § 687 (1994), amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 687 (West Supp. 1997).
554. See id. § 687(b).
555. See id. § 687(c).
556. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(Welfare Reform Act of 1996), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 108(e), 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. (110
Stat.) 2105, 2167 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 681-687 (West Supp. 1997)).
557. See Welfare Reform Act of 1996 § 103(a) (1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 613(d) (West Supp.

1997).
558. See Welfare Reform Act of 1996 § 103(a) (1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 613(c).
559. See Welfare Reform Act of 1996 § 107, 42 U.S.C.A. § 613 note.

560. In the meantime, the government operates a web site that includes, among other
things, links to descriptions of various state programs under construction. See Welfare
Reform State Links (visited Jan. 17, 1998) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/welfare/
sflinks.htm> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
561. See Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, Atlantic Monthly,
Mar. 1997, at 43, 50.
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tions that the goals are unrealistic prove false, the combination of congressionally chosen mandates (rather than rolling best-practice standards) and inadequate information-sharing infrastructure makes it
unlikely that successes will spread as rapidly as they would under a truly
experimental regime.
Of course, it is possible that voters in one state will demand that the
responsible officials adopt the successful methods of their neighbors, and
we do not discount the possibility that this will happen. But as in other
contexts, there is no reason to assume that this result will come about
automatically. Welfare reform devolves power to the states, but offers no
special reason to hope that devolution will result in fruitful experimentation. Taken as a whole, the bill capriciously limits the range of experiments the states may undertake and diminishes the potential significance
of those that occur by trivializing the information pooling necessary for
joint learning.
VII. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

The existence of administrative agencies with the power to fashion
rules of law, institute enforcement actions, and adjudicate disputes poses
a double dilemma for the constitutional principle of separation of powers. First, in the Madisonian synthesis, the combination of executive, legislative, and judicial power in one branch of government invites tyranny.5 62 Second, this combination is especially egregious when it occurs
outside any of the institutions contemplated directly by the Constitution,
in a fourth, administrative branch of recent pedigree and uncertain democratic legitimacy.
Both of the standard responses to this embarrassment seek to avoid
the problem by pleas for a mature worldliness. The first argues against a
narrow or formal understanding of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 563 The second argues that delegation to administrative
agencies in particular is democratically legitimate because, under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 64 those agencies are accountable
to the citizens affected in ways analogous to the way the legislature is accountable to its constituents. 565 But these arguments are more apologia
562. See The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison); John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure andJudicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 612, 640-41 (1996).
563. See 1 Kenneth Gulp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
§ 2.3, at 38 (3d ed. 1994); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578-79 (1984).
564. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
565. See South Carolina ex rel. Patrick v. Block, 558 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D.S.C.
1983) (stating that APA rulemaking is "intended to insure that the process of legislative
rule-making in administrative agencies is infused with openness, explanation, and
participatory democracy which is essential to minimize the dangers of arbitrary and
irrational decision-making"); Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of
Environmental Labeling, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 147, 206 (1993) (stating that "the notice and
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than analysis. The Administrative Procedure Act "democratizes" (traditional hierarchical) agencies at the cost of substantially paralyzing them;
indeed, it is more nearly true that traditional agencies are neither democratic nor effective than that they are both.
Yet we do not mean to cast the New Deal agencies as villains. The
explosion of agencies that began to gain steam in the first decades of the
twentieth century566 was itself a recognition that older forms of regulation were inadequate, and thus from the perspective of the eighteenthcentury Constitution, the paradigmatic New Deal or 1970s agencies may
be seen as truly "experimental" themselves. 567 Indeed, it is partly a testimony to the vigor of these entities that they have begun to transform
themselves, as we have seen above. But it is no secret that the older
model of the agency never fit comfortably within the Madisonian
framework.
Recast on experimentalist lines as projected in Part V.B, however,
administrative agencies more readily fit within the framework of American government than do the agencies as we currently know them. On the
one hand, experimentalist administration creates the mirror-the systems of information exchange and benchmarking-in which the doings
of the other branches, and its own as well, are reflected for public scrutiny. In this way, the new methods limit the possibilities of self-aggrandizement of any one branch of government, the central concern of contemporary separation-of-powers doctrine. 568 On the other hand, the
decisions of experimentalist agencies depend on direct deliberation by
citizen users. In this, the administration is of a piece with the democracy
it serves, not merely democratic by analogy to it. If the judiciary, as the
shield of liberty against the danger of tyranny by government or majority,
was the least dangerous branch of the original Madisonian democracy,
the administrative agencies, as mirror and motor of direct deliberation,
are the least dangerous branch of democratic experimentalism.
A. Separation-of-PowersDoctrine and its Discontents
We begin by recalling the separation of powers as it appears in the
Constitution, and as it does not. The commonplace that our system of
comment procedures of the APA are invaluable to democratic participation"); Philip J.
Harter, The APA at 50: A Celebration, Not a Puzzlement, Admin. & Reg. L. News, Winter
1996, at 2, 2 (stating that APA rulemaking "provides a democratic means by which the
people who will be affected... can participate in the decision").
566. See James Willard Hurst, Law and Social Order in the United States 35-41
(1977).
567. See 1 Davis & Pierce, supra note 563, § 1.4, at 9 (quoting a 1916 speech by
American Bar Association President Elihu Root characterizing broad delegations to
agencies as worthwhile "experiments").
568. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (upholding the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1982 ed. Supp.
V)), makes aggrandizement of the power of a branch of government the touchstone of

separation-of-powers analysis.
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government separates legislative, executive, and judicial power is, of
course, overstatement. The Constitution contains no express principle of
separation of powers. That principle must be inferred from the
Constitution's structure-which sets forth "legislative Powers" in Article
1,569 "executive Power" in Article 11,570 and 'judicial Power" in Article
I.5 7 1 But any closer reading establishes that the Constitution does not

perfectly match branches with functions. As Justice Jackson explained in
his concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case, "[w] hile the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. '5 72 The fundamental question in traditional debates about the separation of powers
then becomes how much integration will be permitted consistent with the
Constitution's architecture?
Where the Constitution expressly delegates a power to a branch of
government, there can be no complaint. For example, the President's
authority to veto legislation is a kind of lawmaking, rather than lawenforcing power; yet Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 provides the definitive
answer to any claim that the practice is unconstitutional. Similarly, the
express grant of an exclusive power to one branch precludes its exercise
by another.5 7 3 But these are easy cases for traditional constitutional law,
with answers provided by the Constitution's text alone, without any reference to a more abstract principle of separation of powers.
Harder cases arise when a government practice contravenes no express constitutional norm but departs from the presumed structure of
separation. In modern times, the clearest example of such a departure
was posed by INS v. Chadha.5 74 Section 244(c) (2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act authorized one House of Congress to override the
Attorney General's decision not to deport an otherwise deportable
alien. 575 After Congress overrode the Attorney General's decision to permit Chadha, who had overstayed his student visa, to remain in the United
States, Chadha challenged the Act, claiming that the unicameral legislative veto violated the principle of separation of powers.5 76 The Court
held for Chadha, ruling that however expedient, the legislative veto was
inconsistent with Article I's prescription that Congress legislate by bicam569. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1.
570. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
571. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
572. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
573. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1993) (holding that by
granting to the Senate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments," in Article I, Section 3, the
Constitution precludes a court challenge to procedures employed by the Senate in
conducting an impeachment).
574. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
575. See id. at 925 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1976) (repealed 1986)).
576. See id. at 928.
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eral action followed by presentment to the President.577 According to
the Chadha Court, the lawmaking formula set forth in Article I is
578
exclusive.
Even this limited affirmation of the separation of powers, however,
was enough to renew questions about the legitimacy of administrative
agencies. In his lone dissent in Chadha,Justice White accused the majority of formalism, contending that "[i]f Congress may delegate lawmaking
power to independent and Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand Art. I as prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on
legislative power for itself."579 In the ensuing years, therefore, commentators and the Court itself have sought to deny their equivalence in order
to reconcile the delegation of lawmaking authority to administrative
agencies with Chadha. According to the prevailing view, the flaw in congressional delegation that Chadha repairs is "aggrandizement,"58 0 the attempt by Congress to increase its power at the expense of the other
branches. By contrast, when Congress delegates power to administrative
agencies, it does not increase its own power, and thus poses no constitutionally significant threat to liberty.
Questions of what constitutes aggrandizement aside, 58 1 this reconciliation seems untenably narrow. Why assume that democracy is served by
the agencies merely because their existence does not threaten liberty by
aggrandizing the power of any other branch? Surely there is some risk to
democracy in removing lawmaking power from the hands of the people's
representatives and placing it in the hands of bureaucrats. This danger is
most apparent in the case of so-called "independent" agencies, but even
577. See id. at 944-51. These are both necessary conditions. See Consumers Union
of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (invalidating
bicameral legislative veto).
578. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-58. One could quibble with the Court's
characterization of a decision to override deportation as "legislative," given that it affects
the rights and duties of a particular person. See id. at 964-65 (Powell,J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the legislative veto in Chadhawas an unconstitutional judicial act
by the legislature). Whether the Court correctly identified the nature of the legislative
veto in Chadhaitself, or not, it clearly meant to endorse a general principle that whenever
Congress engages in what would concededly be legislation, it must follow the procedures
of Article I.
579. Id. at 986 (White, J., dissenting). For the canonical discussion of formalism and
functionalism in separation-of-powers jurisprudence, see generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal
and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?,
72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987).
580. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988); Manning, supra note 402, at
715-17.
581. One pervasive problem is that of drawing a neutral baseline. In Chadha itself,
after all, the authority of the Attorney General to withhold deportation in the first place
stemmed from an act of Congress. In the absence of that initial delegation, the status quo
for persons such as Chadha would have been deportation. From this perspective, the
legislative veto did no more than place a limit on Congress's prior delegation of authority
to the executive branch. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 990-96 (White, J., dissenting).
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those agencies that are in principle answerable to the President lack the
kind of connection to the people that Article I envisions for congressional lawmaking. Thus, in our view, Laurence Tribe's attempt to explain
Chadha as "a rejection of a quasi-parliamentary form of government in
which Congress delegates legislative power to itself or its parts, 58 2 fares
no better than the less precise formulations of the nonaggrandizement
principle. For if the express provisions of Article I may be seen as implicitly rejecting an alternative, parliamentary form of democracy, do they
not, a fortiori, reject manifestly undemocraticforms of government?
The problem is heightened, we saw, because Congress cannot monitor the use of the authority it delegates: Agencies exist because Congress
is unable to devote the time and resources necessary to respond to the
complex facts of the modern world.5 8 3

It follows, therefore, that

Congress cannot supervise all of the details of agency action, and that
agency decisions with which Congress might disagree if it gave them serious consideration will necessarily escape Congress's attention.
B. Present and Future Solutions
In the worldly view, the Administrative Procedure Act 58 4 provides a
solution to the antidemocratic character of agency lawmaking. Agencies
subject to the APA must, as a precondition to substantive rulemaking,
give the public notice of a proposed rule and permit comments on
whether it should be adopted. 58 5 Notice and the opportunity for comment give the public many of the same opportunities for influencing the
adoption of rules that they would have in the case of norms adopted directly by Congress. Of course, persons dissatisfied with agency rulemaking do not have the opportunity to express their views at the ballot box
(except indirectly, through, for example, presidential elections). But
here too the APA seeks to democratize the agencies' functioning by providingjudicial review of final agency action for aggrieved persons. 58 6
Thus, the APA aims to domesticate the "fourth branch" by subjecting
it to checks similar to those imposed on the other three. This solution
may have worked so long as the methods of centralized fact-finding plausibly provided the necessary information for effective regulation, but that,
as we have seen, is no longer true. A quarter century of efforts to further
democratize and improve the performance of the agencies largely by extending the circle of those participating at the center of centralized
582. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1238 (1995).

583. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some
Comments on Rubin, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 427, 428-30 (1989) (contrasting a nineteenth-

century legislative solution to transportation-safety problems with a twentieth-century
delegation to an agency for purposes of solving transportation-safety problems).
584. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1994).
585. See id. § 553(b) (notice); id. § 553(c) (opportunity to submit views).
586. See id. §§ 701-706.
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rulemaking have produced confusion and stasis that resemble the turmoil of Congress itself.
Indeed, the APA in some ways makes the agencies more vulnerable
to the defects of centralized representative democracy under conditions
of volatility and diversity than the legislature to which they have been in
part assimilated. For while the notice-and-comment requirement for
rulemaking ensures that agencies conduct congressional-style hearings,
the availability of judicial review of agency rulemaking undercuts their
ability to respond rapidly to new developments in specialized areas.
Rulemaking, in consequence, can be tortuously slow, as we saw in the
context of NHTSA's efforts to require passive restraints. 5 87 The clash between procedural safeguards and administrative adaptability is so great
and manifest that open enemies of government regulation can think of
no more expeditious way to frustrate the agencies than to impose on
5 8
them additional requirements of procedural due process. 1
These results notwithstanding, we believe that the fundamental impulses behind the worldly view of the APA are correct: To domesticate
the agencies within American constitutionalism, they must be rendered
democratic. The separation-of-powers principle in part serves to frustrate
democracy by making it difficult for the government to act. But that is
only half of the story. By ensuring that legislative decisions are made by
persons accountable to the people, the separation-of-powers principle
also empowers democracy.58 9 Thus, a successful account of the role of agencies in American government must, at a minimum, answer to democracy.
In retrospect, the shortcomings of the APA derived from the attempt
to apply the conventional methods of democratic domestication to institutions born of the recognition of the limits of convention. Had the
agencies worked in conformity with the APA, they would have created a
firmament of little democracies, each responsible in effect for legislation,
adjudication, and administration in a specific area of economic activity.
In that case, they would have resembled, more than anything, the world
of sectoral councils and parliaments contemplated by British pluralists

587. See supra Part V.C.1; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 60 (1995) ("For more than a decade,
administrative law scholars have complained that the agency rulemaking process has
become ossified."); id. at 60 n.4 (collecting sources).
588. For example, the "Contract with America" that served as the Republican Party
platform in the 1994 congressional elections proposed additional procedures as a means of
impeding rulemaking. See Republican National Committee, The Contract with America
141 (1994); see also Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of
American Rulemaking, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745, 768 (1996) (observing that subtitle E of
Tide IH of the recently enacted Contract with America Advancement Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 801(a) (1) (A), (C), 801 (a) (3) (1994), institutionalizes congressional review of all agency

rulemaking).
589. See Ely, supra note 2, at 131-34 (arguing for "a legislative lawmaking process").

COLUMBIA LAW REVEW

[Vol. 98:267

such as Laski and Cole in the early decades of this century.5 90 What,
then, would have become of the authority of Congress and the integrity
of our Constitution? We will never know how much the difficulties of the
agencies derived from the limits of representative democracy, even in the
small world of highly specialized activity, and how much from fomenting
novel arrangements while compelling respect for the constraints of the
old.
Experimentalist administration as conceived in the broader setting
of directly deliberative democracy, in contrast, is democratically domesticated from birth. Thus, the central separation-of-powers problem of conventional agencies-their insulation from politics-never arises. The experimentalist agencies we described in Part V5 91 serve local government
by facilitating benchmarking, set national standards by benchmarking
rolling best practice, and benchmark services that they themselves provide. Thus, they coordinate the expertise of others instead of attempting
to constitute themselves as a substitute for it, and their success reinforces
rather than saps the democratic efficacy of the other institutions of government. By setting and continuously improving the standards for directly deliberative participation by which all instrumentalities of government are judged, as a condition of their own activities, the agencies
safeguard democracy while advancing it. In this sense they would be the
least dangerous branch of a new Madisonian synthesis.
VIII. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

We have argued for democratic experimentalism thus far in doctrinal contexts that may seem unusually well suited to it. The delivery of
services analogous, if not identical, to those provided by private-sector
firms, and the setting of complementary rules and standards, are significant parts of the work of administrative agencies. Thus, it is not surprising that we find the current experience of private firm restructuring relevant to the restructuring of administrative agencies. Similarly, federalism
has also long been seen as an efficient instrument of decentralization,
however much our tradition of federalism also values state sovereignty in
its own right. Hence, novel forms of economic decentralization easily
suggest new forms of federalism. Discussion of the courts, correspondingly, has focused so far on their scrutiny of the experimentalism of the
other actors in a system of service provision through collaborative
59 2
federalism.
Perhaps it would be wise to go no further, and forswear the extension of experimentalism to the remaining pillar of American constitution590. For the relevant essays in the setting of contemporaneous pluralist works, see
generally Paul Q. Hirst, The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G.D.H.
Cole, J.N. Figgis, and H.S. Laski (1989).
591. See supra Part V.B.
592. See supra Part V.D.
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alism: the protection of individual constitutional rights against decisions
of local, state, and national majorities. To do this, we would have to distinguish the subconstitutional, rolling best-practice rights to participate
in local decisionmaking available under democratic experimentalism
from familiar constitutional safeguards. In such a two-tiered system, for
example, a new, presumably statutory, rolling best-practice right to be
consulted in the experimentalist formulation of a locale's welfare policy
would be qualified by the limits on pre-enforcement litigation and other
experimentalist techniques described above, while the old constitutional
rights to such liberties as freedom of speech and religion would still hold
sway in their traditional domain.
But this distinction between protections based on an experimentalist
structure and rights founded in the Constitution is ultimately untenable.
Even a partial transformation of our understanding of the Constitution's
structural provisions as described in the foregoing sections shades understandings of rights. The preservation of liberty typically serves as a principal justification for the Constitution's division of power. At the same
time, horizontal (separation-of-powers) and vertical (federalism) limits
play a crucial role in the substantive interpretation of the Constitution's
individual-rights provisions. The most important rights-based controversies of the century-involving economic liberty, racial segregation, incorporation of the Bill of Rights, free speech, the rights of criminal defendants, and procreative autonomy-concerned the limits of federal judicial
tribunals as much as the underlying substantive norms. Thus, a new understanding of the separation of powers and federalism will reshape
thinking about individual constitutional rights as well.
Moreover, as democracy increasingly comes to mean decentralized,
direct deliberation, it will be increasingly difficult to distinguish the citizens' participatory rights in these particular settings from those more
general "process-perfecting" rights to democratic participation that are
frequently taken as the most fundamental of all political liberties. The
more community policing effaces the distinction between crimes and lawful actions by disrupting behavior that leads directly to crime, the harder
it will be to distinguish between the traditional constitutional immunities
due those suspected of crimes and the rights enmeshed in the new institutional mechanisms by which citizens will police the new police. The
more citizens tailor public services to the way they live, the more previously suppressed ways of life are publicized and granted official recognition. Consequently, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish constitutional protections of a prepolitical sphere of intimate association and
conscience-modeled on the right to freedom of religion and expressed
in the notion of a right to privacy593-from protection of experimentalist
participation in all its diversity.
593. It is interesting to note that when, in the leading modem constitutional privacy
case, Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court sought jurisprudential antecedents, see 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965), it turned to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), a case that
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Thus, experimentalist and traditional constitutional understandings
of rights cannot be durably separated, at least without recourse to a question-begging formalism that asserts that the former simply are nowhere to
be found in the Constitution's text. To complete our project, therefore,
we must find a way of reconciling them in the concept of an enforceable
Constitution that-democratizing the judicial determination of rights
and constitutionalizing the everyday exercise of democracy-begins to reduce the familiar tension in constitutional democracies between popular
sovereignty and a constitutional order entrenched against the decisions
of the polity.
This is the task of this Part. We begin by marking out what we take to
be the common ground in contemporary philosophical discussion of
rights and underscoring the affinities between the historically contextualized view of rights central to that discussion and the notion of pragmatist
sociability that undergirds democratic experimentalism. 594 Then, we
connect this pragmatist conception of rights with a seemingly peripheral
aspect of the Supreme Court's rights doctrine, the concept of prophylactic rules, and suggest a radical generalization of that concept. 595 Next, we
describe the mechanism ofjudicial review that would give practical effect
to the experimentalist understanding of rights.5 96 Finally, we illustrate
how experimentalist learning can transform our notion of what we hold
59 7
as holders of fundamental rights.

A. The Awkward Consensus on Rights
Current discussion of rights as both immunities from state and private interference, and entitlements to public goods due the citizens of a
democracy-even when calculation of the public good suggests otherwise-has arrived at an uneasy, half-spoken agreement that rights matter.
The agreement arises out of the failure of ambitious and promising
projects to establish rights on universally valid foundations, 598 and the
persistence, despite this failure, of the conviction that rights, in a democracy, ought to be respected as though they were indeed so founded.5 9 9
Because the agreement that rights matter grows more from common disappointments than from the complementary discoveries of meeting
ought to have grounded the parents' right to educate their children in an extension of
religious freedom, but in fact grounded it in principles of economic liberty.
594. See infra Part VIII.L
595. See infra Part VIII.B.
596. See infr-a Part VIII.C.
597. See infra Part VIII.D.
598. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) (proposing a
deontological account of rights); John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (1971) (deriving rights
from purportedly basic tenets of democracy).
599. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 15, at 12 (allowing for rights as trumps that are
nonetheless based on consensus); cf. Dworkin, supra note 598, at 199 n.1 (accepting the
possibility of an entrenched consequentialist account of rights as an alternative to his
deontological account).
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minds, however, it seems to discourage exchange rather than invite it.
Like wayfarers crossing paths at a desolate inn, the participants are too
absorbed by the vicissitudes of their separate journeys to welcome conviviality. Yet this reticence to the side, there is, on examination, a short step
from these points of agreement to a shared positive view of rights as historically contextual. This view corroborates the general pragmatist idea
of sociability and begins to connect it to an understanding of rights in an
experimentalist democracy.
Consider, then, the awkward consensus of the moment. Consider
specifically the foundational project, most closely identified with the work
of John Rawls. Its original grand aim was to understand the rights we
associate with democracy not as an historical legacy of certain societies,
60 0
The core task,
but rather as accomplishments of moral reason itself.
therefore, was to demonstrate how rational beings, acknowledging only
their freedom and equality, and thus ignorant of their separate destinies
in life, would on reflection choose to live by rules reconciling freedom
and equality akin to those actually observed in the advanced social democracies of the post-War world. 601 The force of the demonstration was
to reveal the principle behind the practice, and so to make the social
democracies more defensible against their political enemies, while guiding the efforts of their friends to join the benefits of freedom to those of
effective equality.
Criticism-no one decisive, all together overwhelming-focused relentlessly on the way the foundational results relied in the end on just
such historically dependent indicia of identity as gender or social class
whose irrelevance was to be demonstrated. One line of attack fixed on
the implausibility of imagining any future, much less one reconciling
freedom and equality, in abstraction from all the marks of identity that
give meaning to life projects. 60 2 Another traced the inconsistencies in
principle of defining constitutional rules in ignorance of the world and
then living by the principles of those rules once the veil of ignorance is
lifted. 60 3 Unable to advance his original project, Rawls himself eventually
validated the criticism by reformulating the democratic freedoms of the
600. See Rawls, supra note 598, 118-92 (supporting his principles of justice by
invoking a hypothetical agreement among idealized, deliberately acontextualized actors).
601. See id.
602. Feminists made this point with considerable force. See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib,
Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics 2-3
(1992) (linking the critique of liberalism to a more general critique of Enlightenment
reasoning); MargaretJane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699,
1713 (1990) (noting how, in contemporary culture, the values advanced by Rawls are
associated with masculinity, while going on to offer a pragmatist reconceptualization).
603. See, e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981) (questioning the possibility of
rational argument absent agreement upon a conception of the good); MichaelJ. Sandel,
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 28-46 (1982) (arguing that Rawls's theory assumes a
human identity artificially isolated from community influences and obligations); Michael

Walzer, Spheres ofJustice (1983) (rejecting Rawls's effort to root political justice in a very
small number of abstract principles).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

modems as a grand historical legacy of centuries of intolerance and
604
tyranny.
Yet, paradoxically and revealingly, the recognition of the historical
contingency of our freedom that led to Rawls's (and others') reversal
only served to reinforce commitments to the centrality of rights in modem political life on both sides of the debate. Critics of the foundational
program were quick to affirm that their quarrel was not with the broad
substance of the rights in question, but only with the claim to elaborate
and motivate allegiance to them without reference to the experience of
particular communities or identity groups; 60 5 adherents to the foundational program followed Rawls's lead, situating the rights of freedom and
equality more precisely in their historical context while
recommending
60 6
them as vital examples of broad principles in action.
Important nuances of motivation and definition aside, there is agreement that commitments to rights to freedom and equality are part of our
identity as members of democratic societies. 60 7 Apparently, our rights do
not lose their majestic and independent authority when we come to acknowledge that in some sense we chose them. Because our rights are
part of who we are, they shape, explicitly or not, all the manifold projects
by which we determine the future of our polities. Indeed, as the criticism
of foundationalism suggests, given the centrality of rights to our political
identity, we cannot imagine a future for our polities at all without con60 8
templating how we shall affirm or modify our rights.
Observe that this conception of political rights and personhood as
mutually defining is a variant of the pragmatist idea of the joint determination of individuality and sociability. In pragmatism, because of the irreducibly social character of learning, we form ourselves as individuals by
interpreting, in collaboration with others, the possibilities for self-development that society takes for granted; ourjoint elaboration in turn transforms those possibilities. The common-ground view specifies rights just
as the immunities and entitlements that qualified persons alone and to604. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism at xv-xxv (1993).
605. Of course, the critics meant the point as a criticism. See, e.g., Paul F. Campos,
Secular Fundamentalism, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1814, 1819-21 (1994) (arguing that even in
his later work, Rawls's conception of "reasonableness" is considerably narrower than he
acknowledges).
606. See Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy (1988), reprinted in
1 Philosophical Papers: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 175, 185 (1991) (stating
approvingly that "[wihen reread in the light of" Rawls's later work, "A Theory ofJustice no
longer seems committed to a philosophical account of the human self, but only to a
historico-sociological description of the way we live now"); Tribe & Doff, supra note 527, at
114-17 (1991) (connecting this project to common-law methods).
607. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv.
L. Rev. 1175, 1194-99 (1996) (noting substantive similarity between deontological and
consequentialist accounts of rights).
608. For a statement of the common-ground position from the vantage point of the
antifoundational position by one of its principal advocates, see Michael Walzer, The
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 Pol. Theory 6, 13-15 (1990).
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gether may at any moment suppose in their life plans. Correlatively, only
those who may take these rights for granted qualify, as citizens, to exercise sovereign self-determination. More precisely, the common-ground
view can be rendered as the idea of the joint determination in context of
rights, of the identities and capacities of individuals and groups: The
identity to which we aspire shapes and is shaped by the capacities for
action in the world that we acquire, just as our identity and practical abilithe immunities and benefits we (ought to)
ties are shaped by and shape
60 9
hold as a matter of right.
These relations are both analytic and practical. Neither as observers
nor as actors can we say what rights are, or how they are to be used,
without reference to the identities and capacities that give them substance, just as no specification of individual identity is adequate without
reference to rights. Thus understood, rights, far from estranging us from
ground of mutual recognione another, are a crucial part of the common
610
tion upon which we raise our individuality.
The close association in historical context between rights, on the one
hand, and ideas of personal honor and dignity associated with sovereignty, on the other, suggests an explanation of what might be called the
resistance of rights to skepticism: How we can both acknowledge that the
justification of rights may vary historically-or, contemporaneously, from
setting to setting within any one society-yet continue to regard rights as
basic to our understanding and evaluation of ourselves in relation to
others. The respect we accord the rights we know, regardless of knowledge of alternatives, is recognition of their priority in our self-understanding as the political and practical expression, however approximate, of the
very preconditions of humanity. Particular rights may be conceived as
the pragmatist principles upon which we must provisionally stand to exercise our powers of human self-determination (including, of course, the
power to press for changes in rights). So closely are the rights of citizenship identified with the preconditions of humanity that persons denied
rights, the exercise of which they believe within their capacity, will often
risk their lives protesting the denial. For the same reason, audacious persons and groups will struggle to acquire the capacities for forms of selfdetermination (ranging from economic independence to participation in
public affairs) thought to merit recognition of corresponding rights.
This mutual dependence of rights and identities explains why the
extension of rights so often appears as an instrument for enlarging the
current understanding of humanity, and why enlarging the polity so
often appears as an instrument for extending rights. New rights arise
amidst the contentious exploration of the ambiguities of existing ones.
609. This view of rights is explored in Joseph Raz, Right-Based Moralities, in Theories
of Rights 182 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
610. For the contrary view of rights as entailing isolation and so obstructing
community, see Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843), reprinted in Selected Writings
39, 51-55 (David McLellan ed., 1977), and Sandel, supra note 603, at 60-65.
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Because they enjoy the capacity to exercise the citizenship (or personhood) lights as newly defined, persons formerly excluded become full
citizens (or come to be understood as flil persons). The wider scope of
citizenship or its equivalent brings with it a broader spectrum of backgrounds and experiences, and these in turn prompt another reexamination of the understanding of rights. As a result, there arise new understandings of all the terms of these relations, as unpredictably innovative
in their way as the discovery of new practical solutions through the recombination of diverse perspectives.
For example, arguments for religious toleration in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries affirmed belief in a Creator to be a condition of
citizenship, but held establishment of any religion an affront and a threat
to the sincerity of this devout acknowledgment. 61 1 Thus, the heretic and
infidel became citizens by admission to the extended community of sincere believers, even as sincere belief came, through this new association,
to partake of a kind of divinity independent of doctrine.
In the last century, questions about the relationship of sex and citizenship provide a practical illustration of the mutual dependence of
rights, capacities, and identities. The legal struggle for equality of the
sexes began with an effort to establish rights for women on the principle
that women have the same capacities as men, and therefore, that sex is
not an important characteristic of identity. 612 The strategy made sense

given that it opposed a legal regime in which sexual difference was taken
as the justification for inequality. In upholding a prohibition on the practice of law by women, the Supreme Court opined that "[t] he natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life." 613

Formal equality, 614 or sameness feminism, was a useful vehicle for
challenging this most basic denial of citizenship rights for women. Yet
the acceptance of women as full citizens posed an immediate difficulty,
for the fact is that men and women are alike in some ways and different
in others. With the battle for the most basic right of inclusion over, the
possibility arose that treating men and women as the same treated them
unequally because they are situated differently. How, for example, can
611. Most famously, Locke and, later, Burke avowed religious freedom and toleration,
but not for atheists. See Edmund Burke, Speech on a Bill for the Relief of Protestant
Dissenters (Mar. 17, 1773), in 7 The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke 21, 36
(1904);John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 51 (1.Tully ed., 1983) (1690).
612. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1115-16 (1997) (noting how
protest movements of the nineteenth century succeeded in removing some of the most

explicitly unequal aspects of marital property law).
613. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
614. See Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity Feminist Theoretical Approaches to
Child Custody and Same-Sex Relationships, 23 Stetson L. Rev. 701, 701 (1994) (describing
formal equality feminism as arguing that "[s]imilarly situated women and men should be
treated identically").
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and should the law take account of pregnancy? 615 And given the stillrecent victories in the name of sameness, how to speak of difference without risking the progress already made?616 Are separate colleges for women justifiable where they are not for men?617 Successive answers to
such questions simultaneously articulate a view of women as fully human
and of humans as gendered beings. And this mutual redefinition, in
turn, recasts our conceptions of both humanity and gender. These are
the latest legal questions in this area-and it is impossible to think about
the rights questions without inquiring after capacities and identities as
6 18
well.
In a closely related context, the fight to legalize same-sex unions
analogously sees the identification of the family with biological procreation as a capricious, even bigoted narrowing of a broader understanding
of marriage as the institution of abiding and responsible intimacy under
the aegis of the state. Should this argument succeed, the state will honor
the exchange of vows between gays or lesbians as any others.6 19 The possibility of discovering new and reconcilable understandings of rights once
held to be antagonistic becomes our compensation for the disappointment that rights are too closely tied in their meaning to particular contexts to be founded on unambiguous first principles once and for all.
Thus, experimentalist rights, in the sense of deeply entrenched immunities and benefits whose meaning and validity appear at once beyond
the reach of history and conflict yet to depend on both, are a pleonasm,
615. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and

American Law 56-60 (1990) (arguing that as long as the model employee is male,
accommodating women means treating them "specially," but once the benchmark itself is
pluralized, equal protection becomes possible); Sherry F. Colb, Words that Deny, Devalue,
and Punish: Judicial Responses to Fetus-Envy?, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 101, 127-39 (1992) (same).
616. This fear no doubt played at least as great a role in the feminist community's
lukewarm reception of the work of Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development (1982), as the (more academic) charge of
essentialism. See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Essay, 95 Yale LJ. 1373, 1380-81 (1936) (warning that Gilligan's work might become "the
Uncle Tom's Cabin of our century").
617. The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Virginia, striking down the
Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women, notes the lower court's observation that
single-sex education may have greater pedagogical benefits for females than for males. 116
S. Ct. 2264, 2277 n.8 (1996).
618. Indeed, the most sophisticated legal scholarship on the subject recognizes that
the very discussion of gender underscores both its power to organize social relations and its
contextual dependence on those relations. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist

Jurisprudence, 105 Yale LJ. 1 (1995) (advancing a conception of equality that permits
individuals to choose their gender without regard to their sex); Katherine M. Franke,
What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691 (1997) (arguing that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination because it reinforces sex-role stereotypes of men
as sexual subjects and women as sexual objects).
619. See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996).
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not an oxymoron. They are the only kind of rights that we actually have,
and what we know best. The history of the expansion of the franchise
and other rights of political participation from white male property owners, to white male citizens, to all male citizens, to all adult citizens-perhaps the master narrative of political and constitutional understandingis surely this general form of experimentalism writ large, and in blood. It
was precisely the commitment to democratic ideology that, at each step in
the redefinition of fights, enabled critics of the limited scope of citizenship to accuse their opponents of hypocrisy, and to rally their friends
when open struggle was unavoidable. Neither cynics nor sloppy historians, abolitionists who invoked the Declaration of Independence in support of the proposition that "all men are created equal" 620 were invoking
democracy's capacity to democratize itself, and so the canonical experimentalist capacity of revising a deep assumption in light of the experience it enables.
B. Pragmatist Conceptions of Rights in Existing Doctrine
The foregoing account of rights suggests that, however characterized
in existing constitutional understandings, rights are inevitably experimentalist, and indeed, careful examination of Supreme Court doctrine
reveals occasional recognition of this fact. We begin with cases of expressly experimentalist rights.
In a number of Warren Court decisions clarifying the protections
due suspected criminals, the Supreme Court developed, in the form of
what came to be called prophylactic rules, a jurisprudence of rights that
gives practical and potentially general effect to an experimentalist understanding of constitutional immunities and entitlements in context. In
Mapp v. Ohio, the Court required that evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment protection against illegal searches and seizures
be suppressed during the prosecution's case-in-chief.62 1 This exclusionary rule, the Court later explained, was not required by the Fourth
Amendment itself; rather, the rule was justified as a judicial deterrent to
unlawful police conduct. 622 In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court surveyed
the then-existing state use of psychological pressure to extract statements
from criminal suspects held in custody for questioning, and concluded
that these practices often rendered the resulting statements "compelled"
in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimina620. See Republican Platform of 1856, in 1 National Party Platforms 1840-1956, at 27,
27 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter eds., rev. ed. 1978) (relying on the Declaration as
a basis for Congress's power to prohibit slavery in the territories); Howard Jay Graham,
Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 4-5 (1954); Trisha Olson,
The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 347, 364 (1995).
621. 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961).
622. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-85 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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tion. 623 Accordingly, the Court disallowed the subsequent use of confes-

sions unless the prosecution "demonstrate [d] the use of procedural624safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."
Despite differences in their formulation, the rights that the Court
derived from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were experimental in an
important sense. In cases following Mapp, the Court insisted on the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a particular remedy while acknowledging that the Constitution did not immediately require it. In
contrast, the Miranda Court, despite finding the constitutional requirement of a remedy, held that it was a matter of constitutional indifference
what procedural safeguards a state adopted, so long as the privilege
against self-incrimination was protected. 625 Experimentation by law enforcement authorities would be permitted, but only if the alternative procedures they developed proved to be at least as effective as those prescribed by the Court in a baseline that has since become familiar: Prior
to commencing custodial interrogation, the police must apprise the suspect of his right to remain silent, his right to counsel (including free
counsel if he is indigent), and the consequences of waiving these
rights.62 6 The police must then honor a suspect's invocation of his
rights.62 7 Synthesizing these and other cases, commentators, and then
the Court, came to speak of both the exclusionary rule and the Miranda
rules as prophylactic.628 The Court adopts a prophylactic rule when it
identifies circumstances that threaten constitutional values, without necessarily being able to specify the causal chain by which the threat will
eventuate, and where, accordingly, it may both fix general preventive
measures and invite other actors, with better knowledge of the specifics,
629
to improve on them.

If the Constitution does not itself require the precise Miranda warnings or the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, from where does the
Court derive the authority to impose these requirements, even if only un623. 384 U.S. 436, 445-57 (1966).

624. Id. at 444.
625. See id. at 467 ("[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted.").
626. See id. at 468-69.
627. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (holding that police
interrogation of a suspect following his request to obtain counsel violated his Miranda

rights).
628. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 647 (1993) (White, J., dissenting);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657
(1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
423-25 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 251 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). For an
argument that most rules of law are in some sense prophylactic, see David A. Strauss, The
Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190, 195 (1988).
629. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-26 (1975).
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til the states do better?6 0 The leading attempts to explain prophylactic
rules63 ' do so-mistakenly, we think-by treating them as a response to
merely interstitial ambiguities in the larger body of what are supposed to
be well-defined constitutional rights. This view takes for granted Justice
Brandeis's famous observation in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that
"[t]here is no federal general common law." 63 2 Federal courts, by contrast with state courts of general jurisdiction, have no warrant to formulate basic norms of conduct absent a statute or a delegation of authority
by the Constitution. This circumscribed jurisdiction of the federal courts
still leaves the possibility, however, of federal common-law adjudication of
the presumably less basic norms that regulate conduct in the zones of
ambiguity in the interstices between the laws derived from these
sources. 63 3 On this view, decisions like Miranda and Mapp (as later
reimagined) are legitimate because in them the Court announces just
such rules of "constitutional common law," 63 4 or, in a closely related variant, merely exercises its traditional discretion in selecting a remedy upon
finding a violation of the primary (here constitutional) norms of
63 5
conduct.
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on these lines
has a straightforward appeal. The Constitution itself deems some
searches and seizures invalid and requires an adequate remedy for violations but is indifferent as between particular, adequate remedies. 63 6 The
combination of requirements and indifference legitimates the Court's decision to impose the exclusionary-rule remedy as an act of constitutional
common-law adjudication. Like conventional common-law adjudication,
it can be superseded by a contrary legislative decision (provided of
course, that the remedy chosen by the legislature is itself adequate).
But the idea of constitutional common law is, at most, a metaphor,
and an awkward, ultimately misleading one at that. For one thing, the
designation "common law" does not quite fit. When a state high court
630. For skeptical views about the legitimacy of this sort of judicial lawmaking, see
Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 791-92 (1994);
Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100, 124-56 (1985); Monaghan, supra note 629, at 21-23;
Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 761, 768-83 (1989).
631. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law. The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 881, 892 & n.42 (1986); Monaghan, supra note 629, at 20-26.
632. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
633. See HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405-22 (1964).
634. See, e.g., Field, supra note 631, at 892 n.42, 894 n.51.
635. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & DanielJ. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1777-91 (1991) (arguing that there
is considerable flexibility in selection of a remedy for a constitutional wrong).
636. See U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ... ").
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makes common law in the conventional sense (such as rules governing
torts, contracts, or property) there is one specific body that may supersede the court's choice: the legislature of the same state. Similarly, when
the federal courts make common law under a specific statutory grant of
authority, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 501,637 Congress alone has
the authority to supplant the Court's decisions. Conventionally understood, common law and statutory law work together to provide a single
regulatory regime. 638 In contrast, in the criminal procedure area, constitutional common law sets a default that may be followed by some states
and superseded by others. The question whether Congress may impose a
single solution for all of the states introduces further complications. If
constitutional common lav is like true common law, then conventional
preemption principles suggest that Congress has this power. On the
other hand, if the point of constitutional common law is to permit stateby-state flexibility and experimentation, then, allowing a unitary congressional regime to replace a provisional judicial regime appears to defeat
the experimental purpose of the "common law" category. These same
considerations make it clear that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule is no more a remedy in the traditional sense 63 9 than it is an instance
of common-law jurisprudence. Therefore, the explanation of Mapp as an
exercise of the traditional authority of the Court to select remedies, like
the notion of constitutional common law, conceals more than it
640
reveals.
We find more plausible the alternative view that finds the legitimacy
of prophylactic rules not by distinguishing them as a special class of adjudication, but rather by treating their characteristic, explicit recognition of
the two-fold ambiguities of rights on the one side and remedies on the
other as exemplary of the most general features of constitutional jurisprudence: by treating prophylactic rules, that is, as prototypes, rather than
exceptions. In this view, most closely associated with the work of David
Strauss, the notion of serviceably clear distinctions between firmly
grounded core rights and vaguer interstitial ones is simply wrong, because, in practice, we encounter just the kinds of ambiguity in the elabo637. Fed. R_ Evid. 501 (stating that in most federal question cases, the applicability of
a privilege "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be

interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience").
638. Cf. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 163-66 (1982)
(proposing a common law methodology for courts in interpreting statutes).
639. This is especially clear if we understand the primary intended beneficiaries of the
Fourth Amendment to be law-abiding citizens. Under such an approach, a guilty person
concealing a crime but searched illegally is entitled to relief primarily because giving such
a guilty person a "remedy" will deter illegal searches of the innocent. See Sherry F. Colb,
Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 1456, 1496 (1996).
640. The remedy model is poorly suited, moreover, to cases such as Miranda,in which
the very determination whether there has been a violation is made via a prophylactic rule.
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ration of the former that, in the constitutional common-law view, we associate with the latter. 641
Strauss advances this argument with examples of rules that embody
core constitutional protections against majority decisionmaking such as
free speech and equal protection. The Supreme Court's First
Amendment decisions make a critical distinction between content-based
and content-neutral restrictions on speech, 64 2 and judge the former
under a stricter standard of review than the latter. 643 The distinction
does not, however, immediately follow from the text of the First Amendment, which simply prohibits laws "abridging the freedom of speech. '644
The reason the Court views content-based measures with suspicion,
Strauss points out, is that these are "likely to have been influenced by the
legislature's hostility to the speech in question."645 Because it will too
often be impossible to discern the legislature's actual motives and because of the risk that the Court's own views of the value of speech would
infect case-by-case balancing, the Court uses content-discrimination as a
proxy for what may be its ultimate concern: regulations that strike at
speech because it expresses a disfavored view.64 6
Thus, just like the Miranda safeguards, rules about content-based
and content-neutral laws "are relatively rigid doctrines designed to reduce the likelihood that the authorities (generally legislatures in the case
of the first amendment, the police in the case of Miranda)will violate the
law, and designed to improve a reviewing court's chances of identifying
violations where they occur."6 4 7 Just as we might say that the "real" Fifth
Amendment does not require Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation, 648 so we might say that the "real" First Amendment does not
require strict scrutiny of all content-based regulations of speech. 6 49 The
fact that the Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is labeled prophylactic while its jurisprudence of the First Amendment is not, at best imperfectly reflects the Court's view about the relative importance of these
650
rights, but it reflects no deep reality.
641. See Strauss, supra note 628, at 195 ("Constitutional law is filled with rules that
are justified in ways that are analytically indistinguishable from the justifications for the
Mirandarules.").
642. See Dorf, supra note 607, at 1200-01; Strauss, supra note 628, at 198.
643. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
46, 50 (1987) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions typically uphold content-neutral
regulations of speech under a very deferential standard).
644. U.S. Const. amend. I.
645. Strauss, supra note 628, at 200.
646. We do not mean to suggest that such viewpoint hostility is the only concern of
free speech law. See Dorf, supra note 607, at 1200-10. This concern does, however, justify
the Court's use of a stricter standard for judging content-based regulations. See id.
647. Strauss, supra note 628, at 200.
648. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
649. See Strauss, supra note 628, at 201-03.
650. Strauss makes the same point concerning two doctrines relating to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 204-07. First, laws employing
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Although the Court has expressly authorized experimentation with
respect to Miranda and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, it has
not similarly authorized experimentation with the rules implementing all
constitutional rights. Strauss's analysis, however, suggests that this reflects a confusion about the nature of prophylactic rules, 651 and we agree.
Wherever judicially established rules comprise an effort to give effect to
more deeply established but vaguer legal norms, the judicial doctrine
may be regarded as prophylactic, or, if one adopts an experimentalist
attitude, as prescribing presumptive rules to be applied until experience
provides a better alternative.
Before looking more directly at the implications for an experimentalistjudiciary of this generalization of the idea of prophylactic rules to all
rights, we must address three likely criticisms to the argument presented
in this Part so far. First is the concern that openly questioning the "reality" of rights and the Constitution as a whole puts the frame of our government up for grabs in just the way the very existence of a vitten constitution is meant to obstruct, and incites us to imagine horrors, such as an
experimental return to slavery, that may attain a reality in the imagining.
To use a somewhat less drastic example, it might be thought that maintaining the fiction of absolute rights to free speech keeps infringements
on speech to a minimum. 652 Openly acknowledging that the Emperor
has no clothes, on this view, in fact contributes to his nakedness.
But after nearly a century of legal realist critique of foundational
rights, it seems that (to mix the metaphor) the cat is already out of the
bag. Experimentalism does not name an alternative to the identification
of Platonic rights. It names an organized, considered alternative to a haphazard mixture of metaphysical nonsense and ungrounded speculation
about empirical matters. Moreover, this first criticism reflects, in a new
form, a confusion between general, theoretical skepticism and actual
doubt that we have encountered several times before. Recall the pragmatist argument about the impossibility of such generalized skepticism, and
its challenge to us to abandon by force of will even one part of the mass
of ideas we hold true. The outcome of the dispute between the foundaracial classifications are presumptively invalid (subject to strict scrutiny), and second, social
and economic legislation that neither employs a suspect classification nor infringes upon a
fundamental right is presumptively valid (subject to rational basis scrutiny). As Strauss
notes, we might think of these rules as implementing the "real" Equal Protection Clause.
Although racial classifications could be scrutinized for prejudice on a case-by-case basis,
our national experience with race argues for a (prophylactic) presumption that they are
invalid. Similarly, the relative toothlessness of rational basis review for most social and
economic legislation reflects the view that the legislature is in a better position to make the
kinds of balancing judgments that such rules require, and its judgment should therefore
be respected. See id.
651. See id. at 195 ("'Prophylactic' rules are, in an important sense, the norm, not the
exception.").
652. For a useful summary of the debate on this question, see Gerald Gunther &
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1031-32 (13th ed. 1997).
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tionalists and antifoundationalists sustains the pragmatist view in a setting
immediately relevant here: The discovery that rights at the most abstract
level are not "real" in the sense of having firm foundations led, we saw,
not to skepticism about the existence of rights but rather to a reaffirmation of their importance as central to our identity. Surely our revulsion at
slavery does not diminish upon learning that the constitutional prohibition of it rests on the interpretation-compelling enough to rally the
Union-of certain norms, and ensuing amendments, rather than on universal rights revealed to our forebearers and forever fixed in principle.
The second criticism in crucial ways reverses the first. It accepts the
pervasive ambiguity of rights and accuses proponents of anything like the
experimentalism developed here not of exacerbating, but rather of downplaying the significance of that ambiguity. When deeply held values clash
in the interpretation of rights to abortion or (more abstractly) equal protection, this argument goes, only political struggle, entwined with normative debate, and not any device so tame as prophylactic rules, decides the
outcome. 65 3 Thus, this objection replaces the distinction between core
rights and interstitial or peripheral ones with a distinction between a core
of "really" contested rights that get fought out, and a peripheral mass of
merely contested or contestable ones susceptible, perhaps, to experimentalist tinkering.
But where the first objection overstates the vulnerability of rights in
practice to skepticism, the second understates their practical accessibility
to redefinition through reinterpretation in new contexts and combinations. Because new understandings of rights in one context in time ramify to others, the distinction between a "really" contested core and merely
contested periphery is no more stable than the earlier one. A crude indication of this is that the rights associated with the greatest conflict in one
period are seldom the same as the most conflicting rights in another-for
the understandings of personhood, citizenship, and sovereignty on
which, we saw, rights and conflicts about them depend will have changed.
Sometimes conflicts are indeed settled by naked political force, not experimentalist discovery of hidden possibilities, and the tranquility surrounding a right in one epoch is thus the outcome of a fight in a preceding one. 654 But the nature of such struggles as they bear on the

Constitution and its amendment has itself changed in history, and may be
changing again in a way that widens the scope of experimentalist rights
653. Note that phrased this way, the criticism may be voiced by those who embrace
deep moral deliberation by judges, see, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 14, at 343-47, as well as
those who would instead commit it to politics, see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Role
of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 Yale LJ. 1501,
1533-38 (1989) (book review).
654. See Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a
Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 Geo. LJ. 1837, 1845-46 (1997) (describing the
current consensus that sex discrimination is inconsistent with a principle of human

equality as the product of a past struggle).
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jurisprudence. 655 In any case, we will be at pains in a moment to demonstrate how such ajurisprudence, generalizing prophylactic rules, can encourage the exploration of new understandings of dignity and entitlement even in situations that count, by any standard, as really contested.
Still there remains a third objection, which, if true, trumps the earlier ones and moots our exhortation to consider rights in context. This
third objection, unlike the first two, accepts an experimentalist conception of rights. Indeed, it goes our exhortation one better by soberly observing that the very prophylactic rules that we would put at the center of
a new experimentalism have in fact been as rigidly applied as any standard rule of formal doctrine. Anyone familiar with the way the Miranda
rules and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule are actually used,
and, more important, with the unwillingness of states to accept the
Court's invitation to improve on its baseline, will be tempted to laugh out
loud at the suggestion that such could be the basis for a democratization
of rights jurisprudence. Before proceeding, therefore, we must present
an explanation of the practical failure to make use of the doctrinal possibility, and indicate the kinds of institutional changes that would allow the
courts to encourage and then evaluate experimental articulation of constitutional rights.
C. Institutional Correlates
Accompanying the Supreme Court's announcement of the Miranda
rules was the following invitation:
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights
of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity
656
to exercise it, the [Court's own] safeguards must be observed.
On the surface, the Court's framework in Miranda looks very much
like an exercise in democratic experimentalism. The Court identifies a
set of practices as problematic under the Constitution. It formulates a
benchmark that fixes the minimum necessary to comply with the
Constitution. Recognizing that its benchmark is just that, and that experimentation may yield solutions which safeguard the rights of suspects as
well or better, while allowing more effective law enforcement, the Court
announces that jurisdictions may depart from the benchmark upon a
proper showing. One might then expect the states and the federal government to devise a variety of alternative approaches. Yet that did not
occur.
655. See infra text accompanying notes 708-720.
656. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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Although Mirandawas initially met with hostility by law enforcement
agencies, 657 this hostility was not matched by exertions to devise alternative procedures for safeguarding the right to silence. In fact, in 1968, the
year after the Miranda decision itself, Congress enacted a provision that
purported to partially overrule Miranda, by making voluntariness the
65 8
touchstone of admissibility of suspects' statements in federal court.
That statute, which the federal government has declined to invoke in the
Supreme Court, 6 5 9 clearly does not qualify as a response to the Court's
invitation. 6 60 It does not even purport to provide an alternate means of
safeguarding the suspect's right to silence. It simply denies the existence
of such a right,6 61 and thus violates that portion of Mirandawhich is not
subject to experimentation.
Nor have the states been especially eager to experiment in this area.
New York prohibits all postindictment questioning of a suspect without a
waiver of the right to silence in the presence of counsel. 662 New York also
requires as a precondition to the validity of a waiver that a suspect who
has a lawyer be permitted to consult the lawyer prior to waiver. 665 These
requirements, however, are in addition to the Miranda requirements. The
New York Court of Appeals interprets the New York Constitution as providing greater protection against interrogation than the federal
Constitution (in much the same way as the New York Court of Appeals
interprets other state constitutional provisions as providing greater protection than their federal constitutional counterparts.) 6 6 That, of
course, is a perfectly legitimate approach to state constitutional interpretation, 66 5 but it does not in any way respond to the Court's specific invitation in Miranda.
657. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500, 501 (observing that Miranda was
"[w]idely maligned at first").
658. See Act ofJune 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 210, 210 (codified

as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)-(b) (1994)).
659. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.* (1994) (noting the
government's failure to invoke the statute).
660. For an argument to the contrary, see Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A

Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 123-32 (contending that the statutory
provision is a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
The Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), casts further doubt

on Burt's already dubious reading of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
661. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), (b) (asserting that a confession shall be admissible if

found to be voluntary).
662. See People v. Samuels, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1347 (N.Y. 1980).
663. See People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896 (N.Y. 1976).
664. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1332-37 (N.Y. 1992) (interpreting the
New York State Constitution to provide greater protection against searches and seizures of

open fields than the Supreme Court interprets the federal Constitution to provide); see
also id. at 1331-32 (listing numerous cases in which the New York Constitution has been

held to provide greater protection than the federal Constitution).
665. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 548-52 (1986)
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One unlikely explanation for this inaction is that the Court's modest
estimation of its own solution notwithstanding, the Mirandawarnings are
the best means of safeguarding the suspect's right. How better to inform
a suspect of his right to remain silent than simply to tell him prior to
subjecting him to custodial interrogation? This answer may be correct,
but one can have little confidence in it, given that there has been so little
practical experience with alternatives. Indeed, there is reason to believe
that the warnings are not especially effective in preventing coerced
666
confessions.
Of course, the very ineffectiveness of the warnings may explain the
states' reluctance to experiment. The provision of warnings is a relatively
simple procedure for police to follow; it does not impede interrogation;
and it ensures that a statement obtained from the suspect will be admissible in court. In short, despite their initial objections to an apparently
cumbersome procedure, law enforcement authorities may have grown
fond of the default procedures selected by the Miranda Court. Most of
the reform proposals (such as New York's requirement of counsel or the
suggestion that custodial interrogation be abolished altogether) 6 67 would
place further limits on police conduct without simultaneously empowering the police in other ways. It is thus not wholly surprising that there has
been so little experimentation.
Were this the only area in which the federal and state governments
have declined the possibility of experimentation, we might simply conclude that law enforcement officials like, or at least have learned to live
with, Miranda. But the same cannot be said of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. Police hostility to the exclusionary rule is well known,
and leads to the equally well-known but nonetheless disturbing phenome(urging state courts to provide their citizens greater protection for their rights under state
constitutions than the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes under the federal Constitution);
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489, 503 (1977) (same). For a lively debate on the theoretical basis for this
power, compare James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 761 (1992) and Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1147 (1993), with Daniel R. Gordon,
Superconstitutions Saving the Shunned: The State Constitutions Masquerading as
Weaklings, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 965 (1994), Burt Neuborne, A Brief Response to Failed
Discourse, 24 Rutgers L.J. 971 (1993), and David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State
Constitutionalism, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 274 (1992).
666. The most comprehensive analysis of the empirical studies conducted in
Miranda's immediate wake indicates that the case resulted in a small decline in confession
rates, no discernible change in police interrogation practices after the giving of warnings,
and at most a small decline in the overall effectiveness of criminal investigation. See
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 621, 645
(1996). Leo's own study found that seventy-eight percent of suspects waived their Miranda
rights, and that suspects with prior felony records were four times more likely to invoke
their rights than were suspects with no prior criminal record. See id. at 654-55.
667. See Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the
Abolition of Custodial Interrogation, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 69, 109-13 (1989).
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non of widespread police perjury. 6 68 The hostility is hardly surprising:
The rule requires that reliable evidence of guilt be discarded to deter
unconstitutional police practices. 6 69 Although Miranda too sometimes
requires suppression of evidence, it is crucially different from the perspective of the police. 670 Mirandasets forth relatively clear rules that are
easy to follow and have predictable consequences, whereas the limits of
acceptable police conduct under the Fourth Amendment are considerably more ambiguous. 67 ' As a consequence, police often believe that exclusion under the Fourth Amendment is an unfair penalty.
In light of the animosity that law enforcement authorities feel towards the exclusionary rule, one might expect significant efforts on the
part of states and localities to devise a substitute that would satisfy the
672
Court. Although there has been no shortage of academic proposals,
here too there has been almost no actual experimentation.
Whatever other reasons contributed to the failure of the states and
the federal government to experiment with alternative procedural
frameworks in the Miranda and Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
contexts, 673 one factor stands out. The Court did not provide the states
with a secure environment within which to experiment.
Consider the incentives facing a state legislator who believes that she
can provide as much or greater protection for Fourth or Fifth
Amendment rights as the Court's defaults do, and with fewer costs for law
enforcement. For concreteness, assume that the legislator wishes to replace the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule with a comprehensive system of civil liability, including punitive damages, municipal liability, class
actions, attorney's fees, and streamlined administrative review. 674 Let us
also assume that the legislator's preliminary research, based on theoreti668. See Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. Grim. L. &
Criminology 693, 698-701 (1996).
669. For an analysis of the interests served by exclusion and the Fourth Amendment
more generally, see Colb, supra note 639, at 1459-61.
670. Beyond the difference mentioned next, Miranda warnings differ from the

exclusionary rule because, by seeking to reduce the pressure on suspects, they sometimes
directly prevent a coerced confession from an innocent suspect. See Withrow v. Williams,
507 U.S. 680, 690-92 (1993) (drawing this contrast between Miranda and the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule).
671. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (adopting "totality of the

circumstances" test for judging probable cause).
672. Most involve some combination of civil damages awards and internal review.
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 630, at 811-16 (advocating enterprise civil liability, punitive
damages, attorney's fees, class actions, injunctive relief, and expedited proceedings);
Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49, 56

(proposing a tort remedy).
673. As a general matter, it could be argued that state legislators are naturally riskaverse, and thus unlikely to experiment, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9J. Legal Stud. 593, 594 (1980), absent
specific incentives of the sort described below.
674. See Amar, supra note 630, at 811-16.
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cal models and experience in other jurisdictions, suggests that the new
remedial system will result in fewer illegal searches and seizures than the
exclusionary rule does. The legislator cannot know this for sure, however, both because of the uncertainty of such comparisons and because
she cannot predict in advance what criteria the courts will use to compare
the alternative and the default. Under these circumstances, it would be
very risky to adopt the alternative, because if the courts ultimately find
that it does not measure up to the default, criminals convicted in the
6 75
interim will have to be retried and perhaps released.
As we saw in Part I, private-sector learning by monitoring does not
occur unless collaboration is organized to reduce the risks of increased
vulnerability to a level acceptable given the potential gains from experimentation. 676 Similarly, the mere invitation to the states to seek advantages through experimentation is ineffective without mechanisms to reduce the associated risks. Yet nothing in the Court's account of the
"prophylactic" nature of Miranda and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does this.
What guarantee can be given to states that experiments will not result in post hoc liability? The logic of the argument so far suggests a form
of temporary immunity to operate on the same lines as the bar on preenforcement litigation in the administrative context. Of course, the experimental impulse must not be permitted to erode constitutional guarantees. Constitutional rightholders, especially if they are putative
criminals, do not fare especially weli in majoritarian politics. "Alternatives" like the federal statute purporting to overrule Miranda could readily become the norm in the absence of real oversight. Yet requiring states
and localities to qualify for immunity in advance, through ajudicial hearing-in which they explained the goals of their particular solution, reasons for believing it more effective than the benchmark, and suggested
measures for assessing if it did-would act as a major impediment to experimentation. Moreover, it would require judicial assessment of a proposed experiment prior to the accumulation of the sort of information
necessary to judge it.
The challenge is to devise a mechanism of judicial review that discourages sham experiments, while not requiring bona fide experiments
to pass through a potentially stifling and uninformed preclearance mechanism. One of many possible methods of reconciling these competing
pressures would be the creation of a new category (or new categories) of
explicitly experimental constitutional adjudication. Under current doc-

675. Cf. Fallon &Meltzer, supra note 635, at 1739 ("It was much easier for the Court
to lay down the Miranda rules, for example, knowing that the prison doors need not
necessarily swing open for every inmate convicted with the aid of confessions not preceded
by the requisite warnings.").
676. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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trine, a state policy or practice either is or is not constitutional. 677 Courts
have no opportunity to rule that a proposed experiment was well
designed in the sense that it was based on the input of an acceptable cross
section of interested parties; that it considered their perspectives; that, on
its face, the proposal had some reasonable likelihood of succeeding in
giving effect to the relevant constitutional guarantee; and that it gave serious attention to that guarantee.
By way of illustration we propose that the Court, when evaluating a
state's effort to defend an ongoing experiment or to extend one from
smaller subjurisdictions of the state to larger ones, choose from one of
three possibilities within the new category of adjudication. First, it should
be able to declare the experiment a contingent success and allow expansion. Second, it should be able to declare the experiment to have been
ex ante legitimate but an ex post failure. Such a declaration would preclude expansion or continuation without significant modification but
would not provide affected parties with retrospective relief. Third, sham
experiments should give rise to both retrospective and prospective relief
(although the court might well invite the parties to help formulate the
remedy). Necessarily, judicial review would be more deferential in the
early, local stages of an experiment but less so as the state compiles data
about its effectiveness.
The sorts of factors that bear on whether an experiment was ex ante
permissible are the same ones discussed in our general account of the
role of courts in democratic experimentalism in Part V.D. All identifiable
parties, including groups representing the interests of future defendants,
should be permitted to participate in the formulation and monitoring of
the experiment. Both plaintiffs and defendants would invoke comparisons with the best practice in similarly situated jurisdictions. And so
forth.
This sketch suggests, moreover, that there is no reason to limit the
benchmark to the Court's initial minimum, as in Miranda (and by assumption in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cases). Suppose,
to return to our hypothetical example, that experimentation in State A
reveals that expedited civil damages and continuous police training lead
to greater compliance with the Fourth Amendment than does the exclusionary rule, and at no greater cost. Then practices in State B should be
measured by the experience of State A, rather than the lesser threshold
initially set by the Court. In this way, experimentalism provides ever
more rigorous benchmarks, and rights, to use the language of the earlier
discussion of administrative rules, are rolling too.

677. For an intriguing suggestion to the contrary, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. 2258, 2292-93 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the
Court's decision to sustain Washington's prohibition on physician-assisted suicide could be
reconsidered on the basis of future experiments).
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D. The TransformativePotentialof ExperimentalistMethods
Thus far we have described the experimentalist conception of rights,
provided some evidence that current Supreme Court doctrine already incorporates important experimentalist insights, suggested a far-reaching
generalization of that doctrine, and prescribed curatives to render experimentalist understandings of rights more effective. We now turn to the
task of explaining what experimentalist rights are. But where our earlier
discussion was conceptual, here it is practical; by answering the question,
"how are experimentalist rights discovered and implemented?" we also
answer the question, "what are experimentalist rights?" The examples
move from "merely" contested to "really" contested rights. We thus illustrate the most salient features of experimentalist-rights jurisprudence as a
dispute shifts from "merely" how to apply a generally acknowledged right
to whether a right "really" exists in the first place.
Consider first the fusion of prophylactic and rolling best-practice
rules currently in progress under the name of "adequacy litigation" in
cases successfully seeking to enforce a right to education. In the quarter
century since San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,678 petitions urging enforcement of such a right have been addressed to state
courts. 679 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court, declining on grounds of federalism to interfere with the states' traditional responsibility for education, rejected an equal protection challenge to the financing of public
school education through local property taxes as supplemented, but not
equalized, by state grants. 6 0 Appeals were made at the state level, not
merely because of the obstacle of this precedent, but also because many
state constitutions contain broad guarantees of equality in general and,
6 81
beyond that, of minimal or adequate education.
The innovation of recent years has been a shift from suits seeking
equal treatment of school children, as measured by the equality of resources available per capita, to suits seeking to enforce the right to a minimally adequate education for all. Again, obstruction encouraged the
search for a new path: Plaintiffs in legal challenges based on equality
were often unsuccessful, 682 not least because of the divisive character of
claims pitting community against community; and even when equalitybased challenges succeeded, 63 3 state constitutions could sometimes be
amended to undo judicially imposed funding equalization (as in
678. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
679. See infra notes 686-690 and accompanying text.
680. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-44.
681. See Julie K. Undenood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 493, 497-98, 500 (1995).
682. See id. at 501-02 (noting the failure of fumding challenges in Kansas, Illinois,
Virginia, North Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin).
683. See id. at 501 (citing NewJersey, Massachusetts, Alabama, Tennessee, Missouri,
Kentucky, Texas, and Montana).
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California) .684 Worse still, equal funding, once finally secured, often did
not increase the quality of education in poorer districts. The obvious alternative, given the corresponding guarantees in state constitutions, was
to focus on adequacy rather than equality of education.
As the earlier discussion of experimentalism would suggest, this shift
went hand in hand with an increasing emphasis on measurement, and
the constant adjustment of measures to experience. 68 5 Thus, a recent
account addressed to practitioners of educational-reform litigation in
Alabama, presents adequacy litigation, at the core, as a problem in identifying a legally and practically effective combination of measures of educational input and output:68 6 input standards 687 to indicate whether it is at
all possible for a school district to meet its constitutional obligations, and
output standards 688 to determine whether, given appropriate inputs, the
school district is actually fulfilling its obligations. 68 9 As these standards
are typically rolling benchmarks set by various professional and publicprivate entities at the state, regional, and national levels, courts are thus
being asked, and in many cases are agreeing, to decide whether the public-school authorities are complying with their obligations by determining
their conformity to current best practices. Thus, a prophylactic rule giving expression to and protecting a right to an adequate education is specified as an experimentalist rolling rule that takes account of performance
in other districts and states.
Now consider, as an instance of a clash of rights so sharp as to raise
the questions of whether some of the clashing rights "really" exist, a dispute between Georgetown University and a coalition of gay and lesbian
Georgetown law school students. 690 Georgetown, affiliated with the
Roman Catholic Church, refused to recognize a group of gay and lesbian
students and to accord them the privileges, including use of an office on

684. See WilUiam H. Clune, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 481, 489 (1995).
685. See supra Part II.
686. See Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The
Alabama Example, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 559, 592-94 (1995) (discussing Alabama
Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-91-0117-R, 1993 WL 204083, at *1 (Ala. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 1, 1993) (finding that the state was in violation of its legal obligation to provide
students with an adequate and equitable education)).
687. Input standards concern, for example, the definition of adequate textbooks,
educational supplies, school facilities, and guidance and library services. See id. at 569
(discussing state statutory requirements).

688. Output standards concern, for example, drop-out rates, performance on various
kinds of tests, or readiness for further education or work. See id. at 581.
689. For an account of the typical measures, see Eric A. Hanushek, When School
Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 Harv.J. on Legis. 423, 426-41 (1991).
690. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).
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campus, normally due recognized student groups. 69 1 The student coalition sued under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977,
which prohibits discriminatory denial of services or facilities by educa6 92
tional institutions for, among other reasons, sexual orientation.
Georgetown responded that to compel its recognition of an organization
advancing the interests of gays would be to coerce affirmation of practices
it finds immoral, in violation of its own rights to free speech and the free
693
exercise of religion.
On appeal to the District's highest court, Judge Mack resolved the
case with a simple device that appeared to split the baby, but in fact
opened the possibility of moving beyond framing the case in terms of
irreconcilable demands: Georgetown would not be compelled to recognize
the coalition, in violation of its convictions, but would nonetheless be
obliged to furnish the office and other facilities that would normally be
provided recognized student associations. 694 Thus the university community was distinguished from the Catholic fellowship. Gays were accorded
full rights in the university community on conditions that did not directly
affront the citizenship rights of the Catholic fellowship. The decision, to
be sure, was attacked from the one side as an outrage to the integrity of
those who find homosexuality immoral 695 and on the other as an offer of
second-class citizenship to gays entitled to unqualified recognition of
their rights. 696 But we note that the decision was defended by a distin-

guished law professor at Georgetown, himself an advisor to the student
coalition, as a contribution to the reconciliation of the gay and Catholic
communities, and, beyond that, as a small step in the larger process of
integrating gays into full citizenship on the model, discussed earlier, by
which nonconforming believers were included in the polity in preceding
centuries. 697 Whether Georgetown and the larger society will take the
further steps necessary to complete the process remains an open question, but the beginning of even partial engagement offers at least some
reasons to be hopeful. For once mutual engagement begins, some form
of transformation of the actors becomes unavoidable.
A recent wide-ranging reconsideration of affirmative action by Susan
Sturm and Lani Guinier suggests how the kind of redefinition of apparently irreconcilable rights that the Georgetown case promises can be
combined with the practical experimentalism of rolling rules so that continuing assessment of current experience can inform our deep and pas691. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 Yale
LJ. 2411, 2431-32 (1997).
692. See D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2520 (1981).
693. See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 20-26.
694. See id. at 38-39.
695. See id. at 71, 74 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
696. See id. at 49-54 (Ferren, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part).
697. See Eskridge, supra note 691, at 2447-56.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

sionately held ideas of lights in relation to personhood in context. 698
The starting point of their analysis is the connection between affirmative
action as originally conceived and the model of the mass-production
firm, and the implications for the former of the breakdown of the latter.
Work in mass-production firms, they observe, was typically a sequence of
tasks, each fixed in itself and equipping those who performed it to proceed to the next and more demanding one.6 99 Workers were presumed
to be homogeneous except for differences in skill, reflecting increasing
experience within the firm itself. Under this assumption, the problem
for excluded groups was simply to gain entry, for participation automatically led to advancement; and the way to gain entry was to be given some
preferential treatment (in the form, say, of supplementary points) on
whatever standard entrance examination was routinely used to select new
employees. 70 0 But debate about the benefits of equity and the disadvantages of the divisiveness of this method, although they continue, are simply moot when the context of work changes with the restructuring of the
economy. As firms, for reasons we examined earlier, abandon mass production, they come to value diversity as a contribution to the capacity for
problem solving in teams evaluating distinct projects and problems from
alternate points of view.7 0 ' Indeed, the search for employees, and discussion or trial experience with candidates, becomes a way of determining
eventual definition of the job to be filled. Thus, experience outside the
firm counts, and the only way to determine whether someone fits well in
a particular team setting is to see how he or she performs in it. 70 2
Under these circumstances, discussion of affirmative action begins to
shift from the advisability and effectiveness of preferential treatment on
standard tests to the possibilities of organizing internships and apprenticeships that help residents of particular communities acquire the portfolio of experiences they need to make contributions that afford careers
in the emerging flexible economy. Ideas of personal competence, in
turn, will change as a broader experience of diversity reveals abilities with
surprising origins. As leaming to organize such internships and apprenticeships will be a matter of experience, experimentalist techniques of
benchmarking will help identify broadly inclusive and effective methods,
and so shape and enlarge our notions of worthiness. Thus, a new form of
affirmative action, reflecting and respecting the context of the world in
which it is affirmed, may one day be the model of an experimentalist
right directly connecting practical activity with our understanding of ourselves in relation to each other.
698. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 1008-36 (1996).
699. See id. at 1003-07 (describing the breakdown of this model).
700. See id. at 968-1008.
701. See supra Part II.
702. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 698, at 1003-08.
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And yet an important doubt remains. For rightholders denied relief
during the pendency of an experiment, justice is, for that time, denied.
For them, and others who may come into their situation, it would seem
that experimentalism substitutes utilitarian projects for fundamental
rights. But this is a reflection within experimentalism of a problem of
constitutional law in general and not a dilemma peculiar to our program.
Under existing free-speech doctrine, for instance, whether the government may enforce a time, place, or manner regulation depends in part
on whether the government leaves open adequate alternative channels of
communication. 70 3 Whether, for example, leafletting is an adequate substitute for a sound truck70 4 depends in part on a normative judgment
about how important the medium is as a component of the message, but
it also depends on the empirical question of how people respond to
sound trucks on the one hand and leafletters on the other. Whether a
twenty-four-hour waiting period is an undue burden on a woman's right
to abortion 70 5 depends in part on a normativejudgment about the value
of additional reflection before important decisions, but also on empirical
questions about how difficult it is for women in various regions to make
two trips to abortion providers. District courts sometimes make findings
of fact about such questions, but they are poorly situated to do so on a
systematic basis. Legislatures have greater fact-finding ability but, absent
judicial pressure, may incline to undervalue individual rights.
Thus, we do not face a choice between experimentation or no experimentation. The status quo is an ongoing, albeit haphazard, experiment.
Between that kind of experiment and a more democratically and systematically organized one, we think the choice is easy.
CONCLUSION

In proposing an experimentalist renewal that redirects American
constitutionalism to current tasks while reanimating its connection to the
founding inspiration, we have slighted questions of constitutional history
and amendment that, because of the nature of the Constitution, are central to contemporary debate. By way of conclusion, therefore, we indicate
how our program of reform, conceived largely outside the categories of
that debate, may nonetheless contribute to a reexamination of them.
Prior to the American Revolutionary period, a "constitution" was the
ensemble of public institutions, law, and custom, as directed by their
stamina vitae, or animating principles. 70 6 This notion of a constitution as
the totality of government as it is, usually coupled with acceptance of par703. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
704. See Dorf, supra note 607, at 1210.
705. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 1J.).
706. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 175
(1967).
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liamentary supremacy, still describes English constitutionalism. 70 7 In the
United States, however, and indeed throughout most of the world, the
Revolutionary period transformed constitutionalism. To render coherent
the claim that duly enacted Acts of Parliament nonetheless violated the
legal rights of the colonists required that existing arrangements be measured by, rather than be definitive of, the constitution. 70 8 Combined with
the emerging notion of popular sovereignty, this reversal of perspective
made it a short but nonetheless revolutionary step to the view that a legitimate constitution was an explicit, entrenched, and therefore enduring
expression of We The People's understanding
of self-rule: written down,
70 9
popularly approved, and difficult to amend.
Given the deliberate difficulty of amendment, the great challenge
for constitutionalism of the American sort is the accommodation of
change. If government is only legitimate when acting in conformity with
a written-that is to say, fixed-constitution, how can government adapt
to the changing needs of society? Chief Justice John Marshall's classic
answer, formulated in what, in his day, was an expansive interpretation of
Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce, was that constitutional provisions empowering government action may be construed
broadly to enable responses to new exigencies. There was, he thought,
no alternative to this continuing interpretive adjustment, given the inevitable ambiguity of general constitutional language.7 10 The modem
Court extended this idea to include broad interpretation notjust of powers, but of individual rights to freedom and equality in response to changing circumstance. This extension is especially controversial because it authorizes the judiciary to invalidate the legislative work of the democracy,
whereas broad interpretivism of the original Marshallian sort was invoked
to validate it.
This specific variant of the countermajoritarian difficulty aside, the
generalization of the Marshallian solution to both powers and rights
raises a new and deeper difficulty for constitutionalism: How can an effective constitution, written in broad terms that are themselves broadly
construed, correspond to the revolutionary ideal of a fixed, framing document, derived from popular sovereignty, that checks the abuses of govemment? At the limit, broad interpretivism reinvents the older, English
conception of constitutionalism, substituting judicial for parliamentary
supremacy. However, broad interpretivism also acknowledges that the
707. See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 39 (10th
ed. 1959).
708. See Bailyn, supra note 706, at 176-82.
709. See id. at 183-84.
710. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (stating that "[a]
constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers
will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human
mind").
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product of the ultimate authority (nowjudicial rather than legislative) is
itself constitutive of the Constitution.
Restorationists, we noted at the outset, balk at this description, and
reassert what they claim to be original understandings of the
Constitution. Yet, the manifest impracticality of their proposed solutions7 1 demonstrates an unillingness to take seriously the problem of
drastically changed circumstances. Conversely, those who embrace a
frankly evolutionary model of the Constitution must answer not only to
the countermajoritarian difficulty, but also provide a modem variant of
the Marshallian synthesis to show how powers and rights can be adjusted
to circumstance without affront to the idea of the Constitution as an entrenched document. For most practitioners and scholars of constituto
tional law, the result is an uneasy truce between the demands of fidelity
71 2
reality.
modem
of
demands
the
and
understanding
the original
The most ingenious and ambitious of contemporary attempts to resolve the conflict, that of Bruce Ackerman, focuses, accordingly, on the
problem of amendment. 7 13 Siding with the originalists and against the
evolutionists, Ackerman acknowledges popular ratification of amendments as the only legitimate source of constitutional authority.71 4 His
innovation is the argument, and accompanying historical demonstration,
that the notion of Article V amendment has itself been amended in the
course of constitutional dispute. It includes forms, not explicit in the
Constitution, that provide an answer to the problem of entrenched adjustment. In particular, Ackerman contends that the Constitution has, in
fact, from time to time been amended by popular expressions of higher
lawmaking authority even when no change in the constitutional text resulted. 7 15 This theory of "constitutional moments" sharply distinguishes
between the vast stretches of ordinary politics of vote trading and the
short, intense periods of higher lawmaking. 7 16 In the latter, citizens,
moved by crisis, sustain en masse the deliberative politics of public virtue
that the civic republican tradition holds necessary to constitutional
change. This deliberation en masse both amends and ratifies amendment
of the Constitution, adjusting it to changed circumstance and publicizing
the adjustment even if there is no change of the text by procedures originally anticipated. In other words, just as the meaning of rights changes
with their historical context, so too does the meaning and procedure of
amendment.
711. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (urging a return to the original understanding of the Commerce Clause).
712. See Michael C. Doff, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 86 Geo. L.J. 1765, 1795-96 (1997).
713. See generally Ackerman, supra note 15.
714. See id. at 264 (arguing that the Supreme Court should defend constitutional text
and amendments, however radically defined, against the gradual change of ordinary

politics).
715. See id.
716. See id. at 6 (setting forth the notion of "dualist democracy").
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The New Deal is the prototypical constitutional moment. The unprecedented electoral success of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
Democratic Party in the mid-1930s through the early 1940s repudiated
the old understanding of a Constitution that enshrined rights of property
and contract as well as a sharply limited national government. 717 But the
argument also extends to the Civil War Amendments (whose significance,
Ackermaji believes, derives from the Civil War and associated debates,
rather than the manipulations of the Reconstruction Congress),7 18 and to
719
other, less obviously transformative events as well.
The strength and weakness of Ackerman's view are equally conspicuous. The strength is to make constitutional sense of salient facts-particularly the conditions surrounding the New Deal-that otherwise do not.
American government looks radically different today from how it appeared in 1791 or 1868. And although no change in constitutional text
accompanied the change in institutions, much of the institutional innovation occurred in the 1930s and 1940s amidst continuing national political
debate as to its advisability and legitimacy. Among the theory's weaknesses is its failure to account for disaffection with the New Deal: not
rejection of particular institutions, but rather what seems at times a popular repudiation of the idea of omnibus reform, let alone constitutional
amendment on the New Deal model. Thus, politically conservative efforts to repeal, in effect, the New Deal by linked measures with some of
the sweep of those that inaugurated the period seem to disperse, rather
than concentrate, the many separate complaints about particular programs and institutions. Noting this phenomenon, the response by even
those who favor the New Deal synthesis as an integral whole has been to
defend what can be defended piecemeal, to forswear any intent to engage
in the high politics of deliberation, and, in effect, to accuse their opponents of radicalism for doing so. Given the changes underway, and the
identification in the theory of constitutional moments with national deliberation, We The People may be amending the New Deal constitution
720
by anticonstitutional means.
But if, as we have argued, the very form of deliberation is changing
from the seigniorial Madisonianism inspired by civic republicanism to directly deliberative democracy with affinities to pragmatism, the paradox
may begin to dissolve. As the foregoing examples of institutional renova717. See id. at 42-44, 47-50, 105-30.
718. See id. at 42, 44-47, 81-104.
719. See Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal ?, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1519, 1521
(1997) (equivocating as to whether the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s spoke with the
voice of popular sovereignty); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 805 (1995) (constitutional moment validating the use of
congressional-executive agreements in lieu of the treaty power).

720. Ackerman may, of course, save his theory by reference to any of many speculative
possibilities, for example, that there may eventually be national legislation of New Deal
proportions that in effect repeals the New Deal. Time will tell whether such speculation
was prescient or an exercise in compensating fallacy.

19981

DEMOCRATIC EXPERJMENTALISM

473

tion suggest, the drift away from the New Deal has been accompanied by,
indeed accelerated by, the drift towards the prospect of a form of selfdetermination in which the little politics of daily life offer citizens the
opportunity to reflect in partial steps on the means and ends of their
lives, and through this on the larger choices of the republic. With this
drift, the context and meaning of amendment changes as well: In place
of constitutional moments we would have the constitutionalization of everyday life and the democratization, through experimentalist connection
to that life, of the Constitution. In place of mobilization to focus attention on higher things, we would have a form of participation that links, in
its practically inventive reelaboration of rights as well as rules and services, the magisterial and the banal. Thus, amending again the notion of
amendment, as it transforms the idea of deliberation, the present may
mark the beginning of a constitutional revival as faithful today to the
Founders' deepest hopes as their own design.

